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Abstract 
This thesis is part of a small but growing literature on the activism of Christian 
Right ‘pro-family’ organisations from the United States (US) in international 
development politics. This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the texts of five 
globally active ‘pro-family’ organisations from 1997 until the end of 2008. One of 
the major findings is that the ‘pro-family’ political project, previously defined as the 
defence of the family against powerful global elites, is now being articulated against 
values associated with industrialisation and modernity. Through this change, long-
held Christian Right tenets such as hostility to feminism, staunch adherence to free 
markets, and suspicion of the UN, are being reconsidered or redefined to suit the 
needs of the ‘pro-family’ movement. By mapping the ways that ‘pro-family’ 
discourse is changing, this thesis shows the impacts that globalization and 
involvement at the UN is having on this set of conservative Christians, and how 
their agenda is changing as a result of their political activism outside of the US.   
This thesis provides a current, comprehensive and reliable review of the activist 
publications of the US ‘pro-family’ movement, and as such, offers an insight into 
the changing agenda of a movement that is growing both in organisational aptitude 
and in global influence. 
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Introduction 
This thesis considers the changing agenda of a set of conservative organisations 
from the United States (US). These organisations have become major players in the 
global debate over sexual and reproductive rights. These groups identify themselves 
as ‘pro-family’ organisations, and have placed themselves in steadfast opposition to 
progressive organisations and officials who seek to make the enjoyment of these 
rights a universal norm. These ‘pro-family’ organisations are globally active and 
exert their influence at a number of different political levels around the world. They 
form chapters in different countries, lobby delegates at United Nations (UN) 
meetings, organise and attend international conferences, run courses, and 
commission and publish ‘pro-family’ research with the intention of shaping policy 
at the international level. Progressive women’s rights advocates see the ‘pro-family’ 
movement as a major obstacle to achieving broad consensus over health and rights 
at the UN, and thus a serious impediment to making sexual and reproductive health 
services available to people in the global South.1 As described below, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations have been remarkably successful in their global activism. 
 
Despite their effectiveness at the international level ‘pro-family’ organisations have 
struggled to achieve anything approaching their foreign policy successes within the 
US. Important as they are in the US political scene, free rein for sweeping ‘pro-
family’ change was confined to the international development portfolio during the 
Bush Administration. In some cases, the foreign policy changes won by ‘pro-
family’ lobbying under Bush have meant that conditions imposed on US 
development funding have been entirely at odds with US law. Such discrepancies, 
however, have gone largely unnoticed in US domestic politics. As one observer 
notes, in confining the ‘pro-family’ agenda to the outside world, the Bush 
Administration has escaped criticism of policies which ‘would be appalling to most 
moderate Republicans.’2  
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, I use ‘global South,’ ‘third world’ and ‘developing’ countries to describe the political 
and economic bloc of countries facing poverty, high levels of sovereign debt and experiencing 
relatively poor public health. While I acknowledge that ‘developing countries’ is a euphemistic and 
perhaps degrading term that depicts ‘development’ as a linear phenomenon, I retain the term where I 
believe it is appropriate, in order to maintain consistency with my primary texts. Where this is not the 
case, I use the term ‘global South.’ This is abbreviated to ‘South’ a number of times in the thesis. 
2
 Jennifer Butler, quoted in Standaert, M. (2006) Skipping Towards Armageddon: the Politics and the 
Propaganda of the Left Behind Novels and the LaHaye Empire (New York: Soft Skull Press), p. 127-8. 
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Though their real policy victories came with their favoured status under the second 
Bush government, ‘pro-family’ groups had emerged on the international scene well 
before this time. ‘Pro-family’ organisations had begun to network and exert some 
influence internationally during the Clinton Administration, with many gaining 
official UN Non-Government Organisation (NGO) status by the end of the 1990s. 
Thanks to their advocacy, advancement in the status of women’s health and rights 
as a focus of development efforts at the international level had begun to stall. By the 
late 1990s, the entry of ‘pro-family’ organisations into the global NGO process and 
their successful networking with conservative states had made it difficult for 
feminist NGOs to claim that they spoke on behalf of the world’s women. 
Progressive NGO representatives sensed that they were now defending previous 
gains rather than attempting to forge ahead with new goals.3  
 
The ‘pro-family’ movement can be said to have emerged in the 1990s, coalescing in 
response to the Vatican’s urgent appeal for conservative people of faith to come to 
the 1994 UN-sponsored International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in Cairo. A number of US ‘pro-family’ organisations arrived in Cairo to 
oppose women’s rights activists in their efforts to have sexual and reproductive 
rights internationally recognised.4 At that conference, language around population 
control was largely dropped as a justification for the provision of reproductive 
health services in developing countries, in favour of rhetoric advancing women’s 
reproductive health and rights. After Cairo, women’s health and empowerment was 
to be an end, not a means, of development efforts.  
 
More than anything else, for ‘pro-family’ organisations, feminist achievements at 
Cairo heralded an international right to abortion. This threat, more than anything 
else, brought the ‘pro-family’ movement out of the US. The groups gathered in 
greater numbers in Beijing in 1995, to try to prevent the gains made by feminists 
                                                 
3
 Butler, J. S. (2006) Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized (London: Pluto Press), p. 54. 
4
 A number of commentators have noted that the discourse on family planning in development circles 
changed from ‘population control’ to ‘reproductive rights’ around this time. See for example, Eager, P. 
W. (2004) ‘From Population Control to Reproductive Rights: Understanding Normative Change in 
Global Population Policy (1965 – 1994),’ Global Society, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 151, and Grimes, S. (1998) 
‘From population control to “reproductive rights”: Ideological influences on population policy.’ Third 
World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 375. 
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the previous year from being consolidated and extended at that year’s World 
Conference on Women. ‘Pro-family’ organisations found themselves struggling 
against an overwhelming majority of progressive delegations and NGOs as they 
entered the UN arena.5 Alliances between conservative Catholics, Evangelicals and 
other faiths were forged at this time.6  Still largely taking its cue from the Vatican, 
the ‘pro-family’ movement grew in influence and experience during the 1990s. By 
the end of the 1990s, ‘pro-family’ organisations had become a globally active 
movement, enjoying increasing influence at the UN, with an agenda that had 
broadened beyond opposition to abortion to include a whole range of ‘pro-family’ 
concerns. 
 
By the time George W. Bush was inaugurated as President in 2001, the ‘pro-family’ 
movement had an international agenda, experienced advocates, and established 
policy positions on development assistance and human rights. Enjoying the 
patronage of the UN’s most powerful player, the ‘pro-family’ impact of US foreign 
policy positions would be a devastating blow to sexual and reproductive health and 
rights advocates. What follows is a brief list of ‘pro-family’ political achievements 
since 2001. 
 
One of the major policy successes of ‘pro-family’ organisations was the Bush 
Administration’s support and promotion of abstinence-only sex education. 
Abstinence-only education is based on the principle that the only way to prevent 
unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) is to abstain from 
sex until marriage. Teachers of abstinence-only education are not permitted to 
mention birth control or condoms to their students, except to draw attention to the 
failure rates of different forms of contraception. Abstinence-only programmes teach 
students ways to refuse sex and deal with peer pressure, and lay emphasis on the 
importance of monogamy for the maintenance of a healthy society.7 One third of 
                                                 
5
 See Buss and Herman, Buss, D. and D. Herman (2003) Globalizing Family Values: the Christian 
Right in International Politics, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 41. 
6
 Ibid, p. 106-7, Butler, op. cit., p. 154. 
7
 Barnett, J. E. and C. S. Hurst (2003) ‘Abstinence education for rural youth: an evaluation of the 
Life’s Walk program,’ The Journal of School Health, vol. 73, no. 7, p. 264. Academic and peer-
reviewed studies broadly refute the effectiveness of abstinence-only education as a means of 
preventing unintended pregnancies and STIs. A 2006 review of US abstinence-only policies and 
programmes concludes that while there is widespread public support for abstinence as an essential and 
appropriate element of sex education, existing evaluations fail to show that abstinence-only 
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the 2003 President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funds for HIV 
prevention were reserved for ‘abstinence-only-until-marriage’ programmes. 8  In 
addition to this third, the remainder of PEPFAR prevention funds were made 
available to religious organisations, who may exclude information about condoms 
or contraceptives if they choose to do so.  
 
Another ‘pro-family’ success came during the 2002 UN Special Session on 
Children. In this UN meeting, US delegates and their allies attempted to include 
language promoting abstinence-only education in the outcome document. Though 
they did not achieve this, the US delegation did manage to exclude reference to 
comprehensive sex education. One progressive commentator had this to say about 
the event: ‘successfully opposing the mighty US proved to be possible, but it was an 
exhausting and bruising experience for all involved.’9  
 
Perhaps the most important policy achievement for ‘pro-family’ organisations was 
the restoration of the Mexico City Policy, a condition attached to US development 
assistance which stipulates that US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
funding must be withheld from any organisation that performs, refers, discusses or 
provides counselling for abortions, even when abortion-related activities are 
performed with the organisation’s own funds. Despite the relative ease of access to 
abortion within the US, under Bush this ‘pro-family’ stipulation had the effect of 
isolating even moderately ‘pro-choice’ NGOs working in poor countries from their 
main source of revenue. Dubbed the ‘global gag rule’ because of the way it 
prevented discussion around abortion, critics of the policy say it created an 
                                                                                                                                            
programmes have been effective in their stated goals. One study which did show that virginity pledges 
delayed sexual initiation, noted that when the pledger then did have sex, they were less likely to use 
contraception, and thus their postponement did not significantly decrease their chances of becoming 
unintentionally pregnant. See Santelli, J., M. A. Ott and M. Lyon et al (2006) ‘Abstinence and 
abstinence-only education: a review of US policies and programs,’ The Journal of Adolescent Health, 
vol. 38, no, 1, pp. 72-81, and Kirby, D. (2002) ‘Do Abstinence-Only Programs Delay the Initiation of 
Sex Among Young People and Reduce Teen Pregnancy?’ National Campaign to Reduce Teen 
Pregnancy, Washington DC, p. 4, available at 
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/pubs/abstinence_only.pdf [last accessed 15/07/09]. 
8
 For more on this stipulation, see Alrich, C. (2007) ‘Abstinence Education Spending Requirement 
Hinders International Response to HIV/AIDS,’ Guttmacher Policy Review, vol. 10, no. 2.  
9
 Girard, F. (2002) ‘UN Special Session on Children: Bush Administration Continues its Attacks on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health,’ Reproductive Health Matters, vol. 10, no. 20, pp. 141-143. 
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atmosphere of ‘fear and intimidation’ throughout USAID and its partner 
organisations around the world.10 
 
‘Pro-family’ influence was also a key factor in Bush’s decision to freeze the annual 
contribution of the US to the UN Fund for Population Assistance (UNFPA) in 2003. 
The funds were withheld on the basis of a US ‘pro-family’ think tank report which 
asserted that UNFPA was complicit in alleged coerced abortions in China. A US 
State Department investigation of the allegations found no evidence of UNFPA 
involvement in the provision of abortions or sterilisations, and recommended that 
the funds (already approved by Congress) be released to UNFPA immediately. 
Despite the official repudiation of the charges against UNFPA, the Bush 
Administration maintained the suspension of funds and continued to hold back 
funding for UNFPA.11 
 
‘Pro-family’ organisations also managed to incorporate an anti-prostitution pledge 
as a condition of USAID funding for HIV prevention. The ‘pro-family’ view of sex 
work – as a form of slavery that prostitutes seek to escape – is incompatible with 
prevention programmes which call for non-judgmental approaches towards people 
who sell sex. 12  In 2003, the US government announced a condition on US 
development assistance which stated that organisations receiving USAID funding to 
fight HIV/AIDS (outside the US) must sign a pledge confirming that they condemn 
prostitution and sex trafficking. This pledge, a condition of the Global AIDS Bill, 
was the product of intensive ‘pro-family’ lobbying. ‘Pro-family’ organisations’ 
emphasis on sexual slavery as the most egregious form of human trafficking was a 
major aspect of their ability to present prostitution and trafficking as part of the 
                                                 
10
 Kaplan, E. (2004) With God on their Side: How Christian Fundamentalists Trampled Science, Policy 
and Democracy in Bush’s White House (New York: The New Press), p. 229. 
11
 Total funds withheld amounted to over $240 million by the end of Bush’s presidency. See UNFPA’s 
‘Global Population Policy Update’ no. 86, 26 January 2009, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/parliamentarians/news/newsletters/issue86.html [last accessed 15/07/09]. 
12
 Due to their high frequency of sexual contacts, sex workers require particular attention in the 
prevention of HIV, both for their own sexual health and in order to prevent or control epidemics. In 
populations where the virus is primarily spread through heterosexual intercourse, as it is in most of the 
countries where HIV is a serious problem, work with prostitutes is a significant aspect of prevention. 
Most successful HIV prevention programmes among marginalised groups have worked closely with 
prostitutes to build credibility and trust. See, for example, Koetsawang, S. (1999) ‘A pragmatic 
intervention to promote condom use by female sex workers in Thailand,’ Bulletin of the World Health 
Organisation, vol. 77, no. 11, pp. 888-895, and ‘Making Prevention Work: Global Lessons Learned 
from the AIDS Control and Prevention (AIDSCAP) Project 1991-1997’ available through: 
http://fhi.org/en/HIVAIDS/pub/Archive/index.htm [last accessed 11/08/09]. 
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same problem. As seen in other ‘pro-family’ achievements, many experienced 
organisations at the coalface of HIV prevention were cut off from their funds 
because they refused to conform to this rule.13 A key ‘pro-family’ leader cited this 
effort to ‘follow the money’ – cutting off non-compliant progressive organisations – 
as one of the most important ‘pro-family’ victories that she had witnessed under the 
Bush administration.14 
 
Finally, ‘pro-family’ organisations have been very active in opposing liberal 
language in the outcome documents of UN meetings and conferences. They work 
tirelessly to prevent the inclusion of terms in international agreements that could be 
construed to mean a right to services ‘pro-family’ groups believe should be 
restricted, or behaviours they deem immoral. From 2001 to the end of the Bush 
Administration, ‘pro-family’ organisations and leaders accompanied US officials, 
sometimes as members of the US delegation, advising them to oppose or attach 
reservations to particular terms or phrases in outcome documents. Terms such as 
‘reproductive health services,’ ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘sexual and reproductive 
rights’ became the subject of bitter disputes at the UN, and less precise terms were 
adopted to preserve consensus. Efforts to improve the clarity of language in 
international agreements were seen as dangerous by progressive advocates: opening 
up debate on vague language risked the deletion of entire phrases or paragraphs 
from the agreement.15  These kinds of impasses were common during the Bush 
Administration, and outcome documents and compliance committees remained 
unclear as to the duties of the parties. 
 
                                                 
13
 This was particularly true of unionised sex workers, who overwhelmingly refused to sign the 
document and could no longer obtain US HIV prevention funds. 
14
 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 225. 
15
 An example of this is the effort by feminists to change the term ‘access to reproductive health’ to 
‘access to reproductive health services’ in order to clarify which duties governments are obliged to 
perform in order to improve women’s health. Under Bush, the US insisted on the use of the term 
‘reproductive health care’ rather than ‘reproductive health services’ in documents. It is understood by 
both sides of the debated that ‘services’ is representative of a broader set of obligations than ‘care,’ 
including the right to information, contraception and abortion where it is legal. Ylva Bergman suggests 
that ‘Services emphasize having control over one’s sexuality and fertility and not just being cared for 
when sick or bleeding to death.’ In one case, the outcome document asserts a ‘right of access to 
reproductive health,’ using neither care nor services. See Bergman, Y. (ed.) (2004) Breaking Through: 
A guide to sexual and reproductive health and rights,’ The Swedish Association for Sexuality 
Education, Stockholm, available at http://www.rfsu.se/publications__rfsu.asp [last accessed 15/07/09]. 
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All of these ‘pro-family’ conditions were placed on development funds intended to 
improve the health and well-being of the world’s poorest communities. US-funded 
organisations working in countries with the highest rates of HIV transmission, with 
the people least able to afford treatment to prevent the onset of AIDS, were the 
same organisations that were threatened with removal of their funding if they 
openly promoted the use of condoms. Maternal health NGOs working in sub-
Saharan Africa – where in 1999, women had a one in sixteen chance of dying as a 
result of pregnancy16 – had to use teaching curricula that promote abstinence over 
contraceptives and stress the failure rates of condoms in order to continue to receive 
USAID funding. Organisations receiving USAID funding could not participate in 
their national abortion debates, even though abortion and freedom of speech are 
constitutionally protected rights in the US. ‘Pro-family’ victories in the 
development arena have been swift and substantial. 
 
Whether or not they will ever be able to bring about these same policy changes 
within the US, ‘pro-family’ organisations are a movement of global significance. 
Either through the serendipitous election of a president sympathetic to their views, 
or through their achievement of a critical mass of organised enthusiasts (or a 
combination of both), globally active ‘pro-family’ groups represent a serious 
challenge to women’s health and rights advocates. These ‘pro-family’ successes 
have been striking, not only because of the relative inexperience of the groups 
compared to their progressive opponents, but also because of their historical 
suspicion of international institutions. Given their former distaste for ‘handouts,’ 
‘big government’ and international organisations, the speed and success of their 
entry into development politics is extraordinary.  
 
With these accomplishments in mind, the broad impact of this movement calls for a 
thorough analysis of the motivations of US ‘pro-family’ groups at the global level. 
This is an undertaking that this thesis attempts to carry out. In doing so, I seek to do 
three related things: examine how the groups understand and frame the political 
world outside the US, show how this informs their changing agenda, and document 
                                                 
16
 See Garner, M. (1999) ‘Death in the midst of life,’ BBC News Online, Tuesday 29 June 1999, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/06/99/world_population/379943.stm [last accessed 
15/07/09]. 
 12 
if and how these understandings are changing over time. In other words, the aim of 
this thesis is to map the ideological framework of globally active ‘pro-family’ 
organisations, and show how this framework is changing. Before I do this, however, 
I discuss what I mean by the term ‘pro-family.’ 
 
What is the ‘pro-family’ movement? 
The ‘pro-family’ movement makes up only one part of the global issue-based 
activism pursued by US Christian Right organisations. Experts on the Christian 
Right highlight a growth in the movement’s political interests outside the US since 
the end of the Cold War. Observers have focused on different subsets of the 
Christian Right in their attempts to understand the globalization of the movement. 
Correspondingly, experts identify broadly different motivations behind the activism 
of Christian Right groups as they extend their agenda, to use William Martin’s 
words, ‘beyond the water’s edge.’17  
 
For this reason, in this thesis, I study ‘pro-family’ motivations separately from the 
other international concerns of the US Christian Right. Though the organisations 
may be ‘in touch’ with each other and share broadly similar views and sources of 
financial support, they are different people, promoting different causes and have 
increasingly divergent views of the world outside the US. Furthermore, 
distinguishing the diverse rallying cries of Christian Right advocacy groups may 
improve our understanding of what kind of impact ‘pro-family’ activism has on the 
Christian Right as a whole.18  
 
In order to separate the ‘pro-family’ movement from other aspects of international 
Christian Right activism, I briefly discuss the other global issues to which US 
Christian Right organisations have applied themselves. International Christian Right 
activity and advocacy can be roughly divided into five categories: isolationism, 
support for Israel from ‘Christian Zionist’ lobby groups, worldwide evangelism and 
missionary commitments, opposition to religious persecution, and ‘pro-family’ 
                                                 
17
 Martin, W. (1999) ‘The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy,’ Foreign Policy, no. 114, p. 
67. 
18
 This might be done by using network or power structure analysis techniques, or comparative 
analysis, but is not attempted in this thesis.  
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advocacy (the focus of this thesis). I briefly discuss each of these, highlighting 
tensions between the different issue areas. 
 
Isolationism 
This is the traditional approach Christian conservatives in the US have taken with 
regards to globalization, and it remains an enduring sentiment which threads 
through many of the texts examined in this thesis. Christian Right isolationism 
manifests itself as a ‘passional myth’19 which sees the US as having a sacred history 
and Christian way of life, which requires protection from corrupting influences that 
come from outside. This extends to the protection of US industry, through what 
Christian Right observer Didi Herman refers to as the ‘stoking [of] nativist and 
protectionist fires.’20 Isolationism is also evident in the mistrust of external entities, 
especially communist countries and international institutions.  
 
In her historical analysis of right-wing organisations in the US, Roads to Dominion, 
sociologist Sara Diamond suggests that opposition to government involvement 
beyond the US has been a part of the US conservative framework since the 1930s, 
and this sentiment has persisted to the present – though less vocally – despite the 
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour and other international entanglements.21 After 
the Second World War, Diamond writes that isolationist sentiment transformed into 
‘militant anticommunism,’ a sentiment which she suggests has profoundly 
influenced the right-wing understanding of the world.22  She recalls that Patrick 
Buchanan ran his 1992 Republican Primary race with ‘America First’ as his 
catchphrase, evoking memories of the Right’s ‘isolationist roots.’23 True to this core 
isolationist philosophy, some Christian Right organisations still have removing the 
                                                 
19
 This term is borrowed from Daniela Rossini, from a paragraph which describes this myth as 
‘nostalgia for the “golden age” of isolation, a time when every American pursued his own personal 
interests without worrying about foreign affairs and the duties and responsibilities they implied.’ 
Rossini, D. (1995) ‘Isolationism and Internationalism in Perspective: Myths and Reality in American 
Foreign Policy,’ in Rossini, D. (ed.) Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in 
American Foreign Policy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), p. 14. 
20
 Herman, D. (2001) ‘Globalism’s Siren Song: the United Nations and International Law in Christian 
Right Thought and Prophecy,’ the Sociological Review, vol. 49, no.1, p. 61. 
21
 Diamond, S. (1995) Roads to Dominion: Right wing Movements and Political Power in the United 
States (New York: The Guilford Press), pp. 23-4. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, p. 23. 
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US from the UN as their primary goal.24 Others act as UN ‘watchdogs,’ for example 
Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, whose mission is the protection of US sovereignty 
from the UN and other international institutions.25  
 
As an explanation for the persistence of isolationism in contemporary Christian 
Right discourse, some authors suggest nostalgia for a bygone ‘golden age’ in which 
the US was relatively free from the complications of international affairs.26 Scholar 
and progressive activist Jennifer Butler suggests that the persistent conservative 
suspicion of the UN is partly a hangover from the Cold War; an enduring belief that 
the UN remains a stalking horse for communism. 27  Despite the persistence of 
isolationism in some quarters, recent literature on the Christian Right acknowledges 
a movement away from isolationism as a guiding principle. 
 
Support for Israel 
Christian Right foreign policy concerning Israel is inextricable from beliefs about 
Armageddon and the Second Coming of Jesus. Experts on this topic stress the 
importance of pre-millennialism, the belief that the Second Coming of Christ is 
imminent, in understanding Christian Right support for Israel. 28  For his part, 
Marsden writes that Christian Zionists (as he calls them) see events concerning 
Israel ‘through an eschatological prism, indicating either God’s displeasure or the 
proximity of the end of the age.’29 Jerry Falwell famously summed up the Christian 
Right position on Israel: ‘Whoever stands against Israel, stands against God.’30 
Indeed, this ‘Biblical focus’ on Israel is widely held, according to former 
Republican Party strategist Kevin Phillips, who notes that 63 percent of white 
evangelical Protestants see the existence of the state of Israel as a requirement of 
                                                 
24
 One such campaign is called ‘Get US out of the UN.’ See www.getusout.net for more details [last 
accessed 17/12/2008]. 
25
 See http://www.eagleforum.org/ [last accessed 17/12/2008]. 
26
 See Diamond (1995), Martin, op .cit., p. 78. 
27
 Butler, J. (2002) A New Sheriff in Town: The Christian Right Nears Major Victory at the United 
Nations, Public Eye, available at http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v16n2/PE_Butler2.html 
[29/12/08]. 
28
 See for example, Herman op .cit., p. 66, and Croft, S. (2007), ‘Thy Will be Done: The New Foreign 
Policy of America’s Christian Right,’ International Politics, no. 44, p. 698.  
29
 Marsden, L. (2008) For God’s Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy (London and New 
York: Zed Books), p. 184. 
30
 Falwell, quoted in Brouwer et al, op. cit. p. 18. This quote also appears in Martin op cit, p. 72. 
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prophecy to be fulfilled before Jesus will return.31 These evangelicals make up a 
sizable proportion of US citizens who support Israel. In his 2004 book, theologian 
Tim Weber notes that over a third of the Americans who support Israel say that they 
do so ‘because they believe the Bible teaches that the Jews must possess their own 
country in the Holy Land before Jesus can return.’32 To pursue this objective, there 
are a number of conservative Protestant NGOs in the US raising money with the 
purpose of using it to support Jewish migration to Israel.33 
 
Nevertheless, the issue of Israel is problematic for the Christian Right in a number 
of ways. Many Jews themselves remain mistrustful of their allies’ advocacy for 
Israel; in second coming scenarios of the Christian Right, Jews either convert to 
Christianity or they die a horrible death.34 Similarly, Marsden notes that Christian 
Zionists uniformly oppose Islamic regimes, 35  unlike many in the ‘pro-family’ 
movement and the US government who are more inclined to work alongside 
Islamic governments and organisations to pursue conservative political goals. 
Furthermore, in his consideration of the rise of global Christianity, historian Phillip 
Jenkins warns that in the future, the issue of Israel may serve to isolate Northern 
Christians ‘not just from Muslims, but from the rising churches of the South,’ many 
of which are sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians.36 Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that it may hinder the pursuit of other goals at the international level, support 
for Israel remains an important aspect of Christian Right foreign policy.  
 
Worldwide evangelism 
As William Martin notes, by their identification with the very term ‘evangelical,’ 
US protestant evangelicals declare their desire to spread Christianity ‘unto all the 
                                                 
31
 Phillips, K. (2006) American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and 
Borrowed Money in the 21st Century, (London: Penguin Books), p. 364. 
32
 Weber, T. (2004) On the Road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals Became Israel’s Best Friends, 
(Michigan: Baker Academic), p. 11.  
33
 See Croft, S. (2007), ‘Thy Will be Done: The New Foreign Policy of America’s Christian Right,’ 
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world.’37 This spread is taking place in no small measure. Marsden observes that the 
number of Christians in Africa has risen to nearly half of the continent’s population; 
from 144 million in 1970 to 411 million in 2005.38 Over a third of these new 
African Christians belong to faith communities with value sets which are consistent 
with the conservative positions espoused by the US Christian Right.39 Religious 
scholar Timothy Shah demurs however, warning that these numbers should not be 
understood as a reflection of people in the South ‘receiving’ their religion from the 
US: the phenomenon, he argues, is largely indigenously led.40 Nor, he suggests 
should parallels between the moral views of US conservatives and Southern 
Christians be understood as important, as views on homosexuality and abortion tend 
not to constitute a central aspect of political life as they do in the US.  
 
Nevertheless, widespread international evangelism is on the Christian Right agenda. 
In their book Exporting the American Gospel, Brouwer, Gifford and Rose document 
the rise of US missionary activity in the global South and the ‘Asian Tigers.’41 
These areas are comparable to the ‘10/40 window,’ a missionary target observed by 
Sara Diamond, denoting the northern lines of latitude between which the vast 
majority of the world’s non-Christians live.42 The targeting of Islamic people for 
conversion by evangelical Christians is an issue for Christian Right organisations 
who seek conservative Islamic support for ‘pro-family’ policies.43 Brouwer et al 
emphasise the complementary and connected nature of US political goals and the 
spread of conservative Christianity in the South.  
 
It is not only Islamic people who are concerned about the evangelical Christian 
Right and their drive to ‘win the world for Christ.’ As Brouwer and his colleagues 
suggest, the successful efforts of evangelicals in the global South (and Africa in 
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particular) ‘to convert Catholics to “real” Christianity’ are a major problem for 
Catholic allies of the Christian Right.44 Proselytising evangelicals make much of the 
economic underdevelopment in developing countries, say the authors, attributing 
this to centuries of corruption, syncretism and weak religious leadership by the 
Catholic Church.45  
 
Brouwer et al and Marsden see evangelism in poor countries as a form of ‘soft 
power,’ in which the vision of US prosperity attracts adherents in developing 
countries.46 If this is so, Christian Right missionary activism presents a view of 
progress that is compatible with earlier Christian Right views of development. 
Christian Right leaders had previously rejected involvement in development and 
foreign aid, because, they reasoned, poor countries were to blame for their own 
problems. These were ascribed to a lack of certain crucial values that encourage the 
accumulation of wealth, or in blunter terms, because of developing countries’ 
‘addiction to paganism [and] immorality.’47 In the promotion of self-sacrifice, hard 
work and submission to God as the means of achieving health and wealth in the 
global South, Christian Right proselytising offers a conservative alternative to 
rights-based models of development. As will be shown in later chapters, these 
values (particularly self-sacrifice) still inform the ‘pro-family’ understanding of 
how development ought to be pursued, in terms of what ‘pro-family’ groups see as 
their beneficial impact on individuals and communities.  
 
Freedom from Religious persecution 
As Marsden notes, persecution is ‘a recurring theme throughout Christian history.’48 
Seen in the light of the increasing evangelical activity described above, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that globally active Christian Right groups have organised to combat 
the persecution of Christians beyond the US. A number of groups such as ‘Stand 
Today,’ ‘International Christian Concern,’ ‘Bible League,’ ‘Christian Freedom 
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International’ and ‘Voice of the Martyrs’ are a part of the Christian Right effort to 
prevent Christian persecution around the world.49 
 
Protecting Christians from execution in Sudan in the 1990s was a major rallying 
point for these Christian Right groups, with representatives claiming that over a 
million Christians had been killed in that country’s turmoil, some reportedly by 
crucifixion.50 Opposition to persecution grew to be a principal aspect of evangelical 
foreign policy by 1996, when the National Association of Evangelicals appealed to 
the Clinton Administration to curtail development funds to any governments who 
were deemed to be persecuting Christians.51 Christian Right leaders organised a 
‘day of the persecuted Church,’ which may have involved 100,000 congregations in 
the US by the second year it was held.52 Attention to this cause has also stimulated a 
flurry of interest in missionary activity in the late 1990s; by 2001, political scientist 
Stuart Croft reports, overseas missions organised by US Protestant organisations 
had increased by at least a factor of eight from their number in 1996.53 That areas 
deemed by the Christian Right to be rife with religious persecution are the same 
countries that are targeted for proselytising has not gone unnoticed by critics of the 
Christian Right. 54  As Marsden observes, the Bush Administration’s increased 
attention to this issue has enabled evangelistic Christian Right organisations 
opportunities to proselytise in areas to which they previously had no access.55  
 
Though much of the focus has been on persecution of Christians under Islamic 
regimes, China has also been a target of Christian Right anti-persecution groups. A 
number of Christian Right groups lobbied the Clinton administration in an attempt 
to block China’s ‘most favoured nation’ trading status in 1997.56 For the most part, 
however, efforts against Christian persecution have portrayed Islamic governments 
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and groups as the chief culprits of this form of violence. According to Croft, some 
Christian Right groups even attempted to frame the events of September the 11th, 
2001 as part of an ongoing ‘jihad’ against ‘Americans, Christians and Jews.’57 This 
effort was broadly unsuccessful, however, as the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’ allied 
the Bush Administration with the very governments these Christian Right 
organisations had been accusing of persecution: Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Uzbekistan and Pakistan.58 
 
The Bush Administration was not alone in its selective understanding of its duty to 
prevent religious persecution: the ‘pro-family’ segment of the Christian Right also 
made an effort to achieve some distance from this issue. Law professors Doris Buss 
and Didi Herman’s interviews with prominent ‘pro-family’ leaders reveal that to a 
large degree, ‘pro-family’ leaders accept the political expediency of working with 
the very governments their anti-persecution Christian Right compatriots despise. 
Austin Ruse, leader of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-Fam), 
states frankly: ‘we do not work on religious freedom, we work on life and family.’59 
In the same interview, Ruse goes on to say that he and other ‘pro-family’ leaders 
‘work very well with [Sudanese and Libyan UN delegations], at the same time 
having revulsion for the things that they are doing to Christians in their own 
countries.’60 Rather than characterise this as hypocritical, Buss and Herman prefer 
to see Ruse’s nonchalance in this area as a blend of political compromise with a 
willing ‘suspension of disbelief.’61 While it is unclear how much belief Ruse is 
choosing to suspend, so to speak, the extreme and open pragmatism with which he 
operates is an indication of how disparate the Christian Right movement is. 
Moreover, it shows the degree to which Ruse and his ‘pro-family’ associates are 
unwilling to be sidetracked from their cause, recognising the need for Islamic allies. 
 
The ‘pro-family’ movement  
As has been shown here, there are several reasons to consider the ‘pro-family’ 
movement separately from other Christian Right issue areas. As noted, ‘pro-family’ 
                                                 
57
 Croft, op. cit., p. 697. 
58
 See ibid, p. 697, and Marsden, op. cit., pp. 123-4. 
59
 Austin Ruse, quoted in Buss and Herman, op. cit., p. 95. 
60
 Ibid, p. 96. 
61
 Ibid, p. 96. 
 20 
organisations collaborate with those same governments that their Christian Right 
allies accuse of persecuting Christians and threatening Israel. Politically, ‘pro-
family’ groups are more autonomous from Christian denominational divisions and 
the Republican Party than the other internationally active Christian Right 
organisations discussed above. Because of this, ‘pro-family’ groups are freer to ally 
with Catholic, Mormon and Islamic organisations – what others in the Christian 
Right might consider to be ‘a pact with Satan’ – in order to pursue shared goals.  
 
More than the other parts of the Christian Right, the ‘pro-family’ movement is a 
part of what Keck and Sikkink classify as a ‘transnational advocacy network.’62 By 
attempting to work with a variety of international conservative organisations and 
seeking to create a permanent bloc of ‘pro-family’ government delegates at the UN, 
the ‘pro-family’ movement pulls itself further away from its domestic base and 
other international causes of the Christian Right.  
 
In terms of their ideological commitments, ‘pro-family’ groups have a deeper 
commitment – at least rhetorically – to reducing poverty and improving people’s 
well-being (in measurable ways) than the other internationally active sectors of the 
Christian Right discussed here. This is likely to be related to the influence of 
conservative Catholic organisations on the ‘pro-family’ movement, with their 
connection to a church which has a history of building hospitals, organising famine 
relief and working to relieve poverty in developing countries. 
 
At the policy level, at least, unlike the other issues of importance to the Christian 
Right, the ‘pro-family’ movement’s focus is on human bodies as much as it is on 
human souls. The focus on physical rather than spiritual well-being has led to the 
emergence of ‘pro-family’ think tanks, which research and produce a ‘pro-family’ 
form of social science. This development can be read as a broader attempt to break 
the secular monopoly on health and human rights language, and social science in 
general. The emergence of what Buss and Herman call Christian Right ‘expert 
discourse’63 has been politically useful, providing US policy makers sympathetic to 
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‘pro-family’ views with the justifications required to advance ‘pro-family’ policies, 
as has already been shown in this chapter. 
 
Most obviously, perhaps, ‘pro-family’ organisations hold a view of the UN that 
distinguishes them from the rest of the Christian Right. In fact, it seems to be the 
case that ‘pro-family’ groups’ reputations rely to some degree on their acquisition 
of NGO status at the UN.64 Rather than hold the UN in disdain, as is common in the 
broader US conservative framework, 65  ‘pro-family’ organisations are deeply 
involved in the UN system, and use it as a platform to press for conservative social 
policies. This effort betrays a belief in the UN which is absent from other Christian 
Right organisations, and also a conviction that their social agenda is widely 
supported by delegates in the majority of nations.  
 
Moreover, the language with which ‘pro-family’ organisations advocate for their 
policies is far more secularised than that of other international Christian Right 
groups. As Swinski finds in her doctoral dissertation on conservative movements at 
the UN, ‘pro-family’ groups have adjusted the way they represent their views, from 
tradition to rights, and now use science and reason rather than religion and morality, 
to advance their arguments.66 Explicit discussion of religion is carefully managed, 
and in many cases, wholly avoided. 67  ‘Pro-family’ organisations appear to be 
satisfied that their policies require no explicit appeal to religious principles. 
Lastly, these groups are globalizing in a way that is different from the other groups. 
‘Pro-family’ organisations are attempting to broadcast their conservative agenda as 
a universal blueprint for good development, rather than a movement that serves the 
interests of Christians, or citizens of the United States.  
 
The globalization of ‘pro-family’ organisations should not be understood in 
isolation from other Christian Right activities, in that success or failure in one area 
may influence – and be influenced by – other areas of concern to the movement. 
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Christian Right organisations are informed by similar media and do advocate for 
similar foreign policies overall, but their ability to present a united front at the 
international level has been limited.  
 
The agenda of ‘pro-family’ organisations diverges from that of other Christian 
Right groups. Consequently, while I acknowledge that the Christian Right political 
power base in the US is, in theory, the same for all internationally active Christian 
Right organisations, I propose that inconsistencies and in-fighting may not require 
resolution. This is because, in practice, ‘pro-family’ groups’ devotion to their 
particular international concerns has been paramount. ‘Pro-family’ international 
activities are not widely broadcast to the US public and tend to be funded in 
different ways from domestic causes: in one case in particular, a prominent ‘pro-
family’ organisation’s international activity relies on a single donor.68 One ‘pro-
family’ activist disclosed that he had received ‘hate mail’ from other international 
Christian Right organisations. 69  Considering the activism of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations separately from other globally active Christian Right organisations 
also helps to define the particular characteristics of the ‘pro-family’ movement. 
 
Terminology  
Although I consider a very similar set of Christian Right groups that Buss and 
Herman term the  ‘CR UN’ – Christian Right groups active at the UN – I refer to 
the groups under scrutiny here as ‘pro-family’ organisations, or the ‘pro-family’ 
movement.70 The reason for this is that I see the international efforts of these groups 
as extending well beyond their activity at the UN, in that they are attempting to 
create a conservative global movement which is intended to affect political debates 
at many levels.  
 
Croft uses the term ‘conservative Protestants’ in his discussion of Christian Right 
foreign policy, but because Catholic and Mormon organisations are a part of the 
international ‘pro-family’ movement, I require a more inclusive term. In addition, 
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these groups are acting in a number of ways that are not conservative. Their attempt 
to dramatically change the status quo (though they claim they want to change it 
‘back’ to a presumed better past) is perhaps the most obvious example of this, but 
their increasingly novel international activity, such as their new alliances with old 
nemeses, is also an important reason to avoid the label ‘conservative.’ 
 
Another option would be to simply call these groups the Christian Right, as Butler 
does. Yet this nomenclature does not capture the specific focus of ‘pro-family’ 
groups, which is the curtailment of sexual and reproductive rights, the central 
concern of this thesis. Marsden also uses the term Christian Right, and includes 
conservative Catholics and Mormons as Butler and Buss and Herman do. The main 
qualifying characteristic for belonging to the Christian Right in Marsden’s work is 
‘the common denominator’ of ‘social and fiscal conservatism.’ 71  While this 
definition works in the broader purview of Christian Right foreign policy, it fails to 
capture the absolute priority which ‘pro-family’ groups assign to social policy: 
fiscal conservatism comes a distant second to social conservatism. Moreover, these 
groups are involved in deciding how development monies ought to be distributed, 
rather than whether they ought to be.  
 
International ‘pro-family’ organisations can be considered a subset of the Christian 
Right, and include conservative Catholic and Mormon organisations. Including 
Catholics in the ‘pro-family’ movement is conventional. As Buss and Herman note, 
despite some awkwardness between conservative Protestants and Catholics within 
the US, the organisations work well together in terms of their international 
activity,72 and have done so for some time. Croft does not include Catholics in his 
analysis, but that may again be a result of his focus on foreign policy, in which 
positions of Protestants and Catholics clearly clash, for example, on the issue of 
Iraq.  
 
Finally, in her discussion of how to label US conservatives in Roads to Dominion, 
Diamond acknowledges William Hixson’s caution that ‘it is a good rule not to grant 
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final authority over the use of words to those whose interests are served by them.’73 
Christian Right NGOs certainly believe the term ‘pro-family’ serves them. Butler 
notes the popularity of the term, with these groups choosing most often to identify 
their activities as ‘pro-family,’ which she suggests is ‘perhaps is the most unifying 
aspect of Christian Right activism, and the one that resonates in other parts of the 
world, in particular the Muslim world.’ 74 By applying this name to themselves, 
‘pro-family’ organisations imply that their opponents are ‘anti-family.’ Yet the 
names that social movements give themselves are never politically neutral, nor are 
they intended to be. In using the term ‘pro-family’ as representative of the groups I 
seek to understand, I accept their sincerity in the belief that they are working in the 
best interests of the family, as they define it. I retain the word in quotations 
throughout this thesis because I do not accept that the work these groups do is 
necessarily in the best interests of families, nor do I accept that their definition of 
the term ‘family’ is a universally true or useful one. However, since this thesis is an 
attempt to understand the changing ideological framework of this movement, I have 
chosen terminology that allows for a close reading of the way these groups consider 
themselves, yet preserves a degree of analytical distance. 
 
I use the terms ‘movement’ and ‘social movement’ to describe the activism of ‘pro-
family’ organisations because ‘pro-family’ organisations are ‘reach[ing] beyond the 
customary resources of the social order to launch their own crusade against the evils 
of society,’75 to use John Wilson’s definition. Although ‘pro-family’ groups do not 
fit any one category of David Aberle’s 1966 analysis of social movement types (or 
Wilson’s 1973 development on Aberle’s classifications), there are elements of all 
four types present in ‘pro-family’ activism. 76  The ‘pro-family’ movement is 
‘transformative’ (or ‘revolutionary’), in that the organisations anticipate enormous 
change, seeking to overhaul modern social structures and remake them in the image 
of the ‘natural family.’ It is ‘reformative’ in its issue-based activism and its efforts 
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to ‘protect’ women and families in the global South. It is ‘redemptive’ in that the 
personal evangelicalism or religious conversion of individuals has the potential to 
bring about sweeping social change in the ‘pro-family’ mindset. Lastly, the 
movement is ‘alternative’ in its countercultural emphasis on a particular lifestyle.  
 
Buss and Herman do not classify Christian Right groups active at the UN as a 
global or transnational ‘social movement’ (preferring to see them as a subset of the 
Christian Right) but they believe they have ‘the makings’ of one. I suggest that the 
‘pro-family’ movement’s sustained global efforts fit Sidney Tarrow’s definition of a 
social movement, as ‘collective challenges (to elites, authorities, other groups or 
cultural codes) by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained 
interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.’77 The ‘pro-family’ movement 
can thus be thought of as a continuous challenge to a wide array of opponents or 
ideas which its members perceive as threatening the ‘natural family,’ a concept I 
discuss in detail in the following chapter.  
 
Structure 
In this thesis, I search for the different ways that the global environment and its 
actors are discussed in ‘pro-family’ discourse. I organise texts from the websites of 
a number of organisations which are representative of the ‘pro-family’ movement 
into four areas which I see as important signposts in the ‘pro-family’ view of the 
world outside the US. These are globalization, the UN, feminism, and fertility. All 
four areas of focus also represent justifications that ‘pro-family’ organisations 
provide for their activities beyond the US. 
 
Understanding the ‘pro-family’ view of globalization is the focus of chapter three, 
and sets the context for the chapters that follow. The UN demands special attention 
because it has been instrumental both to the way the organisations have 
characterised the political world outside the US, and to the ‘pro-family’ entry into 
development politics. ‘Pro-family’ views of the UN are the focus of chapter four. 
Opposing feminism stands out as one of the main justifications for ‘pro-family’ 
activity at the global level, and has been a key aspect of the international ‘pro-
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family’ agenda since Cairo. The way feminism is portrayed in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse is described and analysed in chapter five. Fertility, discussed in chapter 
six, persists as a key interest of ‘pro-family’ organisations as they make sense of the 
international politics around women’s health and rights. My research attempts to 
show how some of these depictions are shifting over time, and where appropriate, 
explanations as to why this may be occurring. These shifts often involve costs or 
complications and these are discussed at the end of each chapter. 
 
The world outside the US has been on the ‘pro-family’ radar for 15 years; my 
research shows the way global entities and ideas have been framed by ‘pro-family’ 
organisations and how this is changing over time. I consider ‘pro-family’ discourse 
from 1997 and extend my analysis to the end of 2008 to consider the changing 
ideological framework of the ‘pro-family’ movement. Before I proceed to these 
research chapters, however, I evaluate the contributions of literature on the 
ideologies of international ‘pro-family’ groups, and discuss the methodology I use 
to analyse ‘pro-family’ texts.  
 
 27 
Chapter One: Understanding the emergence of the international ‘pro-family’ 
movement 
 
‘Ideas have consequences.’1 
Allan Carlson, the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society, 2000 
 
This chapter critically reviews the literature offered to explain the emergence and 
continued activism of ‘pro-family’ groups beyond the US. The first part of this 
chapter discusses three assumptions I make which direct my examination of ‘pro-
family’ ideology. The remainder of this chapter describes and evaluates the 
different ways that observers of the international Christian Right have approached 
this issue.  
 
Observers of the Christian Right draw on a number of different ideas about the 
nature of the ‘pro-family’ movement (and globalization itself) to understand the 
global emergence of ‘pro-family’ groups. In this chapter, the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of their arguments are analysed in terms of their coherence, 
veracity and usefulness. This chapter also discusses the other aspects of ‘pro-
family’ international expansion that other authors in the field deem vital to 
understanding the movement. 
 
Part I: Assumptions 
The first assumption I make is that the ‘natural family’ is the centrepiece of ‘pro-
family’ activism. While the set of moral ideas encapsulated by this term have not 
always been labelled in this way in Christian Right discourse, the ‘natural family’ 
refers to a set of norms and beliefs about sexual and reproductive behaviour about 
which ‘pro-family’ organisations have agreed since well before their international 
emergence.  
 
The second assumption is to do with the ways that understandings of globalization 
affect the behaviour of international organisations. By this I mean that the way that 
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the changing world is discussed within ‘pro-family’ discourse is intimately 
connected to how the organisations decide what to do, as they pursue their ‘natural 
family’ politics at the global level.  
 
The last assumption, which is connected to the previous one, is that participating in 
global debates changes actors. Successful interaction between actors in the 
international ‘pro-family’ network calls for a relaxation of certain ideological tenets 
held by organisations of the domestic Christian Right. Each of these three 
assumptions is discussed and justified below. 
 
The ‘natural family’  
Not all family arrangements are morally equal in the ‘pro-family’ vision. The 
‘natural family,’ consisting of a married man and woman and their biological 
offspring, is a central platform for ‘pro-family’ advocacy. ‘Pro-family’ scholars 
agree that for the purposes of ‘sharing love and joy, propagating children, providing 
their moral education, building a vital home economy, offering security and binding 
the generations,’ the ‘natural family’ is the ideal social unit.2  
 
In addition to its ability to produce positive social outcomes, ‘pro-family’ groups 
advocate that the ‘natural family’ is the fundamental social unit described in Article 
16 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Among other things, the declaration 
states that ‘men and women of full age, without limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family,’ and that ‘the family is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.’ 3  From this, ‘pro-family’ activists see the heterosexual 
married couple and their children as the fundamental social unit protected by this 
definitive UN human rights document. Deviations from this, in the ‘pro-family’ 
view, are not to be encouraged by countries who uphold this declaration.  
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‘Pro-family’ intellectuals acknowledge that societies cannot universally achieve this 
ideal. ‘Tragedies alone,’ writes one commentator, ‘such as the premature death of a 
young parent, mean that the ideal will always be tempered by the reality.’4 With 
these kinds of situations in mind, ‘pro-family’ activists call on public servants to 
draft policies that both deal with shortfalls (without encouraging them) and 
maintain a focus on protecting ‘the natural family’ as the primary goal of social 
policy. Not only is membership in such a family a human right, according to ‘pro-
family’ activists, it is also a cure for social disorder. According to a prominent ‘pro-
family’ intellectual, the ‘natural family’ has become a key term behind which a 
variety of conservative religious organisations with different agendas can rally.5 
The ‘natural family,’ then, is both a rhetorical tool for conservative policymakers, 
and an ideological symbol affirming the moral foundations of the ‘pro-family’ 
movement. 
 
The ‘natural family’ and its role in animating international Christian Right politics 
is thoughtfully analysed by Buss and Herman in their groundbreaking book, 
Globalizing Family Values. These authors identify the Christian Right’s emphasis 
on this particular type of family as a ‘new family theology.’ In their view, the 
‘natural family’ has two key elements: marriage and heterosexuality.6 They suggest 
that the prefix ‘natural’ has arisen as an aspect of Christian Right counter-discourse, 
in opposition to feminism and gay rights activism. This type of family (which until 
recently, say ‘pro-family’ activists, never needed to be defended) has been re-
branded in opposition to ‘new foes.’7 Moreover, they add, God is now implicated in 
the creation and blessing of the ‘natural family.’ Because the biological family is 
‘natural,’ say Buss and Herman, Christian Right scholars see it as ‘God-given,’ and 
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7
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because it is ‘God-given,’ it is by definition ‘natural.’8  Given that many ‘pro-
family’ publications which spell out the exact role of the ‘natural family’ in 
Christian Right politics were released after Buss and Herman’s 2003 book, their 
early interest in this topic shows considerable foresight. They astutely connect this 
new way of opposing homosexuality and abortion to the increase in scholarly 
research supporting Christian Right political activism.  
 
To these observations, I would add that the ‘natural family,’ has become the 
primary ‘pro-family’ justification for the marital containment of sexuality. 
According to a ‘pro-family’ declaration, ‘marriage between a man and a woman 
forms the moral context for sexual union' and sex outside of the context of 
‘traditional’ marriage is a ‘deviation from natural sexual behaviour.’9 The ‘natural 
family,’ then, is a way of reiterating or translating older conservative ideas about 
sexual morality into a new kind of political discourse, which ‘pro-family’ groups 
sense is more appropriate to their current rhetorical requirements. Most importantly, 
the ‘natural family’ captures the sexual morality upon which ‘pro-family’ discourse 
rests, and around which ‘pro-family’ activists coalesce.  
 
The way ‘pro-family’ organisations understand globalization influences their 
behaviour 
A significant part of this thesis is concerned with the ‘pro-family’ approach to 
globalization, and the political world beyond the US, and how this is changing over 
time. I take it as a given, then, that ‘pro-family’ understandings of the world 
influence the way that the organisations behave in it, and vice versa. This may 
appear a somewhat trite observation. Yet it is an important one, in that it 
underscores the importance of looking at ‘pro-family’ understandings of the world 
as a means of appreciating their agenda, rather than simply observing their 
behaviour and the goals they achieve.  
 
The dynamic nature of ‘pro-family’ global activism is also an important aspect of 
this assumption. Like all institutions, ‘pro-family’ organisations are encouraged by 
                                                 
8
 Ibid, p. 5. 
9
 See ‘Mexico 2004: the Mexico City Declaration’ at 
http://www.worldcongress.org/WCF3/wcf3_dec.htm [last accessed 29/07/09]. 
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successes in some areas and discouraged by failures in others. These successes and 
failures influence the way that ‘pro-family’ groups characterise their opponents and 
the context of their battles, and this, in turn, informs their next endeavours. From 
these kinds of interactions, an observer can discern a changing agenda that is 
influenced by the outside world, as well as influencing other actors at the same 
time. 
 
This becomes especially important in the context of globalization. In discussing 
how religious movements fare under globalization, James Beckford posits a two-
way relationship between a movement’s understanding of globalization, and its 
attempts to use the phenomenon for its own particular purposes.10 In Religion and 
Globalization, Peter Beyer discusses this kind of relationship in terms of creating 
and destroying identities, but like Beckford, sees the usefulness of certain identities 
(and I would argue, agendas) as a key component of change under globalization: 
‘...the global system corrodes inherited or constructed cultural and personal 
identities, yet also encourages the creation and revitalisation of particular identities 
as a way of gaining control over systemic power.’11 
It is not just the identities of the actors themselves that are changed to suit the 
political agenda of the participants; the way ideas and organisations in the global 
realm are characterised is also related to political efforts to gain influence in the 
global arena. How social movements understand global entities and systems affects, 
in an important way, the way they advance their causes. 
 
For this reason, I suggest that ‘pro-family’ understandings of globalization are more 
important in this kind of undertaking than pinning down what globalization is or is 
not. It would thus be a mistake to produce a definition of globalization here. My 
goal is not to show how ‘pro-family’ organisations understandings differ from 
objective reality as I render it; rather it is to convey what they understand to be 
global realities, and how these are changing over time. In other words, I suggest that 
the ‘pro-family’ agenda needs to be examined with an acknowledgement of the 
changing ways ‘pro-family’ activists depict globalization and the global world. 
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 Beckford, J. (2000) ‘Religious Movements and Globalization,’ in Cohen, R., and S. Rai, (eds.) 
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Acting globally pulls ‘pro-family’ groups away from their domestic base 
As noted in the previous chapter, Buss and Herman see the internationally active 
groups as such a distinct category that they provide a label for the subset of 
Christian Right groups active at the UN: the ‘CR UN.’ They offer two main 
justifications for separating them from their domestic base: the international groups’ 
activism at the UN (an organisation the domestic Christian Right tends to view with 
suspicion); and the international Christian Right’s alliances with Islamic ‘pariah’ 
states.12  
 
Butler develops this observation further, by noting that this segment of the Christian 
Right – initially hostile to the UN – now actively presses for its own agenda through 
the General Assembly. ‘Each new success,’ observes Butler, ‘has gradually moved 
Christian Right organisations to a higher level of engagement and investment in the 
UN as an institution.’ 13  As the UN is characterised by a culture of liberal 
interaction, ‘pro-family’ organisations have adjusted their conduct in order to be 
successful in that context.14 Keck and Sikkink put it thus: ‘Modern networks are not 
conveyor belts of liberal ideals but vehicles for communicative and political 
exchange, with the potential for mutual transformation of participants.’15 Although 
the same culture of liberal interaction is arguably true of US domestic politics to 
some degree, international ‘pro-family’ organisations are clearly diverging from 
their domestic base in terms of ideology.  
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Social movements that are able to adapt to new political processes and expectations 
are more likely to persist as influential actors in a new environment. In this context, 
the ability to influence political outcomes will depend on advocates’ abilities to 
learn from their experiences, and change certain views or the way they frame their 
arguments to suit their environment. For example, in 2003, Buss and Herman offer 
evidence that the Christian Right viewed global space as controlled by its anti-
Christian enemies, who are working together to ‘undermine the “natural family” 
and … religious belief itself.’16 But by 2006, this depiction had already begun to 
change, with Butler noting the exponential increase in conservative NGOs applying 
for UN accreditation.17 Chapter three, on globalization, confirms this development, 
showing that ‘pro-family’ groups increasingly see the global realm as ripe with 
opportunity for ‘pro-family’ activism, both in the UN arena and beyond it. ‘Pro-
family’ groups now see their message as one to which the people of the world are 
highly receptive. Given the successes the groups have had in broadcasting their 
principles, we can see that unlike their domestic base, ‘pro-family’ organisations are 
beginning to see the global realm as a space of opportunity, rather than opposition.  
 
Yet these differences should not be overstated. ‘Pro-family’ stances on sexual 
politics are largely homogeneous throughout the domestic and the international 
Christian Right. As Butler and Buss and Herman note, opposition to homosexuality 
and abortion unifies Christian Right organisations more than any other set of issues. 
However, in forging a cross-religious, UN-affiliated, secular-sounding form of 
political activism, adherence to the ‘pro-family’ movement may involve muting or 
sidelining other relatively ‘mainstream’ Christian Right political activities, as were 
described in the introduction.18 The motivations driving the global activities of ‘pro-
family’ organisations need to be considered separately from those of the Christian 
Right as a whole. Acting globally is having an effect on the ideology and agenda of 
the ‘pro-family’ movement. 
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Part II: Understanding the emergence of ‘pro-family’ groups 
There are a number of different ways to frame the entry of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations into the global political scene. In the remainder of this chapter I 
separate these different ways of thinking about ‘pro-family’ globalization into seven 
categories, which represent seven different causes as highlighted by authorities in 
this field. 
 
The first observation, made by a number of different scholars, is that ‘pro-family’ 
activities beyond the US can be understood simply as a politics of opposition 
expanded to the global level. This has been expressed in a variety of ways. Some 
suggest that the international Christian Right sees opposition to concealed and 
corrupt enemies in the global realm as an important justification for the expansion 
of ‘pro-family’ politics. Another possibility is that opposition to domestic enemies 
is the key reason for the Christian Right’s international activity. Lastly, most 
observers of these organisations acknowledge the importance of international 
progress on ‘new’ rights as a central aspect of the expansion of ‘pro-family’ protest 
beyond the domestic sphere.  
 
Another framework offered by observers of the Christian Right is that global 
expansion has always been a part of the movement’s agenda. Proponents of this 
view suggest that for ‘pro-family’ organisations, God’s plan was never limited to 
the US. Linked to this framework is the importance of second coming beliefs in 
motivating global ‘pro-family’ activities. Leading Christian Right scholars warn 
observers of the ‘pro-family’ movement not to underestimate the importance of 
millennialism in the ideologies of these organisations. Because ‘pro-family’ 
activists see themselves as a religious force, the Bible and certain religious 
principles are recognised as motivating this activism. The role of scripture and 
religious identity are discussed in terms of their likely impact on the way these 
actors define their role in the global sphere.  
 
Connected to the expansion of a ‘pro-family’ politics of opposition, scholars have 
noted the importance that ‘pro-family’ organisations attach to their efforts to 
‘correct the liberal bias’ at the UN. Appealing to democratic principles, ‘pro-family’ 
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activists portray themselves as resisting an ‘international assault on the family,’ 
conducted by powerful liberal organisations whose arguments go un-opposed in 
international institutions. In this way, perceptions of social upheaval are attributed 
to globalization, and create an impetus for conservative organising at both the local 
and the global levels.19 
 
Another reason for the global emergence of ‘pro-family’ organisations is to do with 
their close associations with neo-conservatives. From the neo-conservative 
perspective, ‘pro-family’ activism provides a social framework – the ‘aggressive 
promotion of American style values’ 20  – which will help to bring about a 
democratic and capitalist ‘new American century.’ Finally, two prominent scholars 
on the Christian Right suggest that the expansion of ‘pro-family’ politics beyond 
the US is part of a broader effort to ‘mainstream’ the Christian Right movement. 
Connected to both mainstreaming and empire-building is the propagation of ‘pro-
family’ research, intended to support the positions of ‘pro-family’ advocates from a 
non-religious perspective. Each of these eight frameworks is discussed in detail. 
 
1. A ‘friend-foe way of thinking’ globalized 
Internationally active ‘pro-family’ organisations clearly share a similar set of 
ideological perspectives with their domestic Christian Right base. These 
perspectives can perhaps be more accurately characterised in terms of what they 
oppose. In this light, ‘pro-family’ global activity can be understood as the 
globalization of a particular politics of resistance. This section discusses the 
different ways that scholars have used this politics of opposition to understand the 
global intentions of ‘pro-family’ organisations. 
 
William Martin remarks that the same Christian Right agenda that motivates these 
organisations domestically – suspicion of secular organisations, hostility to ‘anti-
family’ policies, and determination to maintain their way of life against the 
perceived threat of cultural annihilation – have driven Christian Right groups to 
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become politically active at the global level.21 This perspective seems reasonable, 
given that the organisations’ entry into the UN has been through opposition to the 
same ‘anti-family’ policies they oppose at home. ‘Pro-family’ organisations saw 
their opponent’s progressive ideas ascending in the global political realm, and thus 
threatening the domestic sphere from outside. In this framework, then, the 
organisations have begun to act globally to protect the ‘pro-family’ way of life from 
the intrusion of progressive opponents, and they remain globally active in order to 
continue this battle. 
 
Buss and Herman describe this combative aspect of the ‘pro-family’ movement as a 
‘friend-foe’ way of thinking, typical of organisations of the Christian Right. For 
these organisations, say Buss and Herman, ‘a politics of change is constituted 
through a process of contesting “the enemy.” ’22 Using this framework, determining 
who ‘pro-family’ groups believe their ‘enemies’ are can be a guide to understanding 
their motivations. The way that characterisations of enemy entities change is an 
indicator of the direction of the ‘pro-family’ movement.23  
 
What Buss and Herman describe as a ‘friend-foe’ culture is similar to the 
anticommunist sentiment described by Sara Diamond in Roads to Dominion. 
‘Anticommunism,’ Diamond writes, ‘was, and is, a package of beliefs about the 
moral superiority of the United States… a dichotomous and reactive way of seeing 
the world.’24 If ‘pro-family’ organisations do see entities in the global realm as 
either good or evil, then this ‘friend-foe’ belief system is likely to be a contributor 
to their mobilising beyond the US: they are called to combat ‘evil’ and protect 
‘good’ on a global scale. 
 
This way of thinking about ‘pro-family’ groups is simplistic, to say the least. It is 
bound to miss some of the other important aspects of the ‘pro-family’ movement 
and the way it is changing. Yet it is indisputably pervasive in ‘pro-family’ 
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discourse. In the discourse of these organisations, enemies are everywhere, and 
vigilance is vital. The sense of being threatened is a nearly universal feature of ‘pro-
family’ texts, and is almost certainly intended as a stimulus for action. To be fair, 
‘pro-family’ groups are by no means alone in this; environmental and anti-nuclear 
organisations also exist – and at times, thrive – because of the sense of looming 
danger that they broadcast (and their adherents perceive). The difference between 
the world views of these NGOs and the Christian Right is about the way they 
moralise the dangers they discern. To use Steve Bruce’s words: ‘Bad things happen 
because bad people desire them,’ in the Christian Right understanding of the 
world.25 
 
Although this thesis documents a number of examples in which ‘pro-family’ 
scholars seek to move away from this reactive form of politicking, ‘friend-foe’ 
politics persist as a strong element of ‘pro-family’ discourse. Because this particular 
framework is so useful in understanding ‘pro-family’ politics, I organise much of 
the research in this thesis around the way that ‘anti-family’ enemies and ideas are 
framed, in order to document the changing politics of these organisations. In the 
paragraphs that follow, I briefly discuss three of the ways that observers of the 
Christian Right have used a form of this ‘friend-foe’ framework to explain the 
global emergence of ‘pro-family’ organisations. 
 
One of these frameworks is described as combating an ‘enemy other.’ Peter Beyer’s 
influential 1994 book Religion and Globalization held that the Christian Right 
would struggle to find firm footing in the global sphere because they require an 
identifiable outside enemy: a primary operating principle of this group, in Beyer’s 
view. Some theorists (Huntington being the most obvious) expected to see Islam 
arise as the ‘enemy other’ in the worldview of the Christian Right.26 But this has not 
been the case. 
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If the Christian Right needs outside enemies, and global space does not allow for an 
‘outside,’ how, then, have ‘pro-family’ organisations managed to globalize so 
successfully? In her 2001 article Siren Song, and again with Buss in Globalizing 
Family Values, Herman provides a useful way of understanding how the Christian 
Right has been able to thrive under conditions of globalization. She argues that 
globalization has created a number of different international foes for these 
organisations. 27  According to Herman, these new foes are more difficult to 
recognize and combat successfully because they are not identified with one nation, 
ethnicity or religion. But they are still at large in the world, and have become all the 
more threatening through their anonymity. In this way, ‘pro-family’ organisations 
have gained a foothold in the realm of international development politics by 
focussing their fear on unidentifiable enemies. This lack of specificity, in Herman’s 
view, has in fact facilitated network-building at the global level. This is because the 
concealed nature of these enemies necessitates a global retaliation in order for the 
forces of good to win the day. Herman (who has the advantage of hindsight over 
Beyer) is very likely correct in this observation. This raises a question that is 
addressed in chapters three to six of this thesis. Is a vague, unseen ‘enemy other’ 
enough to sustain ‘pro-family’ interest in the global realm over time, or will it give 
way to more visible or specific enemies?  
 
Another theory to explain the ‘pro-family’ emergence in international politics is that 
these organisations have globalized in order to more successfully oppose particular 
enemies at home. In Esther Kaplan’s view, the international activities of ‘pro-
family’ organisations are primarily a means of achieving domestic goals rather than 
global ones. Kaplan, who devotes a chapter to the global activities of the Christian 
Right in her unapologetic tirade against the Bush White House, suggests that the 
main reason for ‘going global’ was to find ways to bankrupt organisations hated by 
the domestic Christian Right, such as Planned Parenthood.28 This understanding of 
the motivations of ‘pro-family’ organisations is a variation on Keck and Sikkink’s 
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‘boomerang pattern,’ in which domestic NGOs seek allies beyond their nation-state 
to bring about the domestic policy changes they desire.29  
 
Though Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang effect’ is an excellent way of explaining 
the motivations of some transnational political actors, it is not useful here. Keck and 
Sikkink’s theory does not fit the ‘pro-family’ experience. The boomerang effect 
requires domestic actors to seek an international or global authority to bring 
pressure to bear on their own government. In the 1990s, when ‘pro-family’ 
organisations worked in the context of a US administration that they uniformly 
loathed, they still saw global space as hostile to their way of life.30 If this perception 
has changed, it has done so only after the election of President Bush. For this 
reason, the boomerang effect can only be a valuable framework for understanding 
the motivations of ‘pro-family’ groups in the post-Bush context. 
 
In addition, seeing the international realm in terms of its uses to the domestic 
constituency also belies the degree to which ‘pro-family’ organisations now see 
their role as international policy makers and part of a global ‘pro-family’ movement 
as an end in itself. Though there is evidence that particular progressive 
organisations remain a focus of ‘pro-family’ wrath,31 the nemeses of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are themselves global actors. Thus this narrow purpose, if it were ever 
the main objective of ‘pro-family’ activism, is no longer as important as the broader 
agenda pressed for by advocates of the ‘natural family.’ ‘Pro-family’ politics has its 
own rationale and global ambitions, a fact largely ignored by the domestic focus of 
Kaplan’s analysis and the boomerang effect.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, a number of scholars suggest that opposition to ‘new’ 
human rights, particularly the right to abortion, is the main reason that ‘pro-family’ 
organisations have become globally active. Anti-abortion sentiment was 
undoubtedly central to the attendance of ‘pro-family’ organisations at the UN 
conferences of the 1990s. In interviews with Swinski, ‘pro-family’ leaders said that 
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they and their organisations got involved in the UN to prevent liberal governments 
and NGOs active in that arena ‘from instituting an international right to abortion, 
first threatened at the Cairo conference.’32  
 
This perspective is also present in Buss and Herman’s analysis, who suggest that 
these ‘new rights,’ of women and children are seen by the Christian Right as a 
Trojan horse, masking a ‘more nefarious “anti-family” agenda.’33 Thus for Buss and 
Herman, part of the reason that ‘pro-family’ organisations are motivated to act at 
the UN is because they felt they were called to combat ‘anti-family’ foes who had 
seized (or were close to seizing) control of the UN. From this perspective, ‘new’ 
human rights, such as sexual and reproductive rights, were (and are) a means of 
concealing the true ambitions of those who would use the UN for their own 
(malevolent) purposes. I discuss the way this kind of thinking appears in ‘pro-
family’ discourse in chapters three, four and five.  
 
Outside of the ‘friend-foe’ line of analysis, there are a number of different ideas 
offered by observers of ‘pro-family’ organisations as to the reasons they have 
emerged on the global scene. The motivations (as offered by literature on the 
Christian Right) that have encouraged the ‘pro-family’ movement to become, and 
remain, active at the global level are discussed in detail in the remainder of this 
chapter.   
 
2. Global expansion was always a part of the Christian Right agenda 
While it may be the case that international activity has been an important step in 
winning specific battles for ‘pro-family’ organisations, it is possible that this has 
always been an aspect of Christian Right ideology. This argument can be made in a 
number of different ways. Some authors emphasise the scriptural importance of 
globalization in the fulfilment of end times scenarios derived from the Book of 
Revelation. Others consider missionary activity, opposition to communism, and 
interest in the Middle East as evidence that the Christian Right has always had its 
eye on the world beyond the US. 
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Feminist academic Linda Kintz takes this latter view. Though she does not address 
the globalization of ‘pro-family’ politics, she sees the extension of religious 
conservatism beyond the nation-state as part of a system built on an ‘American 
mythology’ which is intimately connected to a religious adherence to free markets. 
This mythology can be depicted as  
‘...a closed set of concentric circles stacked one on top of the other and ascending 
heavenward: God, property, womb, family, church, free market, nation, global 
mission, God.’34 
Using Kintz’s framework, the ideology of ‘pro-family’ organisations’ has never 
been confined to the US. In this sense, the world beyond the US is, and always has 
been, a part of the Christian Right agenda. Applying Kintz’s idea to the 
globalization of the ‘pro-family’ movement suggests that the organisations see their 
role as part of a ‘global mission,’ extending conservative Christianity and 
capitalism throughout the world.35   
  
Though plausible, this framework is not particularly helpful. While it is likely true 
that the Christian Right has always been mindful of what has been going on outside 
the US, it says nothing about why ‘pro-family’ leaders felt they had to act beyond 
the US at the time they did so and in the way they have. Most importantly, it does 
not highlight the importance of sexual and reproductive politics as an impetus to 
‘pro-family’ activism. 
 
3. Second Coming beliefs are integral to ‘pro-family’ activism 
One of the major questions in the literature on internationally active ‘pro-family’ 
organisations is to what degree millennialism (also referred to as end times and 
second coming beliefs) is driving the emergence and perseverance of the 
international ‘pro-family’ movement. Many influential books and articles on ‘pro-
family’ organisations do not discuss scripture or prophecy in their analyses of these 
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organisations and their motivations.36 This section discusses the extent to which 
prophetic literature and ideas about the second coming provide a useful means of 
understanding the motivations of ‘pro-family’ organisations in the global realm. 
 
Buss and Herman clearly see second coming beliefs as a major component of the 
way that the Christian Right understands ‘the global.’ Analysis of ‘CR UN’ 
perceptions of global space in Buss and Herman’s book are peppered with insights 
as to the connections between global entities and end times beliefs in Christian 
Right prophetic literature. For example, the UN, as Buss and Herman observe, has 
played an important role in second coming scenarios as a ‘One World Government’ 
run by a charismatic Antichrist, seen as a precursor to Tribulation.37 Similarly, Buss 
and Herman write that end times scenarios, in which ‘true’ Christians are bestowed 
with the ability to resist the deceptions of the Antichrist, are connected to a ‘fear of 
conspiracy,’ or as Herman has written elsewhere, a ‘paranoid style’ that is deeply 
embedded in US culture. 38  In this way, Buss and Herman suggest that pre-
millennialism (the belief that Christ’s second coming will bring about a thousand 
years of His rule on Earth) shapes the way that believers see the social and political 
world and their role in it. 
 
Martin’s understanding is similar, suggesting that Christian Right actors hold ‘a 
conviction that increasing globalization is a fulfilment of dire Biblical prophecies 
foreshadowing the return of Christ and the onset of Armageddon.’39 In his article, 
Martin sees the internationalisation of the Christian Right as arising from two wells: 
a desire to broadcast their conservative ideological agenda globally, and a 
motivation to ‘win the world for Christ.’ While they may be both be present and 
motivating Christian Right political activity, these two ideas are fundamentally 
different, and lead to quite different forms of international activity. While the 
literature appears to unanimously accept the first motivation, that there is a 
conservative (or ‘traditional’) social agenda driving the organisations, it is far less 
clear about the role of Christian Right sacred texts and popular literature. 
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In Siren Song, Didi Herman emphasises the central place of Armageddon and the 
Second Coming in the Christian Right conception of ‘the global.’ Without such a 
framework, she argues, academic attempts to understand the Christian Right at both 
the domestic and the international level are incomplete. As evidence for her claim, 
Herman offers three main arguments. The first is that for decades the Christian 
Right has identified the ‘cultural degeneration’ of the late twentieth century as an 
apocalyptic precursor to end times, and so its members already believe that the end 
is near.40 The second argument Herman makes is that the political policy-makers of 
the Christian Right elite are among the millions of Americans who purchase 
prophetic literature and believe ardently that Jesus will return.41 Stuart Croft and 
Kevin Phillips both offer additional support for this argument, quoting polls which 
find that around two thirds of conservative Protestants surveyed said they believe 
that the events described in the Revelation to John will come true.42 
 
Herman’s third reason to take end times beliefs seriously is that many Christian 
Right foreign policy positions only make sense against the backdrop of an 
apocalyptic attitude. Her main example is the eagerness with which the historically 
anti-Semitic Christian Right supports Israel, described in the introduction to this 
thesis. Herman explains backing for Israel through its place in the prophetic 
mindset: rapture-minded Christian Right activists want the US government to 
defend Israel and the Jews, in the hope that America will be spared during the ‘final 
days.’43 Croft puts it this way:  
‘If the ‘end times’ thesis is accepted – as it is widely in the red states of America – 
then there is a particular role for Israel to play, and the role of [conservative 
Protestants] is to support Israel in its coming battles.’44 
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Like Herman, Croft sees the protection of Israel as based on ‘theological 
predispositions.’45 There is no hint in Croft’s article that end times scenarios or 
theology in general are used as rhetorical tools by political actors. Likewise, 
Herman rejects the idea that conservative actors use end times scenarios and 
language to conceal their true motives, arguing that second coming beliefs ‘must be 
understood as providing a belief-framework that shapes, influences, and impacts 
upon political activity.46 She concludes her argument in Siren Song by affirming 
that ‘any analysis of [Christian Right] global ideology that neglects pre-
millennialism does so at great cost.’47  
 
Croft suggests that end times beliefs and prophetic literature are the foundations for 
Christian Right foreign policy positions in general. He notes that theological 
understandings of world events are accepted ways of thinking within the parameters 
of Christian Right discourse in the US.48 He cites an example from the Robertson 
School of Government teaching programme at Regent University, Gov 654: 
International Politics, which promises to teach ‘a God-centred understanding of 
international affairs,’ in order that students can ‘apply Biblical principles to an 
analysis of peoples, nations and international organisations; to help discern the 
footprints of the coming of Christ’s new world-wide order.’49 Phillips, for his part, 
notes that 55 per cent of white evangelical Protestants agreed that ‘following 
religious principles’ should be a top priority for foreign policy in a 2004 Pew 
Research Center poll.50  
 
Croft accepts without debate that Christian Right interpretations of biblical 
principles feed into their foreign policy positions. Buss and Herman, however, take 
a more cautious approach. Although they acknowledge that there are many other 
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motivating factors, they repeat that the Christian Right’s international activism 
‘cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the role played by theological 
belief systems.’51 Buss and Herman stress that they are not saying that the only way 
that Christian Right activism can be understood is through theology; rather that 
their emphasis on the theological underpinnings of Christian Right behaviour is a 
response to the scarcity of literature on the topic.52  
 
Finally, in terms of their understanding of international governing institutions, Buss 
and Herman suggest that the Christian Right do call on their millennial ideas (not 
just their conservative ones) when they are considering globalization. They suggest 
that for the Christian Right, ‘one-worldism without Christ at the helm is an illusion 
and an impossibility.’53 The authors offer a number of Christian Right texts which 
do in fact endorse world government (of a conservative Christian variety), which 
include some images of global theocracy that moderate conservatives would find 
distasteful.54 Other than this, Buss and Herman refer the reader back to arguments 
made in Siren Song to justify their contention that end times beliefs persist as a 
motivating factor for Christian Right international activism. 
 
While Herman’s and Croft’s article, and Buss and Herman’s book provide many 
detailed, important and intelligent contributions to the literature, second coming 
beliefs as a motivator for global activism are unlikely to be as important as these 
authors suggest. Moreover, a focus on these beliefs has the potential to obscure or 
mystify more important ideological factors that are driving the politics of the ‘pro-
family’ movement. Though I do not make this claim for the Christian Right as a 
whole, I suggest that for understanding globally active ‘pro-family’ groups 
(especially when considering the discourse of elites), looking for representations of 
end times scenarios in ‘pro-family’ texts is unlikely to uncover the driving forces 
behind global ‘pro-family’ activism. Nevertheless, since this thesis is an attempt to 
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understand the ideology and motivations of Christian Right ‘pro-family’ groups at 
the global level, and Buss and Herman still arguably represent the conventional 
wisdom on this question, each of their arguments need to be addressed. The 
following section discusses the reasons for and against the consideration of second 
coming beliefs as a factor in the global emergence of ‘pro-family’ groups 
 
Herman’s first argument for taking second coming beliefs seriously, made in Siren 
Song, is that the liberalisation of social mores have for decades indicated to the 
Christian Right that the end is nigh. ‘Pro-family’ activists’ investment in reversing 
this liberalisation suggests that the groups subscribe more to post- than pre-
millennialism. This is a Christian view of the future which holds that Christ will 
arrive after the millennium, and – crucially – after Christians have established a 
Christian Kingdom on Earth. In Globalizing Family Values, Buss and Herman 
suggest that pre-millennialist principles may be decreasing in significance in 
Christian Right thought, in favour of post-millennialism. This is of practical 
importance, they note, because ‘theologically, postmillennialism makes more sense 
of religious activism’ and allows for a deeper unity of purpose with conservative 
Catholic organisations. As they put it, postmillennialism ‘entails building a 
Christian world in the here and now.’55 This development, which I would argue is a 
movement away from conscious millennial thought altogether, makes ‘pro-family’ 
organisations more like NGOs than pre-millennial Christians. Like other 
international NGOs, they are trying to change the world to make it more as they 
would like it to be. This is not to say that their motivations are not ‘millennial,’ it is 
more that ‘pro-family’ groups are heavily involved in bringing about the social 
change they believe God wills, rather than leaving God to do it.     
 
To Herman’s second point, that millions of Americans read prophetic literature and 
believe in the scenarios is undeniable. However, sociologist Michael Lindsay 
argues that many elites in the Christian Right disassociate themselves from the 
popular literature associated with second coming scenarios. In his interviews with 
evangelicals, Lindsay was surprised to find a significant number of evangelical 
leaders who spontaneously volunteered that they had never read the Left Behind 
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series. 56  He suggests that these ‘cosmopolitan’ evangelicals want the Christian 
Right movement to be taken seriously beyond their own networks, or in Lindsay’s 
words, they are ‘trying to distinguish themselves from the rest of the evangelical 
subculture.’57 It seems likely that ‘pro-family’ activists at the global level do fall 
into this category, preferring the respect of their conservative peers – and indeed 
those of other religions – over that of Christian Right popular culture. I return to 
this issue later in this chapter. Even if they have read prophetic literature, given the 
context of their political activity, ‘pro-family’ activists are less likely to express 
their millennial beliefs overtly. Thus if end times beliefs are motivating the elites of 
the ‘pro-family’ movement, they are working beneath the surface, so to speak. 
 
Thirdly, in terms of explaining Christian Right foreign policy positions, there may 
be factors other than end times beliefs at play here. It is irrefutable that there is a 
section of the Christian Right specifically dedicated to increasing and maintaining 
US evangelical support for Israel.58 In addition, it seems likely that Israel – being 
the birthplace of Jesus – will always be a sacred site for many Christians, in 
addition to its potential role in the second coming. Thus theology must be given due 
credit for explaining this particular Christian Right foreign policy position. There 
are other reasons for Christian Right support for Israel, however. One is the 
enduring alliance between the Christian Right and neo-conservatives, 59  whose 
interest in Israel has more to do with its geo-strategic influence than its role in end 
times scenarios. Israel’s proximity to Muslim countries may also be part of the 
reason for the domestic Christian Right’s continued interest in ‘protecting’ that 
country. While ‘pro-family’ organisations have had some success in forging new 
alliances with Islamic groups, Islam remains a perpetual adversary and rival 
proselytizer in the eyes of many in the domestic Christian Right movement. Finally, 
entrenched policies can be extremely difficult to shift when they are backed by 
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effective lobby groups, even when they impose significant political costs on the 
governments who promote them.60  
 
The penchant for searching out conspiracies, which Buss and Herman see as 
connected to the apocalyptic narrative, is certainly present in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse. However, the degree to which conspirational thought is attributable to 
Christian Right apocalyptic beliefs is disputable. The tendency towards conspiracies 
can be traced to roots outside the context of end times beliefs, such as in the anti-
communist accusations of the John Birch Society and in the beliefs of members of 
the US Militia Movement.61 
 
Lastly, to Herman’s statement that she does not believe conservatives are using the 
language of Armageddon as a cover for other political motives, this is undoubtedly 
true. It should be noted however, that the internationally active ‘pro-family’ groups 
under scrutiny in this thesis seldom use this language at all. For example, in her 
analysis of literature from ‘A.D. 2000 and Beyond’ (a clearinghouse established just 
before the year 2000 which encourages extensive international evangelism), Sara 
Diamond finds no suggestion that the end of the world is imminent.62 Similarly, a 
search for terms related to Armageddon on the websites of the groups under 
scrutiny in this thesis found no relevant references.63  
 
There are, I would argue, a few stylised allusions to second coming beliefs, which 
could be connected with millennialism. One example is Allan Carlson’s suggestion 
that the ‘natural family’ is the path to ‘a world restored.’ 64 The 2008 ‘pro-family’ 
film, Demographic Winter: the Decline of the Human Family (which is examined in 
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detail in chapter six) also has an undeniably apocalyptic ‘feel,’ as does its 2009 
sequel, Demographic Bomb. Nevertheless, the content is still resoundingly issue-
based and leaves the restoration of the world to humanity rather than the return of 
Jesus. The existence of a linguistic/cultural disposition in the US (and elsewhere) 
that tends to see the end of history as predetermined and near may be debated. But 
if it exists, it is not peculiar to the Christian Right.65 Thus, insofar as scholars can 
say anything about people’s motivations, the distinct absence of millennial language 
used by ‘pro-family’ groups that employing it as a framework for analysis of their 
motivations is questionable.  
 
Given this absence, then, why do Buss and Herman see it as so important that 
prophetic literature is acknowledged in the globalization of ‘family values?’ In their 
discussion of the ‘natural family,’ which was discussed earlier in this chapter, Buss 
and Herman write that 
‘[Christian Right] family theology is… both a restatement of what conservative 
Christians believe God intends and a new common sense; that neither God nor Jesus 
contributed to this doctrine is neither here nor there.’66 
In their view, as noted earlier, given the lack of biblical authority for the ‘natural 
family,’ 67  its importance to ‘pro-family’ activism can be understood as having 
arisen as a counter-discourse to feminism and gay rights activism.  In setting aside 
the lack of scriptural justifications for the ‘natural family’ as interesting but 
unimportant, Buss and Herman acknowledge that the rise of the ‘natural family’ 
movement is best understood in primarily for social and political – that is, counter-
discursive – rather than scriptural or prophetic terms. Yet given the dearth of any 
‘pro-family counter-discourse’ on millennialism, Buss and Herman’s emphasis on 
its significance in the globalization of the Christian Right must be questioned.  
 
Buss and Herman would argue, presumably, that just because ‘pro-family’ 
organisations do not openly discuss end times scenarios does not mean that they 
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have no impact on the ideologies of these groups. But the absence of such end times 
scenarios in itself marks a significant shift in the discourse. It is likely that ‘pro-
family’ elites see talking about the second coming as a guaranteed route to 
marginalisation. Astute political Christians know that talking about rapture does not 
inspire the respect of a secular or interfaith audience; fear of being labelled a 
religious fanatic would certainly limit the openness with which they share their 
views on this topic. Thus while I cannot, and do not, make the claim that end times 
beliefs are not underlying ‘pro-family’ activism in the global arena, the absence of 
open discussions of the second coming and apocalyptic language in the texts of 
‘pro-family’ groups is in itself highly politically relevant, as it is indicative of ‘pro-
family’ audiences and agendas. Either ‘pro-family’ organisations do not see their 
global activities as particularly connected to the return of Christ, or they do not 
want others to believe this is the case. At any rate, I would argue that over time, the 
distinction between these alternatives may become less relevant. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that they can be understood to be present in the discourse of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations, end times scenarios are identified and discussed.  
 
4. The Bible as a motivator behind ‘pro-family’ activism 
The Bible clearly has an impact on the motivations of ‘pro-family’ organisations. 
By definition ‘pro-family’ groups are self-selected and self-organised into issues 
which they, as Christians, deem to be important. Many evangelical Protestants 
claim as the basis of their faith that the Bible is the inerrant and literal word of God. 
Even so, psychologists Ronald Hopson and Donald Smith offer some compelling 
arguments that suggest that looking for religious motivations in Christian Right 
behaviour is not a particularly useful thing to do. Hopson and Smith identify a drift 
away from religiosity within the Christian Right movement.68 Retreating from an 
‘explicitly religious emphasis,’ they suggest, is only a problem for the Christian 
Right if their religious identity is the only thing of importance to the movement as a 
whole. They note, however: 
‘That some Christian Right groups willingly masks [sic] the religious dimension of 
their agenda… argues for an expanded consideration of the bases for Christian Right 
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political ideology. As religious tenets are selectively employed to sacralize a priori 
political convictions, to emphasize solely the religious dimension is purely 
arbitrary.’69 
Moreover, the authors suggest that the associations the Christian Right makes with 
‘unholy’ groups (they use the Unification and Catholic Churches as examples, but 
in our international context, we can take this argument further by noting the 
alliances ‘pro-family’ activists are making with conservative Islamic groups and 
governments) are evidence of the non-religious foundations of Christian Right 
activism.70 Such alliances show that ‘pro-family’ activism may involve suppressing 
certain theological motivations – such as the calling to evangelise non-Christians – 
in order to pursue more politically astute conservative ones.  
 
Hopson and Smith go so far as to suggest that the religious substantiation the 
Christian Right makes for its political positions are superimposed onto what they 
term ‘pre-existing ideological commitments.’ 71  Hence, they argue, the trend 
towards secularization of Christian Right discourse and behaviour, rather than being 
taken as a sign of the movement’s demise, may help to uncover the real foundations 
of Christian Right socio-political values. 72  If the Christian Right’s political 
positions do not emerge as the result of a literal reading of the Bible, the authors 
conclude, it is imprudent to assume that Christian Right ideology is a rendering of 
Biblical mores applied to the political realm.73  
 
However, the argument can be made that the motivations for political activism are 
still Christian, even in the absence of Biblical justifications, if the proponents of 
those political actions believe they are carrying out the will of God. But given that 
this means that the way that God makes His will known to ‘pro-family’ activists is 
via culture rather than scripture, this in a way lends further weight to the arguments 
of Hopson and Smith: that ‘pro-family’ identity is socially or culturally constructed, 
and based on a rendering of the Bible that is peculiar to a set of Christian 
conservatives, who subscribe to a particular ideological worldview. From this 
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perspective, the task of this thesis is to discern what the ‘pro-family’ worldview is, 
and how it is changing, rather than attempting to pin down whether and which 
biblical narratives have influenced their activism. In this thesis, then, whilst I 
acknowledge that the Bible is an important aspect of ‘pro-family’ culture and 
identity, I do not refer to scripture as a means of uncovering the driving forces of 
‘pro-family’ global activism. 
 
5. Correcting the liberal bias at the UN 
US Christian Right organisations have frequently depicted the UN and other 
international institutions as liberal, secular and eager to encroach on US 
sovereignty. In this light, ‘pro-family’ organisations have characterised their entry 
in to the UN system as correcting a liberal bias in international politics. Moreover, 
‘pro-family’ organisations see their global efforts as vital to amending a false belief 
of conservatives from the developing world: that they are an isolated few, fighting 
against a powerful onslaught of massive liberal organisations. Part of the goal of the 
‘pro-family’ network is to create a bloc of ‘pro-family’ states at the UN, in order to 
put a stop to the invasion of national sovereignty in countries dependent on UN 
development funding. 
 
Seeing religion as absent from debates around development, Butler suggests that 
international actors among the Christian Right have characterised themselves as the 
de facto voice for religion and tradition. 74 Butler, concerned that the entry of the 
Christian Right on the UN stage may appear to be more democratic than it is, 
suggests that the UN NGO arena is characterised by a problem familiar to observers 
from the US: the polarisation of civil society into the religious right and the secular 
left.75 This can be read as a global extension of the culture wars: the kind of global 
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clash that Philip Jenkins foretells, between the religious South and the secular 
North.76  
 
Swinski is also dubious about the Christian Right’s claim that its presence enhances 
the democratisation of the UN civil society process. Her thesis finds that some of 
the key elements of the democratic process are noticeably absent in the behaviour of 
international anti-abortion organisations. These groups, she suggests, tend not to 
share the same core liberal philosophy of their progressive opponents, so ‘they do 
not seek consensus, work inclusively, or work for the greater legitimacy of the 
UN.’77 If Swinski’s thesis is correct, then ‘pro-family’ reasons for entering the UN 
arena are more likely to be about fighting their opponents and winning the day. 
From this point of view, ‘having the conservative perspective heard’ is merely a 
rhetorical tool used by ‘pro-family’ organisations to justify their entry to others. In 
this sense, this appeal to democratic representation does not help us to understand 
the motivations of ‘pro-family’ organisations at the UN, other than that they seek to 
be included. 
 
Nevertheless, crying foul over a ‘liberal bias’ does say something about the way 
‘pro-family’ organisations depict the international community and the opportunity 
they see to ‘do good’ there. This assertion suggests a view of the world in which 
conservative people from the South need ‘pro-family’ help in order to network 
effectively. In other words, ‘pro-family’ organisations see their task as showing 
conservatives in the South that there are still a mass of conservative religious people 
in the world whose voices, if heard, can prevent the kind of liberal progress that 
‘pro-family’ groups seek to halt. They seek to say that – contrary to what ‘pro-
family’ groups see as a popular delusion across the globe – there has not been a 
massive global decline in people who care about ‘traditional’ values. This 
characterisation of the political world, in which the ‘silent majority’ begins to fight 
back against a vociferous but powerful minority, is discussed in more detail in 
chapter five. 
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6. ‘Pro-family’ emergence may be a result of globalization 
In reviewing the activities of a globally active ‘pro-family’ organisation from 
Mexico, Butler suggests that ‘pro-family’ globalization may be a result of political 
and economic forces having a destructive effect on conservative ‘family values’ 
everywhere. She traces the origins of Red Familia, a Mexican ‘pro-family’ 
organisation, from its participation in the WCF in 1999 to 2006, showing the 
organisation’s increasing influence beyond the domestic Mexican political scene. 
Similarities between the origin of ‘Red Familia’ and that of US ‘pro-family’ groups 
suggest to Butler that  
‘the Christian Right [of other countries] might continue to globalize not only because 
of US initiatives, but because global economic and social trends are creating the 
same conditions in many countries that the Christian Right first addressed in the 
US.’78  
Butler thus sees globalization as a force that may be actually encouraging the 
expansion of ‘pro-family’ groups beyond their national boundaries. This 
observation is an important one because, to a large extent, it suggests that the 
globalization of US ‘pro-family’ groups has more to do with globalization than it 
has to do with the ideology of ‘pro-family’ organisations.  
 
Different ‘pro-family’ organisations may all be globalizing in support of ‘the 
family’ but they may not share the same ideas about what the ‘family’ needs to be 
protected from. Though there is evidence that some ‘family’ issues peculiar to the 
South are addressed in ‘pro-family’ discourse – such as the absence of fathers due 
to labour migration and the effect of armed conflict on families – there is still a 
significant degree to which the ‘mutual transformation of participants’ in the global 
‘pro-family’ network is yet to occur. Some US ‘pro-family’ organisations have 
tended to insist on including opposition to homosexuality in their international 
documents, despite the fact that this issue is not a major concern for conservatives 
in the South.79 Despite some dissonance in the priorities of different ‘pro-family’ 
groups, networking and interaction are proving to be sources of change for globally 
active US ‘pro-family’ organisations. The ways in which ‘pro-family’ organisations 
from the US claim to reflect the different needs of their partners in the South, as 
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part of a global movement ‘in support of the natural family,’ is discussed in 
chapters five and six. Insofar as ‘pro-family’ emergence is a result of globalization, 
the ideologies of all ‘pro-family’ groups, whether from the US or outside it, have an 
impact on the direction of the movement. As Butler puts it, ‘many NGOs emerge 
radically changed by their encounter with globalization and global organising, even 
as they seek to change the world.’80 
 
7. The neo-conservative/‘pro-family’ alliance 
Butler observes that though the ‘pro-family’ alliance with US neo-conservatives has 
its issues, there is good reason to consider the impact of neo-conservatives in 
stimulating ‘pro-family’ global activism. She writes that 
‘While Christian Right leaders were initially driven to the UN by concerns that the 
international body was making decisions that would impact American law, neo-
conservative intellectuals invite religious conservatives to view their movement for 
conservative family values not as a defensive move, but nothing less than as an 
integral component of a process of American empire-building that will help America 
save and democratise the world.’81 
She suggests that neo-conservatives have been interested for some time in the 
‘global-local links of the culture war.’82 ‘Pro-family’ organisations, says Butler, 
have received considerable support from neo-conservative organisations and think-
tanks as part of a ‘tightly knit’ conservative network which shares ‘staff, fellows, 
board members and funding sources.’83 In this sense, it is likely that ‘pro-family’ 
organisations cannot help but be affected by the views and successes of their neo-
conservative allies. The production of ‘pro-family’ social science, for example, has 
a precedent in the successful neo-conservative think-tanks such as the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. Many of these groups are also 
active at the UN. Butler’s reminder to take this historical alliance into account may 
both uncover underlying neo-conservative influences on ‘pro-family’ ideology and 
highlight new tensions arising as the agenda of ‘pro-family’ organisations changes 
to reflect the new demands of their global environment. 
 
                                                 
80
 Ibid, p. 152. 
81
 Ibid, p. 135. 
82
 Ibid, p. 137. 
83
 Ibid, p. 141. 
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8.  Mainstreaming ‘pro-family’ politics 
In discussing what the domestic Christian Right gains from the globalization of 
‘pro-family’ organisations, Buss and Herman write that ‘this expanded political 
engagement … suggests a movement that is seeking a more mainstream political 
profile.’84 This desire is evident, say the authors, in the ‘pro-family’ production of 
ever more sophisticated ‘expert discourse on the natural family.’85 To this, I would 
add that there has been a rapid increase in cross-country comparative studies on 
family and social policy, which facilitates (and is facilitated by) the growing 
international ‘pro-family’ network of ‘experts’ on the ‘natural family.’  
 
In this effort to normalise (or de-marginalise) their concerns, Buss and Herman 
suggest that ‘pro-family’ organisations have been relatively successful. ‘Natural 
family’ research, say Buss and Herman, has had a significant impact and is seldom 
associated with the conservative Christian politics of its authors.86  This finding 
leads Buss and Herman to consider the degree to which this means the Christian 
Right is using ‘stealth tactics’ to advance an uncompromised religious agenda, or 
whether it indicates the merge of Christian Right ideology into mainstream politics.  
 
There is more to this mainstreaming success than the ‘stealthy’ use of statistics to 
influence government policies, however. In terms of the agenda of global ‘pro-
family’ organisations, I suggest that the more important question raised by this 
effort is how the ‘pro-family’ movement will manage the increasingly disparate 
ideological demands of its political alliances. Political activity at the global level 
entails an open and ongoing declaration of ‘pro-family’ values. Deciding what this 
platform will be is arguably the most important role played by the WCF. In this 
context, the degree to which the organisations are ‘assimilationist’ or ‘stealthy,’ to 
use Buss and Herman’s words, is only relevant if it affects their ability to convince 
their audience of their goals. ‘Pro-family’ organisations, if they are to win allies and 
show their opponents that they are a legitimate political force, will gain the respect 
of international elites by displaying their (changing) agenda in tones and language 
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 Buss and Herman, op. cit., p. 140. 
85
 Ibid, p. 140. 
86
 Ibid, p. 140.  
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appropriate to their audience. The ways in which this is occurring are discussed in 
chapters three to six.  
 
Conclusion 
There is no single reason why the ‘pro-family’ movement has gone global. All the 
explanations described above have some relevance. Nor are they mutually 
exclusive. Some motivations may be operating on some ‘pro-family’ actors at some 
points in time, and not at other times.  
 
Some of the ideological forces described above may have evolved from others. For 
example, ‘mainstreaming’ the movement may be an attempt to move away from a 
‘friend-foe’ way of thinking. What may have started out as an effort to bankrupt 
Planned Parenthood may have evolved into a global ‘pro-family’ mission to save 
the families of the world from the liberal UN. Opposition to ‘new’ human rights 
may have been a lesson to ‘pro-family’ activists in how to articulate their own 
agenda in the language of human rights, which may have had an unintended but 
expedient ‘mainstreaming’ effect. The connections and tensions between these 
different motivations are explored in the chapters that follow.  
 
This thesis explores the different ways that these driving forces – and a number of 
others discovered during my research – are acting upon different sections of the 
‘pro-family’ movement, as well as whether they are changing over time. The 
methods I incorporate to carry out this task are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
‘All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. Get E-
Alerts! Take Action!’ 
Concerned Women for America homepage, 20081 
 
In this chapter, I describe and justify my selection of ‘pro-family’ organisations and 
explain how I use the texts from these organisations. The chapter consists of two 
parts. In the first, I show why I have chosen this particular set of ‘pro-family’ 
groups to represent the ‘pro-family’ movement as a whole, and address the potential 
problems with this selection. I then offer a brief description of each group that 
details how they satisfy the criteria I have laid out.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, I discuss why I have approached the subject from 
a political science framework and why I use discourse analysis as a means of 
understanding the driving forces behind their global activism. 
 
Part I: Selection of ‘pro-family’ groups 
Five organisations were chosen as representative of the US ‘pro-family’ movement. 
I sought a number that was representative of the movement and inclusive of many 
of its elements, but that was also able to be studied in adequate depth. I used four 
selection criteria: presence at one or more World Congress of Families (WCF) 
events, other evidence of global or international focus, diversity of views between 
the groups, and evidence of political influence. What follows is an explanation of 
each criterion, followed by a discussion of the issues raised by this selection 
process. 
 
Selection Criteria 
The organisations I examine in this thesis were chosen from a list of ‘pro-family’ 
groups, foundations and sponsors involved in the WCF. 2  The WCF is an 
international meeting of ‘pro-family’ organisations. It has been held five times, in 
                                                 
1
 Concerned Women for America’s homepage, available at http://www.cwfa.org/main.asp [last 
accessed 24/08/09]. 
2
 See http://www.worldcongress.org/ for a list of organisations involved in this event [last accessed 
25/02/09]. 
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Geneva, Prague, Mexico City, Warsaw and Amsterdam. This event facilitates the 
flow of ideas between ‘pro-family’ activists and coordinates the (US-led) ‘pro-
family’ international agenda to a large degree. The WCF is an example of what 
Keck and Sikkink call a ‘voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal pattern of 
communication and exchange.’3 This form of exchange is common between NGOs4 
and provides evidence that these organisations are attempting to coordinate a 
movement beyond the US. In other words, organisations involved in exchanging 
their ideas in such a setting can be considered global broadcasters – and receivers – 
of ‘pro-family’ ideas.  
 
In addition to their involvement in the WCF, a second requirement of the 
organisations was that they be globally active in some other respect. This was either 
through attending UN conferences with UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) NGO accreditation, or in the form of chapters or affiliations with 
partner organisations from other countries. This stipulation was required because 
attendance at a conference alone was an insufficient criterion for the groups to be 
considered politically active. 
 
Thirdly, the selection needed to be sufficiently diverse in order that it would 
represent the different set of values in the ‘pro-family’ movement. Although 
similarity between organisations in a social movement is to be expected, variation 
between the groups was a requirement for inclusion. Because it is not feasible to 
exhaustively study every ‘pro-family’ organisation, each group under scrutiny 
represents a collection of priorities and conflicts that are sufficiently dissimilar to 
the others that range is maximised and repetition is minimised. For example, Phyllis 
Schlafly’s Eagle Forum is excluded in this study, as I do not consider the agenda 
and constituency of this group to be significantly different from Concerned Women 
for America (CWA) to warrant its inclusion (CWA was preferred as it is the more 
internationally active group). 
 
                                                 
3
 Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (2006) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics,’ in 
Perspectives on World Politics (3rd edn.) ed. by Richard Little and Michael Smith (New York: 
Routledge), p. 171.  
4
 In this thesis, I consider ‘pro-family’ groups as a particular set of NGOs. See section two of this 
chapter for more on this. 
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Finally, while diversity is useful in that it increases the potential breadth of research 
on ‘pro-family’ organisations, it was important to exclude anomalous groups that 
have no influence on the movement. For this reason, a final requirement of this 
selection process was some evidence that the groups chosen exerted some influence 
on ‘pro-family’ discourse. I included three sub-criteria for inclusion, which were: a 
track record indicating the organisation’s knowledge of, and presence at, ‘pro-
family’ causes; submission of a tax return, showing at least a minimal level of 
public donations; and interest or antagonism from political rivals, such as 
progressive NGOs or academics. 
 
Limits and potential issues with the selection process 
With the first requirement of involvement in the WCF, there is what Buss and 
Herman call an ‘elite/street’ issue: organisations that are present at the WCF are an 
‘elite cadre’ of individuals who are not representative of the core ‘pro-family’ 
movement as a whole.5 This is very likely to be the case. However, I suggest that a 
focus on elites is desirable, as they have been responsible for the organisations’ 
emergence in global politics.6 The WCF is a forum in which ‘pro-family’ leaders 
gather in order to discuss the movement’s global direction: though they may be 
constrained by their supporters to some degree, they nevertheless push the 
movement in the direction they want it to go. As this thesis seeks to uncover the 
changing ideologies of ‘pro-family’ organisations in the international realm, a focus 
on the elites of the movement is inevitable and, I would argue, appropriate. I return 
to this issue in the second half of this chapter. 
 
In explaining the intended role of the WCF, Allan Carlson (its coordinator) states 
that the WCF is not an ecumenical effort at joining the world’s religions, rather it is 
‘a coalition of the most orthodox believers within each denomination, church or 
faith group, persons who are the least likely to compromise their core beliefs.’7 The 
                                                 
5
 Buss, D. and D. Herman (2003) Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International 
Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. xviii. 
6
 As one observer of the Christian Right writes, elites ‘shape the symbols which define the public 
discourse’ of the Christian Right. Detwiler, F. (1999) Standing on the Premises of God: the Christian 
Right’s Fight to Redefine America’s Public Schools (New York: NYU Press), p. 134. 
7
 Carlson, A. (2005) ‘On the World Congress of Families,’ Presentation to the Charismatic Leaders 
Fellowship Jacksonville, Florida January 12, 2005. The Howard Center, available at 
http://www.profam.org/docs/acc/thc.acc.020112.wcf.htm [last accessed 24/08/09].  
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WCF is a venue, says Carlson, in which its participants can ‘respond together to the 
global spread of a militant secularism that threatens the liberties and existence of all 
vital faiths.’8 Assuring his audience that the WCF is ‘NOT a massive organisation 
with visions of power and permanence,’ Carlson states that ‘it will continue only so 
long as it proves helpful to others and to the defense of the family.’9 
 
Unlike other scholars of the international Christian Right, I have considered 
activities beyond the UN as a requirement for a ‘pro-family’ organisation’s 
inclusion in this research. Because this thesis considers globalization, or the global 
broadcasting of ‘pro-family’ ideologies, it is important to look beyond the UN: the 
UN is one aspect of the global landscape for these groups, not all of it.  Here I am 
suggesting that ‘pro-family’ involvement in the UN should not be examined 
separately from the globalization of ‘pro-family’ organisations in general. Given the 
rapid rise of conservative forms of Christianity in the South, it seems likely that 
North-South partnerships between conservative Christian organisations outside of 
the UN will become more significant. In other words, the groups’ involvement at 
the UN – facilitated by the Bush administration – may in time be understood as 
incidental to their globalization. For this reason, groups which are active beyond the 
UN are included in my analysis. Finally, including non-UN affiliated groups or 
activities may confirm that the UN has a moderating influence on ‘pro-family’ 
NGOs; as it conveys legitimacy, it also constrains behaviour. 
 
In terms of the diversity requirement, excluding highly similar groups may 
emphasise groups that are marginal to the movement over more influential 
‘mainstream’ ‘pro-family’ organisations. An additional problem is that it is highly 
likely that NGOs are created simply for the purpose of acquiring coveted UN 
ECOSOC accreditation, which as Elizabeth Arweck puts it, is ‘an undisputed cachet 
of legitimisation.’10 This effort bolsters the presence of ‘pro-family’ organisations at 
the UN, but says more about the organisational aptitude of some actors in the 
movement than it says about the makeup and diversity of ‘pro-family’ organisations 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
10
 Arweck, E. (2007) ‘Globalization and New Religious Movements,’ in Religion, Globalization and 
Culture: International Studies in Religion and Society, ed. by Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (Boston: 
Leiden), p. 265.  
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as a whole. This is part of the reason that participation at the WCF is included as a 
criterion. Firstly, attendance at an overseas conference is costly,11 and secondly, the 
conference organisers are eager to present the conference as an international event, 
rather than as a speaking forum for North American NGOs with identical agendas. 
 
A further concern here is how to judge whether a ‘pro-family’ organisation is 
globally active in a political sense. It could be argued that an organisation’s very 
presence on the world wide web renders them a global entity by definition. That 
anyone in the world with internet access can access a church’s webpage means that 
such messages potentially have a global audience, but it does not mean that these 
churches seek a global influence. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, if the 
organisation’s intent is to influence the views of individuals or organisations 
beyond its membership, its internet activities can be considered political. If this 
activism is directed towards increasing the organisation’s global influence, then I 
consider the organisation to be globally politically active. Thus the NGOs under 
scrutiny here satisfy one final criterion: they are going beyond US borders in order 
to change (or save) the whole world from ‘anti-family’ forces or trends.12  
 
It should be noted that I have not included any Mormon institutions in my selection. 
Though I acknowledge the contribution Mormon groups have made in the 
globalization of the ‘pro-family’ movement, it was necessary to keep the number of 
organisations small and manageable. In addition to this, there are Mormons on the 
board of one of the groups I examine.13 These board members are closely associated 
with prominent Mormon ‘pro-family’ activists and scholars.14 Mormon ‘pro-family’ 
groups continue to make a significant contribution to this movement, and it is 
assumed that this research will incorporate some of the ‘pro-family’ perspectives 
strongly held by Mormon organisations.  
 
                                                 
11
 The WCF has always been held outside the US (although the preparatory meetings have tended to 
be held within the US). 
12
 It may be that the organisations are only pursuing this course because they see it as the best way to 
promote the interests of the US, but this still means their agenda is both global and political. 
13
 See ‘Statement 6’ of the Howard Center’s 2006 IRS form 990 (Return of organisation exempt 
from Income Tax Form). 
14
 See Butler, J. (2006) Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized (England: Pluto Press), p. 105. 
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What follows is a description of the groups that I have chosen as representative of 
‘pro-family’ discourse. Spin-off groups and ‘think tanks’ are discussed alongside 
the organisations that founded them, except in the case of HLI and C-Fam, which 
have diverged so significantly that they warrant independent inspection. The five 
groups under scrutiny were created with different intended audiences and arenas of 
action, and have evolved differently over time. Superficial differences in tactics and 
language are of interest because they suggest important ways in which ‘pro-family’ 
groups are adapting to global political terrains by using different approaches. For 
each of the five groups, I describe the organisation’s origins and structure, their 
international emergence, their mission statements, their level of funding and the 
major points of difference between the organisations.15  
 
Concerned Women for America/the Beverly LaHaye Institute 
Concerned Women for America (CWA), founded by Beverly LaHaye in 1979, is 
the ‘women’s wing’ of the internationally active Christian Right. CWA’s origins 
have been retold many times. As the story goes, LaHaye and her husband were 
watching a television interview with Betty Friedan in 1979, when the prominent 
feminist declared that she was speaking on behalf of American women. LaHaye, 
incensed by this assertion, reacted by calling a meeting of Christian Women to 
discover whether or not this was actually the case.16 Encouraged by the attendance 
of well over a thousand women, LaHaye created CWA with the purpose of 
opposing the ‘anti-God, anti-family rhetoric’ of feminists.17 Since its inception, the 
organisation has grown in numbers and in influence, and in 2008 boasted half a 
million members with almost 500 chapters spread across all 50 states.18  
 
                                                 
15
 Funds are in US dollars. 
16
 See www.cwfa.org/history.asp [last accessed 15/06/08]. 
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 Ibid. Susan Faludi notes, however, that by the late 1970s, LaHaye’s name and prominence in the 
evangelical community was already guaranteed to draw a crowd. See Faludi, S. (1991) Backlash: 
The Undeclared War Against American Women (London: Chatto & Windus), p. 280.  
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 See http://states.cwfa.org/states/, and ‘Today’ at http://www.cwfa.org/history.asp [last accessed 
15/06/08]. Though CWA undoubtedly has an influence that exceeds their membership, it is likely 
that membership numbers are misleading. Michael Standaert notes that CWA membership is 
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National Organisation for Women president Eleanor Smeal declared that if her organisation used the 
same system, their membership would be “in the millions.”’ Standaert, M. (2006) Skipping towards 
Armageddon: The politics and propaganda of the Left Behind novels and the LaHaye empire 
(Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press), p. 117. 
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CWA works as two organisations for tax purposes, one to which charitable 
donations are tax deductible, and one that is legally allowed to engage in partisan 
lobbying. CWA is a predominantly Protestant organisation, although a significant 
number of conservative Catholic women are members.19 CWA’s mission is 
‘to protect and promote Biblical values among all citizens – first through prayer, then 
education, and finally by influencing our society – thereby reversing the decline in 
moral values in our nation.’20 
CWA publishes Family Voice, a bi-monthly magazine, available both in print and 
via its webpage. It also broadcasts other items under the titles ‘Press Releases,’ 
‘Op/Eds,’ and ‘In the News.’ 
 
Along with LaHaye, CWA’s president Wendy Wright frequently appears on 
television and other media. The major source of international commentary and 
activism is Dr. Janice Shaw Crouse, a former speechwriter for President George W. 
Bush.21 In 1999, CWA launched a think-tank, the Beverly LaHaye Institute (BLI), 
which claims to recognise ‘the power of good data and analysis to inform and 
substantiate policy positions.’22 
 
Prior to the 1990s, CWA’s international advocacy was chiefly directed towards 
opposing communism, with LaHaye publicly endorsing Reagan’s support for the 
Nicaraguan Contras. 23  Although anti-communism persists as a theme in the 
language CWA uses, after the Cold War, observers note a shift in the organisation’s 
focus away from communism and towards preventing feminist progress at the UN. 
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 Buss and Herman, op. cit., p. xxviii. 
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 CWA’s ‘vision statement,’ which is slightly different, adds that CWA’s hope is for ‘women and 
like-minded men, from all walks of life, to come together and restore the family to its traditional 
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 See ‘Who’s Who in CWA,’ at 
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=2112&department=CWA&categoryid [last accessed 
11/08/09]. 
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 See http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=2112&department=CWA&categoryid [last 
accessed 18/06/08]. 
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In the 1990s, responding to the success of the women’s health and rights movement 
in that arena, CWA sought, and was granted, official ECOSOC status.24  
 
With annual public donations on the rise, and now totalling over $10 million,25 
CWA’s website states that the organisation 
‘…is blessed with members and friends who contribute generously. We don't, 
however, receive funds from large corporations, liberal foundations, or left-wing 
billionaires. Our average gift is less than $30, but because we have power in 
numbers, we are able to be one of the most effective organizations representing your 
views anywhere.’ 26 
CWA’s foot soldiers – or ‘kitchen table activists’ as they are referred to by the 
organisation – make the organisation a powerful political force in the US, through 
their letter writing campaigns and their ability to respond quickly to proposed 
legislation.27 However, ‘kitchen table activists’ have little to do with CWA’s global 
activities. As already noted, CWA’s work at the UN is entirely financed by one 
anonymous donor.28 Moreover, Crouse acknowledges that CWA’s supporters are 
probably largely unaware of the organisation’s international activities.29 This lack 
of awareness is likely to serve the organisation well, as there is some conflict 
between CWA’s inherent nationalism and historical opposition to ‘handouts,’ and 
its relatively new role in international development politics. This role requires 
connecting with the interests of people in poor countries, which is an essential part 
of legitimising CWA’s presence at the UN. More than the other groups examined 
here, CWA remains resolutely ‘pro-America,’ treating interaction with the outside 
world with a caution which sometimes appears to be approaching contempt. Thus 
CWA must balance a moderately pro-development position to its global audience, 
even as the organisation maintains a general anti-welfare, anti-UN and fairly 
isolationist stance at home. This conflict is shared by other Protestant Right groups 
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 See http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ for all NGOs with consultative status at the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs [last accessed 11/06/08]. 
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 See Concerned Women for America’s IRS form 990s from 2004 to 2008. 
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 ‘Stand With Us to Protect the American Family,’ Concerned Women for America, available at 
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active at the UN, and this thesis relies on CWA texts (among others) to demonstrate 
this particular tension within the US ‘pro-family’ movement.  
 
These are not the only conflicts at work within CWA. CWA’s activities at the UN 
have involved developing alliances which the Christian Right as a whole would 
consider to be beyond the pale. Marsden observes that at the same time as the Bush 
administration was publicly denouncing the ‘Axis of Evil,’ CWA was working 
alongside Libya, Iraq, Iran and Sudan against the international recognition of 
women’s rights.30 At an ideological level, CWA declines the opportunity to take a 
firm position on a number of ‘pro-family’ issues. Unwilling to condemn the use of 
contraception within marriage, or the right or desire of women to pursue a career,31 
CWA represents an important set of conflicts faced by conservative women as they 
struggle with feminism. 
 
Despite these issues, CWA remains a big gun in the international ‘pro-family’ 
movement. As Standaert suggests, CWA’s influence has translated into real 
changes in international policy.32 The organisation has significant influence within 
the Republican Party: it is estimated that over a million listeners tune in to CWA’s 
daily radio show, whilst hundreds of thousands of subscribers and church members 
receive publications from this organisation on a regular basis.33 
 
Human Life International 
Human Life International (HLI) is an extensive Catholic anti-abortion network 
which was founded in 1972. ‘With 99 satellite offices in 80 countries,’ HLI’s 
website advertises itself as ‘the largest international, pro-life, pro-family, pro-
woman organisation in the world.’34 Led by Thomas J. Euteneuer, HLI does not 
have UN ECOSOC accreditation. HLI does not seek official permission or 
endorsement to run their campaigns. The organisation erects anti-condom 
billboards, lobbies political figures and proselytises wherever possible. HLI offers 
the following statement about its motivations: 
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 Standaert, op. cit., p. 128. 
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‘The babies are the reason why. Everything HLI does is dedicated to saving lives 
and strengthening families throughout the world. Because we are the only pro-life 
presence in many countries – and because the culture of death is active on so many 
fronts – HLI’s global approach to the life issues is indispensable.’35 
HLI appeals solely to conservative Catholics in its fundraising efforts. Utilising its 
steadily growing budget – now just under $4 million 36  – Euteneuer and his 
colleagues travel to far-flung destinations to spread HLI’s message. Unlike many 
‘pro-family’ organisations, HLI funds are used for more than research and 
advocacy. In its international activism, HLI runs ‘crisis pregnancy’ centres, teaches 
courses on ‘natural family planning’ to young married couples, trains recruits all 
over the world to be domestic lobbyists and ‘pro-life’ counsellors, and hosts local 
‘pro-life’ radio and television programmes in countries all around the world. 
 
 
HLI Billboard, Tanzania, 200837 
 
HLI publishes Special Report, a monthly journal that discusses the progress (or 
otherwise) of the international ‘pro-life’ movement and offers highlights from 
Euteneuer and his colleagues ‘pro-life missionary trips.’ HLI also publishes Spirit 
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 See ‘Our Mission’ at http://www.hli.org/mission.html [last accessed 23/02/09], (Emphasis in 
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and Life, a monthly e-newsletter, and Front Lines, a quarterly magazine which 
sends ‘news from the missions’ to HLI supporters’ email inboxes, and a number of 
books and other publications. HLI’s ‘pro-life’ missionaries distribute books such as 
The Case Against Condoms and The Art of Natural Family Planning: Student 
Guide.38 
 
The Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute 
Though it is an offshoot of HLI, the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute 
(C-Fam) is a different type of organisation altogether. For some time, C-Fam 
publicly maintained that it was not affiliated with HLI, though it no longer does 
so.39 After HLI’s application for official NGO status at the UN was turned down, C-
Fam functioned as a point of access to UN meetings for the excluded Catholic 
organisation.40 Created in 1997, C-Fam is a sophisticated advocacy organisation 
with strong connections within the ‘pro-family’ movement. C-Fam has guided a 
number of other conservative NGOs through the process of gaining UN ECOSOC 
accreditation, and is the most well-known of the ‘pro-family’ organisations at the 
UN. 41  Lead by seasoned activist and journalist Austin Ruse, C-Fam’s primary 
purpose is to 
‘…educate the delegates at the UN and the general public on family issues and 
human rights. It does this through the publishing of newsletters, papers, and other 
informational lectures.’42 
C-Fam’s mission also includes ‘educating the public at large about the pressing 
issues debated at the UN and at other international institutions,’43 particularly those 
that deal with sexual, reproductive or religious issues. Since it was established, this 
has been achieved through the distribution of the Friday Fax, a weekly roundup of 
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events at the UN written for a socially conservative – but not necessarily religious – 
audience.  
 
C-Fam has a think-tank called the International Organisations Research Group 
(IORG). IORG is dedicated to  
‘advancing a deeper understanding of social policies advanced at the international 
level in order to protect and promote better national policies regarding human life, 
the family, religious freedom, and human rights.’44 
IORG’s research is published in ‘White Papers,’ which are investigations of C-
Fam’s institutional foes, pursued as legal arguments and framed in reasoning and 
language that seldom refers to religion. C-Fam’s annual funds averaged around 
$900,000 from 2004 to 2007, and the organisation has previously relied on financial 
support from other organisations, notably HLI Canada and Brigham Young 
University.45 
 
Including Catholic groups is vital to understanding the ‘pro-family’ worldview. In 
many ways, the Vatican was responsible for the entry of ‘pro-family’ groups into 
the UN system in the early 1990s when it called on people of faith to get involved 
in international policy-making on reproductive health. Catholic groups have a 
different understanding of the global sphere from their Protestant ‘pro-family’ 
allies. Seeing their religious identity as shared by millions of people around the 
world, Catholic organisations have seen the world beyond the US as a sphere of 
opportunity for far longer than their Protestant allies. Catholic organisations have a 
history of working within diverse communities in countries all over the world, and 
have shown themselves to be well equipped to accompany their ‘pro-family’ 
partners in global activism.  
 
Though it is likely true that conservative Catholics and Protestants have lately 
found that they have more in common with each other than with liberal members of 
their own religion,46 there are still important differences that need to be managed in 
the relationship. The Pope is still occasionally depicted as the Antichrist in US 
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evangelical subculture, for example.47 In addition, the Vatican has taken a number 
of political positions that are at odds with the Protestant Right, most notably over 
the death penalty and the Iraq War. Protestant and Catholic groups which work 
together must modify their discourse to emphasise shared values and goals, whilst 
playing down historical, cultural and political tensions in this alliance.  
 
Focus on the Family/the Family Research Council 
In the ‘pro-family’ movement, Focus on the Family (Focus) is ‘the big one.’48 The 
organisation was established by evangelical Christian conservative James Dobson 
in 1977. Dobson, a psychologist, is arguably the most important activist in the ‘pro-
family’ movement: as Marsden puts it, Dobson is ‘the man whose endorsement 
conservative Republicans most crave.’49 Focus is run as a ‘non-profit ministry,’ 
offering advice and counselling on a variety of ‘pro-family’ issues.50 Dobson has 
never received a salary from his work at Focus,51 he has made his fortune through 
royalties from his books, which are usually in bookshelves in the ‘self-help’ section, 
and are bought overwhelmingly by women.52 
 
Focus has a vision of ‘redeemed families, communities and societies worldwide 
through Christ,’ and its mission, as stated on its website, is 
‘To cooperate with the Holy Spirit in sharing the Gospel of Jesus Christ with as 
many people as possible by nurturing and defending the God-ordained institution of 
the family and promoting biblical truths worldwide.’53  
The organisation is based on six guiding principles, which it states are ‘drawn from 
the wisdom of the Bible and the Judeo-Christian ethic, rather than from the 
humanistic notions of today’s theorists.’ 54  These are: ‘the pre-eminence of 
evangelism; the permanence of marriage; the value of children; the sanctity of 
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social life; the importance of social responsibility; and the value of male and 
female.’55 Focus’ website defines sexuality as ‘a glorious gift [from God] to be 
offered back to Him either in marriage for procreation, union, and mutual delight or 
in celibacy for undivided devotion to Christ.’56 Dobson broadcasts his daily radio 
show to 164 countries, with an audience of over 220 million people in 15 
languages.57 
 
Focus is a latecomer to the international scene. Early disappointment with feminist 
successes at the international level, combined with the general evangelical suspicion 
of the UN, confirmed Focus activists’ suspicions that the world outside the US was 
‘anti-family’ and ‘anti-God.’ By 2001, however, C-Fam’s Austin Ruse had 
convinced Dobson to apply for UN ECOSOC status, and the organisation swiftly 
established itself as a leading force in international ‘pro-family’ politics. Focus’ 
clout is extensive: in Butler’s words, 
‘Focus has ministries in twenty countries around the world, all of which are run by 
nationals who sign a licensing agreement to use the Focus on the Family label... 
Through affiliates Focus can indirectly influence the capitals of UN member 
states.’58 
Thus it is clear that even without its UN NGO accreditation, Focus would be able to 
exert some influence on the UN, with its connections to ‘pro-family’ states. 
 
Dobson set up the Family Research Council (FRC) in Washington DC in 1983. This 
was in order that he could be more directly politically active without compromising 
Focus’ identity as a ‘ministry,’ or the tax exempt status of its burgeoning revenue. 
FRC is lead by Tony Perkins, a highly capable political activist with a particular 
interest in opposing same-sex marriages and civil unions. The organisation uses 
‘rapid action cells’ to deploy members to oppose or support legislation deemed 
politically significant by its leadership.59 FRC receives annual donations of around 
$10 million, whilst ‘pro-family’ behemoth Focus commands $125 million in public 
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support on a yearly basis.60 FRC publishes the Insight series, which as Buss and 
Herman note, ‘function as valuable position papers for the [Christian Right] 
movement as a whole.’61  
 
Movement into the global realm has been complicated for both FRC and Focus. 
While both have been relatively successful, Focus’ transformation into an 
international entity has involved careful management. In attempting to marry its 
‘helping’ character with its role in political/cultural warfare, and export both 
globally, Focus broadcasts a kind of American family credo which appears to be 
warmly received in many parts of the world. But as many women in poor countries 
remain politically and socially marginalised (and well outside the context of a 
backlash against feminism) Dobson’s message to women of romanticised ‘Biblical 
submission’ as a counter-cultural act62 requires some modification for audiences in 
the global South.  
 
The same can be said for Focus and FRC’s passionate opposition to homosexuality, 
which is a lightning rod domestically, but is far less politically relevant in the global 
South. 63  Conservative organisations in the South may agree with ‘pro-family’ 
stances on sexuality and reproduction, but poverty remains a far more important 
issue for most Southern NGOs. In this sense, Focus is representative of a number of 
international and domestic ‘pro-family’ organisations which have a history of 
involvement in helping Christian conservatives live up to their conservative 
ideals,64 but have little experience in the area of development assistance (other than 
in the spiritual sense).  
 
Both Focus and the FRC have official NGO status at the UN. As with CWA, 
another challenge faced by Focus and FRC’s involvement at the UN is to justify its 
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activities at the UN to its domestic base, given the traditionally anti-UN and anti-
Muslim stance of many in the US evangelical community.65 With CWA, Focus and 
the FRC are the major Protestant organisations involved in ‘pro-family’ politics 
outside of the US. Any analysis of international ‘pro-family’ groups without Focus 
and FRC would potentially miss some of the most fundamental ideas holding the 
‘pro-family’ movement together.  
 
The Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society 
Allan Carlson runs the Howard Center from Rockford, Illinois. Carlson is described 
as ‘more of an academic than a global organizer,’66 and usually refers to himself as 
a social historian rather than a ‘pro-family’ activist. Despite this disclaimer, Carlson 
served on the National Commission on Children under the Reagan 
Administration, 67  and is a prolific speaker and writer on ‘pro-family’ issues. 
Previously on the board of the Rockford Institute, Carlson and his colleague John 
A. Howard left the organisation in 1997 and set up the Howard Center.  
 
The Howard Center’s purpose is 
‘to provide research and understanding that demonstrate and affirm family and 
religion as the foundation of a virtuous and free society.’68 
The website states that the organisation is independent from ‘any particular religion, 
organization, or political group.’69 Carlson himself is a Lutheran, and the board of 
the Howard Center contains people from many different religious backgrounds. The 
organisation has strong connections to the Mormon ‘pro-family’ movement: Dallin 
Oaks, one of the Twelve Apostles of the Mormon Church, is one of a number of 
influential Mormons sitting on the board of the Howard Center.70 Carlson himself 
has what Butler calls a ‘close working relationship’ with Dr Richard Wilkins, 
former director of the World Family Policy Center at Brigham Young University.71  
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Though this organisation operates on a relatively small (but growing) annual 
budget,72 the Howard Center is a hive of scholarly activity. The Howard Center’s 
publications include The Family in America and The Religion and Society Report. 
The former is a monthly report which summarises recent research on family issues, 
couched in predominantly secular language, whilst the latter takes on a more 
explicitly Christian tone in its analysis of the impacts of social change.73 As well as 
operating a massive library of ‘pro-family’ articles, speeches and other publications, 
the Howard Center is active at the UN as an official NGO. Most importantly, the 
Howard Center organises the WCF and runs the official WCF website and 
publications. 
 
More than the other organisations considered here, the Howard Center generates 
ideas and arguments that provide the ‘pro-family’ movement with what Buss and 
Herman call its ‘intellectual sustenance.’ 74  Carlson, in particular, reflects on a 
number of social and economic issues with more depth and sensitivity than others in 
the movement. He acknowledges the tensions with the Christian Right’s alliance 
with neo-conservatives in the Republican Party, and makes no secret of his anti-
industrial sentiments. Carlson sees himself as a conservative who holds traditional 
values, but his nostalgia and agrarianism emphasise an attachment to different 
traditions than those of Dobson and CWA.  
 
Another point of difference between the Howard Center and others of the Protestant 
Right is Carlson’s attitude towards the role of government. His promotion of 
‘family-friendly’ policies, such as income-splitting and personal tax exemptions for 
married couples with dependent children, marks a divergence from other 
evangelicals.75 Though he does not support the ‘Swedish model,’ he emphasises the 
potential benefits of socialising the cost of having children (though through tax 
                                                 
72
 While the Howard Center’s 2004 tax return showed an income of under $500,000; by 2007 this 
had increased to well over $1 million. The Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society 2004, 
2005, 2006 and 2007 Calendar Year IRS Form 990, Return of Organisation Exempt from Income 
Tax Forms.   
73
 See Buss and Herman, op. cit., p. xxix for more on these publications. 
74
 Ibid, p. xxix. 
75
 Income-splitting is a taxation system which reduces the tax paid by families in which one spouse 
cares for dependent children on a full-time basis. According to this system, a working partner 
supporting a wife or husband at home with children ‘splits’ their income, so that they are both taxed 
at the much lower rate which corresponds to half of the working person’s income, thus the couple 
pays substantially less tax overall. 
75 
 
relief, not income redistribution). This is connected to his investment and 
confidence in European countries as potential ‘pro-family’ allies, which also sets 
him apart from many others in the movement who have given up the continent as 
irredeemably ‘lost.’ 
 
These five organisations and their offshoots represent the different religious sectors 
of the ‘pro-family’ movement and the different ways that ‘pro-family’ organisations 
are globalising. Their varied emphases on different policy areas corresponds to the 
breadth of issues with which the movement as a whole is concerned. They also 
embody different – and in some cases opposing – perspectives on how to deal with 
the issues they face. Although other organisations important to the movement are 
omitted from this study,76  I consider the groups chosen to be a representative 
sample.  
 
Part II: How the texts are used 
These organisations and their motives for global activism could arguably be 
examined (and indeed similar studies have been pursued) using psychological or 
sociological methods. I have chosen a political science approach because it 
highlights the most important aspects of the movement’s successes: globally active 
‘pro-family’ organisations are elite agenda-setters, attempting to bring about social 
change and increase their influence relative to progressive organisations. Before I 
describe my methods in more detail, I will briefly discuss the ways that 
psychologists and sociologists have addressed this question and how my approach 
differs from theirs. 
 
Interview techniques 
A number of political psychologists have attempted to answer the question of how 
Christian Right beliefs and motivations work. Kristi Andersen’s (1988) study seeks 
to answer a similar question about ‘pro-family’ organisations as this thesis: what are 
the sources of ‘pro-family’ ideology?77 Her analysis is an attempt to understand the 
cognitive processes through which individuals’ ‘pro-family’ political stances 
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evolve. Andersen interviews her subjects using open-ended questions, with 
interviewees encouraged to explain their positions, and make links between 
statements. Her analysis is excellent, and she uncovers a number of similar journeys 
where interviewees went from being ‘pro-choice’ to being vocal and active 
members of the domestic US ‘pro-life’ movement.  
 
Another important contribution to the psychology of ‘pro-family’ advocates is 
Christel Manning’s (1999) book on how women involved in the domestic Religious 
Right movement ‘grapple’ with feminism in their own lives.78 Manning is interested 
in how conservative Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Jewish women deal with 
inconsistency between their ideological views and the day to day demands and 
experiences in their own lives. She spent time in three different conservative 
communities, using in-depth interviews to ascertain how conservative women of 
faith have responded to feminist ideas. Manning’s subject matter may not seem to 
be directly relevant to this thesis. However, if we consider that one of the same 
issues that has motivated ‘pro-family’ activism at the international level – feminism 
– is a key factor in shaping how Manning’s subjects identify themselves politically, 
then Manning’s methods and findings could be expanded to explain the behaviour 
and ideology of ‘pro-family’ groups at the international level. In addition, 
ideological inconsistencies like the ones Manning describes in her analysis arise 
time and again in ‘pro-family’ texts. In these ways, Manning’s methods may offer 
us a way to explain the behaviour and ideological views of ‘pro-family’ views at the 
global level. 
 
In spite of the potential of interviews to uncover the reasons that ‘pro-family’ 
activists believe what they do, I do not interview ‘pro-family’ activists. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is the statements that are made by elites once they are 
already established as activists that are of interest, rather than the cognitive 
processes by which individuals have arrived at their ideological positions. This is 
partly because these statements and the people who make them are leaders of ‘pro-
family’ culture and politics. As broadcasters of the ‘pro-family’ message, it is 
arguably less important to discover a general route by which they came to their 
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views, than to tease apart what their views are and how they seek to act upon them 
in the global realm. I take it as a given that the organisations have emerged on the 
global scene with a set of ideological commitments, and it is how and why these 
commitments change in the context of globalization that is of interest here. Though 
interviews and psychological studies of how the ‘pro-family’ brain works are an 
important step towards understanding the political behaviour and personal 
biographies of religious conservatives, they do not address the question of how 
conservative social movements see the world beyond the US and how they change 
as they become global actors. 
 
Sociological approaches 
Sociological approaches to this topic have also been used to understand the activism 
and ideologies of the Christian Right. Frameworks derived from Marx, Durkheim 
and Weber, along with other influential sociological models have been used to 
understand conservative religious movements in ways that could be potentially 
useful here. Building on their work, contemporary sociologists have usefully 
applied these frameworks to understand the activities of the Christian Right. What 
follows is a brief description of four sociological approaches to the globalization of 
‘pro-family’ organisations, and my reasons for not utilising these methods in this 
thesis.  
 
Marxist approaches to religion emphasise that religion acts as a palliative for the 
alienating effects of the capitalist mode of production. Carolyn Gallaher’s excellent 
study of the domestic Religious Right picks up on this theme.79 She makes the very 
plausible argument that working-class people find comfort from the economic 
anxieties wrought by globalization in the ‘remasculinization’ offered by Religious 
Right ideology.80 The same approach could be use to understand the popularity of 
‘pro-family’ ideas in the global South. However, while this framework may offer an 
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answer as to why people in the poorest countries seem so ready to accept the ‘pro-
family’ message in the context of economic globalization, it does not cast light on 
why ‘pro-family’ groups themselves believe so strongly in ‘remasculinization,’ and 
what role it plays in their global agenda.  
 
Another important contribution made by sociologists to this topic is their expansion 
of Durkheim’s concept of ‘anomie’ to the literature on religion and globalization. In 
this framework, not dissimilar to the one described above, religion acts as a barrier 
against the erosion of norms and values which are challenged by the relativising 
force of globalization. As an explanation for the rise of religious fundamentalism in 
poor countries, sociologist Radhakrishnan suggests that a ‘fast spreading anomie’ 
compels increasing numbers of people to seek moral guidance and social 
connections in readily available ‘religious banalities.’81 As above, however, while 
this thesis may help to explain attraction to conservative ideologies under 
globalization, it has limited potential in uncovering why religious groups from rich 
countries seek to spread this particular set of ‘banalities’ across the globe.  
 
Sociologists of religion in the Weberian tradition82 see globalization as a process 
through which the world is rationalised according to specific principles that 
trivialise local religious practices and defy the inviolability of the nation-state. As 
such, an argument could be made that the ‘pro-family’ movement is a defensive 
effort to safeguard against the encroachment of a global ‘iron cage of rationality,’ in 
which human heterogeneity is destroyed by an over-bureaucratised global society. 
Others picture this differently, seeing the spread of US style Christianity as one of 
the means by which the ‘protestant ethic of capitalism’ is exported. 83  This 
framework is potentially useful in many ways, although it has little to say about 
why the focus on curtailing women’s health and rights initiatives has been such a 
political success for ‘pro-family’ groups. Application of this framework would also 
be problematic if it ignored the ways in which ‘pro-family’ organisations are 
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themselves attempting to homogenise the social practices of the world according to 
their own rationalised schema. 
 
Some sociologists who study social movements have offered ‘status politics’ as a 
means of explaining why certain movements develop as they do. This approach 
suggests that disgruntled individuals who perceive that their social status has been 
devalued form protest movements to restore themselves to their original position. 
The status politics framework has been fruitfully applied to the domestic Christian 
Right in the context of the anti-pornography,84 anti-abortion, and anti-gay85 aspects 
of the movement.86 In the context of ‘pro-family’ organisations moving beyond the 
US, status politics theory would suggest one of two explanations for this movement: 
either ‘pro-family’ groups are globalising as a means of redressing their loss of 
status at home, or they at one stage perceived their ideology as one of global 
importance and seek to restore it to that position. There is likely to be some truth to 
both of these explanations. In terms of the first, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, the end goal of political ‘pro-family’ activism may not be limited to the 
restoration of the organisation’s domestic standing. In that case, an approach that 
relies on status politics will miss the aspects of global change which the 
organisations desire as ends in themselves. In terms of the second explanation, it is 
true that in many parts of the world, the ‘pro-family’ ideology and way of life were 
more esteemed in the past than they are now. There is some evidence that ‘pro-
family’ organisations see the UN itself as an institution that was once conservative 
in its stance towards the family. Yet to see these groups’ activities as aimed at the 
re-establishment of ‘pro-family’ norms on a global scale is problematic, because 
these groups have portrayed the UN – and indeed the entire world outside the US – 
as untrustworthy, hostile and secular for so long. Nor have the organisations or 
individuals themselves suffered a loss of status at the international level; their 
personal experiences during the Bush Administration have been the opposite. So 
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although the status politics framework may be useful when applied to this issue at a 
general level, to rely on it as a working method would run the risk of obscuring 
important elements in the global emergence of the ‘pro-family’ movement. 
 
Sociological methods and frameworks do have much in common with political 
science approaches, and could have been used here to unearth some extremely 
valuable ideas and findings about the motivations of ‘pro-family’ groups. Sociology 
offers different ways of understanding how people pick up ideas, incorporate them 
into their lives, and transmit them to others. Yet because this thesis is so concerned 
with discerning political ideologies, the analysis of the texts has been carried out 
using a political science framework which focuses on the discourse of elites. Given 
the lack of knowledge of the general public as to the global activities of many of 
these organisations, it seems reasonable to suggest that it is the elites of the 
movement that are responsible for its globalization. For this reason, it is the political 
ideologies of ‘pro-family’ activists which are the subjects of scrutiny in this thesis. 
 
Political Science 
There are a number of reasons to approach ‘pro-family’ ideologies through a 
political science framework. Ideologies are by nature political. Political ideologies 
make sense of the world (using a particular set of assumptions), and stipulate how 
people should behave in it. ‘Pro-family’ activists have clearly defined ideas about 
what is wrong with the world, a blueprint for how they would like it to be, and a 
plan as to how they will make it better.  
 
Political ideologies take on even greater significance in a globalizing world. In the 
absence of an established and respected international legal framework, appeals to 
‘universally shared’ symbols – such as the importance of families and motherhood 
– can be a powerful tool for agenda-setting. In their areas of interest, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations seek to affirm the ‘natural family’ as the global norm for the entire 
population of the world. In this effort, the organisations characterise events and 
entities as either contributing towards a ‘pro-family’ outcome, or an obstacle 
preventing the realisation of this desired end state. But making such claims in the 
global realm is also problematic: as Beyer notes, globalization brings into stark 
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relief the fact that ‘diverse ways of living are largely human constructions.’87 In this 
environment, then, ‘pro-family’ organisations can be seen as competing for their 
ideology – which they argue is the most ‘natural’ one – to be elected as the 
blueprint for development. In this sense, the ideology of global ‘pro-family’ 
organisations can be examined in the same way as other political ideologies. 
 
‘Pro-family’ ideologies have emerged from an environment of cultural conflict. 
These groups have gathered in response to political entities and social phenomena 
that they and their followers find repulsive. In the domestic realm and beyond it, 
these groups define themselves and shape their politics in opposition to others, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, the way these organisations shift 
their ideological priorities and adapt their discourse to new contexts over time is 
politically informed. This is a process in which the movement picks a path between 
maintaining adherence to certain key principles, and the necessity of taking 
strategic opportunities in a constantly changing environment. As the conflicts have 
gone on, the groups have adjusted both their priorities and their tactics, becoming 
astute political actors in the process. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, these organisations (the units of analysis in this thesis) 
are best understood as political entities. Though they are all religious, their 
approach to politics is like any other international NGO88 (except for the obvious 
difference that most NGOs have progressive or liberal goals) with a political agenda 
that seeks to influence the way people behave. They could be considered as a 
distinctive set of Religious International NGOs, or ‘RINGOs’ as Boli and 
Brewington identify them.89 These authors write that RINGOs use religion both as a 
means and an end: their goals are a mixture of solely religious activities like 
proselytizing, and attempting to fix worldly problems through ‘service to humanity 
within a God-given meaning and identity system.’90 ‘Pro-family’ organisations can 
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be understood to differ from ordinary RINGOs in that they see this ‘service to 
humanity’ in their effort to prevent (rather than offer) access to knowledge and 
services, and their attempts to bring down international organisations they see as 
harming the world’s people. I suggest, however, that in their short history, ‘pro-
family’ organisations have shown more enthusiasm in conservative political 
activism and almost no interest in proselytizing (in the sense of saving souls). 
Because they have historically preferred to focus their efforts on proscribing and 
disrupting international development initiatives than providing services, and 
because they make an effort to play down their religious identities, these groups are 
best considered as a political movement of religious organisations.  
 
Discourse Analysis 
‘Pro-family’ organisations form a specific political community with shared goals, 
language, and ideas about the world. As such, discourse analysis provides an 
academic tool through which their ‘friend-foe’ politics can be identified and 
understood. A ‘discourse’ is usefully defined by Charlotte Epstein as 
‘a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations about a specific object 
that frame that object in a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for 
action in relation to it.’91 
Discourses evolve in a process which reinforces successful categorisations and 
representations, through which ‘realities are constructed, made factual and 
justified.’92 Understanding the way these organisations represent the world enables 
observers to see how ‘pro-family’ ideology is changing over time, to see which 
symbols and ideas are believed to be of most significance, and to understand how 
‘pro-family’ groups represent the ideologies of their opponents.  
 
It should be noted here that ‘pro-family’ political discourse almost certainly 
involves misrepresentation, exaggeration and outright deception. How is it possible 
to discern the motivations of people within the ‘pro-family’ movement if we do not 
know whether what is said represents even the views of the person saying it, let 
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alone the entire movement? To this I would reply that the fact that a claim has been 
made publicly is what matters, rather than whether the claims themselves are 
sincere, or representative of the wider ‘pro-family’ community. An assumption here 
is that strategically or deliberately distorted characterisations of the world are still a 
part of ‘pro-family’ discourse, and therefore say something about the ‘pro-family’ 
view of reality. In other words, if ‘pro-family’ activists are scoring political points 
from what they believe are widely held perceptions of the world and the people in it 
– even if they do not believe these perceptions themselves – this still betrays a ‘pro-
family’ belief about the world. Regardless of the objective truth or otherwise of any 
given ‘pro-family’ representation then, persistent depictions of the world that ring 
false or seem intentionally distorted offer the observer an insight into the kinds of 
symbols and characterisations that ‘pro-family’ organisations want their adherents 
to accept. That particularly bizarre characterisations of the world are either picked 
up or ignored by the ‘pro-family’ public is also relevant, attesting to the boundaries 
of the discourse. 
 
In this way, discourse analysis enables observers to perceive the ways that the ‘pro-
family’ movement is changing over time. When these organisations pick up on new 
ideas and stop emphasising old ones, we get an indication of the way the movement 
is changing. These changes in direction may be responses to events and actors 
outside the movement, or the projection of ideas generated from within the 
movement. Some ideas remain consistent core beliefs, while others are amenable to 
change. This type of analysis can show which policy positions are likely to persist, 
and which are not. 
 
While the use of discourse analysis is by no means restricted to political scientists, 
its ability to discern symbols and ideas within the language of a given political 
community makes it an excellent tool for understanding that community’s political 
views. The ‘pro-family’ movement appears to be particularly attuned to the 
importance of symbols surrounding gender and families. Symbols and ideas 
arguably become even more important under globalization as the organisations 
appeal to (what they believe are) universally held morals and beliefs.  
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Finally, discourse analysis enables an observer to see the world through the eyes of 
other people. This allows us to understand why international ‘pro-family’ activists 
do what they do. Considering the discourse of another political community means 
coming to terms with the different assumptions that the people within it make about 
the world and how they work in practice. Thorough analysis of their rhetoric should 
provide a sophisticated understanding of these organisations. Here I am making the 
assumption that it is possible to discern the driving forces of the ‘pro-family’ 
movement from the way its organisations write and talk about the world. This is 
part and parcel of treating these organisations as political entities; every complaint 
or positive comment these organisations make suggests that the world is a step 
closer or further away from the way they think it should be. From this point of 
view, the way social issues are represented within a group of people is responsible 
for – or at least indicative of – the political views of its members, and directs the 
group’s activities to a large degree. If these representations are successfully picked 
up in the discourse, they reinforce the importance of certain symbols, the accepted 
meaning of words, and ultimately the direction of the movement itself.  
 
The texts in this thesis are not read with any new or specially developed technique, 
and no particular type or theory of discourse analysis is intended to be invented or 
redefined here. The texts are simply gathered by the use of search engines on the 
websites of the five organisations under scrutiny, according to their relevance to the 
international or global outlook or agenda of these organisations. For example, texts 
for chapter five, on feminism, were found by searching for the words ‘fem*,’ 
‘wom*,’ ‘masc*,’ ‘child*,’ ‘girl*,’ ‘abort*,’ ‘sex*,’ ‘repro*’ and ‘health,’ on all of 
the websites.’ 
 
What this thesis does not cover 
My research does not provide a detailed description of the activities of the ‘pro-
family’ movement in terms of their attendance at international conferences, 
lobbying US politicians and so on. The efforts of international ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are discussed in detail in a growing number of books on the 
movement. Lee Marsden, for example, traces the activism of these international 
Christian Right organisations in ‘Hijacking the Human Rights and Humanitarian 
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Assistance Agenda,’ a relatively descriptive chapter in his 2008 book on the foreign 
policy influence of Christian Right organisations.93  
 
Butler’s 2006 book Born Again also provides analysis of Christian Right positions 
and arguments at different UN conferences, showing the approaches the movement 
has taken with regards to a variety of issues. She sees herself as a ‘participating 
observer’ of the Christian Right, having represented progressive religious 
organisations at the UN for some years. My research, by contrast, maps the ‘pro-
family’ ideological terrain and its complications. In this sense, then, this thesis is 
intended to complement Marsden and Butler’s work on ‘pro-family’ activism, in 
that it provides a kind of theoretical or ideological narrative to the action they 
describe.  
 
Nor does this thesis follow the activism of ‘pro-family’ organisations in order to 
discern the reasons for their success, as Butler does. Butler’s effort to understand 
why ‘pro-family’ groups have been so successful focuses on the techniques and 
circumstances surrounding the rise of the international Christian Right. Butler is 
sensitive to the difficulties facing these groups as they attempt to build a 
conservative NGO network by creating alliances with conservative Muslim 
governments and organisations. Crucially, she explains the globalization of ‘pro-
family’ groups largely in terms of the opportunity they have been given to do so. 
This she does well, and from a tactical point of view, Born Again provides a superb 
analysis of the strategic aptitude of Christian Right organising. This thesis does not 
attempt to analyse the success of the ‘pro-family’ movement or predict its future 
success using any particular political framework for doing so. In other words, while 
I highlight the changing course of ‘pro-family’ discourse and pay close attention to 
the issues that threaten to divide or hinder the movement, I do not attempt to 
calculate whether or why the movement is successful or not or speculate as to its 
future. 
 
This thesis considers ‘pro-family’ texts from the websites of the groups described 
above from 1997 to the end of 2008. There are two main reasons for starting my 
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investigation of the international ‘pro-family’ movement around 1997. The first 
WCF was held in Prague in 1997, and signals the beginnings of a formal effort to 
coordinate the global agenda of ‘pro-family’ organisations. The second reason is 
that the internationalisation or globalization of the movement arguably only begins 
in earnest around or after this time.  C-Fam was created in 1997, as was the Howard 
Center. Though the other groups may have attended conferences at the UN before 
this time, they did not gain official ECOSOC accreditation or consultative status 
until after 1997.94 I finish my analysis at the end of the Bush administration.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter and those preceding it, I have attempted to do a number of things. I 
have explained my intention to examine and understand the motivations of globally 
active ‘pro-family’ organisations, and justified this aim in terms of the profound 
effects that this movement has had since the late 1990s.95 These ‘pro-family’ NGOs 
are an elite group of conservative global actors who enjoy the support of the US 
Christian Right but do not necessarily have to justify their activities to their 
grassroots domestic supporters. I have described each organisation in detail and 
justified my selection process.  
 
I have considered the ‘pro-family’ motivations offered by the academic literature on 
this movement and used what I see as the most useful and fitting of these to focus 
my research. From this analysis, four areas emerged as important ways of 
understanding ‘pro-family’ motivations. The first is globalization, which provides 
an understanding of the changing context under which ‘pro-family’ organisations 
see themselves as working. The second is the UN, which has been both the means 
through which ‘pro-family’ groups have come to see themselves as global actors, 
and a nemesis which characterises the dangers inherent in global space. The third is 
feminism, which has undoubtedly been a major ideological opponent against which 
global ‘pro-family’ activism has developed. The last is fertility, which brings 
together a number of different strands of ‘pro-family’ thought around population 
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control, secularism and development. In these chapters, I lay out the different ways 
that these areas have been discussed in ‘pro-family’ discourse and show how these 
perceptions may be changing. In considering the changing ways that ‘pro-family’ 
organisations consider the ideologies and the people that they oppose, we gain 
crucial insights into what the ‘pro-family’ movement believes about itself and its 
role in the globalizing world.  
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Chapter Three: ‘Pro-family’ views of Globalization: danger meets opportunity 
 
‘... the process of globalization to which we all seem to be committed will lead to 
the largest “state” of all, the World State, and that state will inevitably be 
despotic.’1 
The Howard Center, 2001 
 
 ‘I quite agree with Abraham Kuyper … "There is not a square inch in the whole 
domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does 
not cry: Mine!”’2 
The Family Research Center, 2001  
 
Globalization is a massive and convoluted topic. Academics have suggested a 
number of different ways of understanding the meaning and practice of 
globalization. One of the first, sociologist Roland Robertson, described 
globalization as ‘the compression of the world into a single place.’3 Other scholars 
have preferred to characterise globalization in terms of the increasing frequency 
with which things and information travel across and between regions of the world.4 
Alternatively, Philip McMichael sees it in more political terms, as a ‘project’ in 
which the increasing reach and influence of global elites is achieved through the 
exploitation of various inequalities. 5  All of these definitions are valid (and 
compatible), from certain perspectives. 
 
In this chapter I attempt to identify how ‘pro-family’ organisations understand 
globalization.  As was discussed in chapter one, I assume that how organisations 
define globalization has a significant impact on how they behave. Finding the 
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‘truest’ account of globalization is less important than understanding what ‘pro-
family’ leaders believe about the phenomenon. For this reason, I use all of the 
descriptions above as ‘working definitions’ of globalization as I seek out the 
different ways that ‘pro-family’ activists understand globalization. 
 
Much has been written on how religious movements fare in the context of 
globalization. Because religions tend to appeal to universal moral principles, and 
globalization challenges the universal applicability of such claims, religious 
movements can struggle to maintain their moral authority in an increasingly 
relativistic social environment. ‘Pro-family’ organisations, with their strong history 
of moral declarations and their firm belief in the rightness and wrongness of certain 
behaviours, seemed predestined to suffer bitterly under globalization. Yet they have 
not. This chapter is an attempt to understand why this is so. It examines the ways 
that ‘pro-family’ organisations have characterised globalization, in order to discern 
how the groups reconcile their ideological positions and their identity with their 
new roles as global actors. 
 
Most ‘pro-family’ leaders see globalization as a secularising process. Globalization, 
they argue, is both anti-Christian and anti-tradition. When it is not associated with 
liberal international organisations and ‘globalists,’ globalization is very 
occasionally conflated with anarchy in ‘pro-family’ discourse. As a result, 
globalization (as it is presently experienced) is at odds with the central values of 
Christian conservatism: the primacy of tradition and divine authority in ordering 
social space.  
 
Where they see globalization as unavoidable, ‘pro-family’ discourse offers its own 
vision of how the process should be guided or shaped (insofar as this is possible). 
This vision sees enlightened global actors using ‘pro-family’ and ‘Judeo-Christian’ 
principles as a guide to make appropriate decisions for their constituencies. These 
principles, say the organisations, are preferable both to the approaches taken by 
liberal leaders of international institutions who are sometimes assigned as 
‘globalists,’ and to a laissez-faire globalization that is controlled by nobody. 
Desiring neither anarchy nor a liberal world government, ‘pro-family’ organisations 
assume the responsibility of saving the world from ‘anti-family’ forces as their own.  
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Policy positions on globalization seldom emerge with this degree of clarity, 
however, with the overwhelming approach to globalization clouded in ambiguity, 
confusion and apprehension. ‘Pro-family’ interpretations of globalization in this 
chapter show a movement that is quite uncertain of how to deal with this 
phenomenon. Inconsistencies and outright hypocrisies are rife. It is clear that ‘pro-
family’ organisations are not always talking about the same aspects of globalization 
when they make their claims for or against it. Globalization, like all forms of 
political change, is never treated neutrally in ‘pro-family’ discourses.  
 
Nevertheless, a fledgling ‘pro-family’ agenda with regard to globalization can be 
discerned. Where political positions do become apparent, they veer in two 
directions. Some ‘pro-family’ arguments state that the process of globalization is in 
itself destabilising and needs to be arrested by appeal to government protection, 
whilst others speak to the ‘pro-family’ opportunities that emerge from this 
instability. Proponents of the former position advocate strong government and small 
communities, whilst advocates of the latter encourage the outreach of US ‘pro-
family’ organisations to areas most affected by globalization, in order to encourage 
the ‘grassroots’ uptake of the ‘pro-family’ message. These are very different 
agendas, but both have been advanced across the ‘pro-family’ spectrum, to various 
degrees. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections which analyse ‘pro-family’ texts that 
relate to globalization. The first section asks: how do ‘pro-family’ leaders interpret 
globalization? The second asks: which aspects of globalization are seen as 
redeemable? The way the groups are changing their perspectives over time is also 
considered throughout the chapter.  
 
Part I: How do ‘pro-family’ leaders interpret globalization?  
According to ‘pro-family’ organisations, globalization is mostly a negative 
phenomenon. ‘Pro-family’ thinkers who consider globalization tend to see it as a 
process that reduces both the freedom of people to live their lives as they choose, 
and the stability of the communities in which they live. The texts differ widely as to 
what it is that is exerting control over people’s freedom, how this influence will be 
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applied, and whether there are agents of globalization who are responsible for this 
reduction of freedom. As already noted, there is a wide variety of ‘pro-family’ 
perspectives on what globalization is, and what is driving it. This section is divided 
into six categories, which have emerged from this examination of ‘pro-family’ 
discourse: globalization as corporate-driven, globalization as external regulation, 
globalization as US-lead, globalization as materialism, globalization as spreading 
the ‘culture of death,’ and globalization as secularism. 
 
Globalization as corporate-driven 
Corporations are occasionally highlighted in ‘pro-family’ texts as playing a role in 
promoting an increasingly repressive global system, and they are largely seen to be 
unreliable entities in terms of protecting tradition and religion. Yet ‘pro-family’ 
groups do not display any expectation that corporations should act in a particular 
way, other than in the direction of maximising profits. Overall, texts that are critical 
of corporate-lead globalization tend to highlight the liberal attitudes of CEOs as the 
reason that globalization has what they see as ‘anti-family’ outcomes, rather than 
the structures or profit-seeking motives of corporations themselves. 
 
The Howard Center stands out among ‘pro-family’ organisations as interpreting 
corporate globalization as problematic in itself, in that corporations inevitably 
increase their power relative to nation-states, local religious communities and 
individuals. The author of a 2002 Religion and Society report suggests that 
‘globalization, in which international corporations control the destiny of smaller 
nations and sometimes of ours,’6 leads to the breakdown of national sovereignty. 
This is through ‘the power of international commerce,’7 in which corporations are 
able to impose their will on the governments of smaller countries. The author sees 
this as a serious problem that threatens the US, though he concludes that ‘for the 
time being, at least, it is Washington, not Wall Street, which rules.’8 Globalization 
looms, but has not yet taken over. Thus with resolve and political action, people can 
still resist the detrimental effects of globalization by encouraging governments to 
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rein in corporations. Economically speaking at least, then, the Howard Center is 
moving towards the prioritisation of the nation-state system over any political 
commitment to unregulated capitalism. 
 
C-Fam, on the other hand, interprets the role of corporations in the process of 
globalization more ambiguously. Big business is only identified as a global threat 
when its executives pursue political goals that are incompatible with those of the 
Christian Right. One C-Fam Friday Fax warns that ‘[i]ncreasingly… with the rise 
of globalization, the left is coming to see big business as a very powerful engine for 
liberal social change.’9 Another Friday Fax bemoans the degree of cooperation 
between UN children’s agency UNICEF, and corporations that they argue are run 
by executives with liberal tendencies: ‘These [UNICEF] programs [promoting 
gender equality] frequently use financial and broadcast assistance from such media 
giants as Walt Disney, Warner Brothers, and Turner Broadcasting.’10 Globalization 
is seen as being negative in this sense, because it facilitates the institutional 
‘teaming-up’ of rich and influential ‘anti-family’ forces, not because it enables 
corporations and individuals to broadcast their agenda globally per se.  
 
Another C-Fam author takes issue with liberal leaders of international corporations 
because he sees corporate leaders as betraying their long-term profit mandates by 
supporting pro-choice organisations. The author is perplexed by the idea that 
‘manufacturers that rely upon an increasing population of children, for instance, 
frequently give their money to groups that support and promote population 
control.’11  Rather than stress the moral dimensions of abortion and contraception, 
this author emphasises that the promotion of such policies counteract the interests 
of shareholders and in general, the economy as a whole.12 Here C-Fam does not 
question the appropriateness of global capitalism in promoting a ‘pro-family/pro-
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life’ society, seeing the two as highly compatible. Thus it is the agents, rather than 
the process, of globalization that is the problem for C-Fam. 
 
Globalization as external regulation 
Concerned Women for America (CWA) depictions of globalization are quite 
perplexing. Almost all CWA texts before 2004 mentioning globalization focus 
exclusively on the UN and its shortfalls. In one 2002 article that tangentially 
discusses globalization, ‘UN takes on Population and Free Markets,’ CWA senior 
fellow Janice Crouse warns that international discussions on globalization equate to 
calls for greater UN control:  
‘Group I [of three groups preparing for a UN-sponsored international conference on 
sustainable development] will focus on socialistic world-government anti-poverty 
schemes. Group II will focus on globalization—UN control of trade and finance in 
the world economy.’13  
Here globalization is intrinsically linked to – even defined by – attempts to control 
it. The UN is seen as an entity that seeks to control the world through its role as a 
regulatory body, imposing its ideological agenda on the world’s population. This 
suggests that (at this time, at least) CWA does not distinguish between globalization 
and what Buss and Herman refer to as ‘globalism’: the drive to create a ‘New 
World Order’ based on socialist, feminist and environmentalist principles.14 
 
Another article by Crouse in 2002 suggests that globalization is one of the UN’s 
‘causes.’ Crouse is concerned with the degree to which the UN is able to influence 
global attitudes and beliefs. In her words, the UN ‘flaunts its causes: gender 
mainstreaming and gender equality, reproductive rights and services, globalization 
and reparations.’ 15  Moreover, the UN is opposed to Western affluence and 
capitalism, says Crouse: ‘According to the UN, capitalism, free trade, private 
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enterprise and entrepreneurship are all sources of environmental and developmental 
problems around the world.’16 Thus in Crouse’s view at this time, globalization is 
not capitalism writ large, it is the UN’s response to it. 
 
Later CWA articles on globalization are not much clearer than their predecessors. In 
an article written four years later in response to a publication by the US National 
Council of Churches (NCC), Crouse still makes a connection between globalization 
and economic redistribution from rich to poor countries:   
‘[the NCC report suggests that] global trade and global aid are essential for greater 
financial equity around the world; translation: Globalization means robbing the US 
and giving to undeveloped nations.’17 
Clearly Crouse is opposed to globalization if it means redistributing money away 
from the US. Crouse’s issue with globalization is still to do with the efforts of 
progressives to mitigate its unequal effects, rather than the process itself.18  
 
This is established further in a 2006 article by Crouse called ‘the big G – 
Globalization.’ In this article, her emphasis on the UN’s role in globalization has 
disappeared but she persists in seeing globalization in terms of the redistributive 
policies advanced by her opponents. In a critique of a United Methodist study 
which (among other things) opposes the increasingly elite control of global 
financial power, Crouse warns that the study’s criticism of unfettered capital flows 
is an unspoken recommendation for regulation of the international economy by the 
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UN, or, she scoffs, by  ‘a cabal of third world dictators.’19 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
Crouse comes out in full support of global capitalism: 
‘Ultimately, though, the study realizes that globalization [is] about politics –– 
globalization means privatization. This statement is fraught with horror!’20  
By 2006, then, Crouse sees globalization as an economic experience, occurring 
despite the involvement of the UN rather than because of it. She is still on the watch 
for would-be regulators, but seems far happier with laissez-faire economic 
globalization than she is with any regulatory involvement. Even though she does 
acknowledge the role of private companies in globalization, missing from any 
CWA texts is an indication of how globalization is promoted or affected by US 
interests. Globalization remains something of a problem, but what exactly it is and 
who is causing it is not ground that Crouse is comfortable covering.  
 
The connection between globalization and perceived ‘globalists’ who seek to 
control the US is shared by other ‘pro-family’ authors. Concern that globalization is 
an effort to standardise norms and practices the world over is prevalent in earlier 
Howard Center texts. One of the ‘dangerous features’ of globalization, according to 
a 2000 Religion and Society Report, is the ‘trend to submerge particular national 
sovereignties and ethnic identities into a multicultural “new world order.”’21 This is 
‘a project of global planification, standardization, or, as it is increasingly called, 
globalization.’22  Even though this author’s comments emerge as he discusses a 
disagreement in the global banking sector, his concern about globalization is wholly 
with its supposed homogenisation of culture, not its economic effects. 
Multiculturalism (which is equated with globalization) is thus seen as a form of 
newspeak, in which the illusion of many cultures in the same context hides a social 
reality in which differences are actually penalized, and freedoms curtailed. 
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This resonates with the central concern that most ‘pro-family’ groups have with 
pluralism and tolerance, which are the same weapons their opponents wield in their 
domestic battles. On a global scale, however, these values take on a more important 
role.  As noted previously, globalization has a tendency to relativise claims to 
religious morality, making accusations of immorality and offence subject to debate 
rather than accepted as moral truths. Given that conservative groups inevitably 
suffer more from anti-discrimination laws and ‘enforced’ tolerance, purely because 
they are offended by a wider range of behaviours than liberals are, ‘pro-family’ 
groups equate tolerance with tyranny, paradoxically seeing any global imperative 
towards tolerance and pluralism as coming at the cost of the diversity of moral and 
religious beliefs. 
 
Globalization in this form, then, is seen as unavoidably despotic to ‘pro-family’ 
organisations. Unlike other ‘pro-family’ activists, early Howard Center texts 
support national sovereignty without reserve; globalization and its promoters 
threaten the freedom enjoyed in the nation-state system. External forces are seen as 
regulatory, and threaten that freedom. In 2003, a Howard Center author suggests 
that putting the brakes on globalization is an important step in promoting and 
protecting domestic harmony within the US. He writes that 
‘Globalization ultimately means the end of national sovereignty, and without a 
principle of sovereignty, no nation, not even the richest in the world, will be able to 
fulfill the fundamental duty of a state to preserve domestic tranquility[sic].’23 
The group thus rejects globalization on the grounds that it promotes a set of global 
norms and rules enacted from beyond the US nation-state. Thus again we see the 
idea that there are central planners behind globalization. While C-Fam and HLI see 
their purpose as defending the freedoms of people in developing countries from 
external secular forces, Howard Center authors emphasise that this same protection 
needs to be upheld for US citizens too. In this view, all nations are fragile in the 
wake of globalization, and require strong states to maintain domestic cohesion. 
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How governments are supposed to safeguard their populace from external 
regulation is left unexplained, however. External regulation is characterised in 
different and sinister ways, some of which are virtually impossible to prevent. One 
Howard Center author writing in 2000 has the following to say about the way the 
world is changing: 
 ‘While democracy and liberty appear to be triumphant on a planet from which 
authoritarian regimes have largely been banished, censorship and manipulative 
control are returning in force under other names… the technology of communication 
is now, more than ever, playing an ideological role to muzzle thought… The true 
masters of the world are no longer those who control the appearances of political 
power.’24 
While the meaning of some parts of this quote may be somewhat obscure, the 
author seems to arrive at the conclusion that with increased communication 
technology, the individual is no longer an active agent; he or she is just a mindless 
conduit for information. The active role is taken, curiously, by technology. Put 
another way, the author sees a group of people – presumably the very 
technologically savvy – benefiting from people’s decreased ability to think for 
themselves. With an excess of information and a lack of access to divine truth (or 
an inability to recognize it amongst so much content), the author sees individuals as 
at the mercy of those in control of communication technology. Paradoxically, the 
same technology used by the groups to advance their views on the ‘natural family’ 
is also to blame for inhibiting diversity and freedom. That powerful people or 
groups, as the author suggests, are increasingly out of sight and unaccountable gives 
little clue as to who they might be, other than that they are not the people who 
‘should’ hold power. 
 
Other Howard Center texts stress that external regulation comes in the form of a 
global democracy. A report from 2002 suggests that globalization means the 
surrender of individual and cultural sovereignty; a global regulation of culture that 
needs to be arrested: 
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‘Americans fascinated by globalization and multiculturalism should consider what it 
will mean to allow our own lives to be regulated by organizations with little or no 
appreciation for many of our most cherished values.’25 
Stressing the dictatorial elements of a posited global government, this author sees 
global regulation, undertaken by a foreign authority, as a deeply troubling 
concomitant of globalization. Such an authority may be both legitimate and 
problematic.  
 
Another 2002 text from this organisation sees globalization as dangerous precisely 
because of its democratizing effects. In a refreshingly candid manner, this author 
suggests that the globalization of democracy will be seriously harmful to those who 
currently hold wealth and power: 
‘… the globalization of democracy will inevitably mean that decisions in our own 
wealthy nations will not be made by their own citizens, but by the far more numerous 
poor of the world.’26 
The same sentiment is expressed in an article written a year later, which 
acknowledges that 
‘with fewer than 300 million people in the United States, we make up perhaps five 
percent of the world’s population, and in a really globalized world we shall be 
outvoted with regularity and required to surrender the privileges that our wealth and 
power have accorded us.’27 
Hence for the Howard Center, the case for upholding national sovereignty is not 
only that it maintains freedom in general, but also that it particularly upholds the 
disproportionately far-reaching liberties of the US. This is especially the case for 
developing countries, the ‘numerous poor,’ who likely see their weak economic 
position as being, at least in part, a result of the West’s extensive wealth and power. 
The interpretation here of ‘real’ globalization as being truly democratic (in the 
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sense that rich and powerful countries can be outvoted and forced to toe the line by 
poor and weak ones) is an interesting one. Not only is it a future the organisation 
does not look forward to in 2002, it is an entirely different vision of globalization 
than that imagined by most other opponents of globalization, who might welcome a 
democratic alternative to the repressive power relations emerging from the new 
global reach of corporations. The Howard Center does not approve of the corporate 
version either, as has already been established, though it is noteworthy that the 
organisation also takes issue with efforts to control corporate globalization. Thus 
Howard Center authors writing around this time all seem to suggest that 
globalization is likely to be harmful to US interests, whether through the tyranny of 
global corporations, the direct surrender of procedural power (as we would be likely 
to witness in a global democracy), or less tangibly, the ideological oppression 
emerging from increasing access to information.  
 
However, no solution to globalization is offered by the Howard Center, and these 
ideas are left undeveloped by its contributors. Though they are common around the 
turn of the century, Howard Center texts discussing globalization appear only until 
around 2003-4, by which time reference to this previously popular topic seem to 
vanish.28 Howard Center authors may have decided that globalization is too slippery 
or treacherous a concept to continue to discuss. There is some evidence, however, 
that the organisation’s concern with democratic globalization as documented above 
has changed. As Carlson notes in 2008 (this time writing for Focus), the staunchest 
allies of ‘pro-family’ forces in the ‘battle for traditional families’ are ‘people of 
color’ in the developing world.29 Moreover, writes Carlson, ‘the 21st century culture 
war’s battle lines will be neither racial nor national... if traditionalists unite, their 
passion for life will provide not only moral authority but numerical superiority.’30 
This seriously complicates the Howard Center’s stance on globalization. If this 
‘pro-family’ organisation continues to claim the ideological allegiance of the global 
population, its days as a staunch opponent of globalization are over. I return to this 
development in the final part of this chapter. 
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Globalization as US-lead 
Many ‘pro-family’ perspectives on globalization acknowledge that the US is 
leading globalization in some way, although the emphasis is on cultural 
globalization. HLI’s Euteneuer is concerned about the spread of US cultural norms 
via both political and economic channels. He sees liberalisation of laws concerning 
sexuality and reproduction in the US as directly encouraging such changes in other 
countries. Consider the following excerpt from a speech given by Euteneuer in 
Sydney in 2003: 
 ‘Less than a month ago the US Supreme Court legalized sodomy as a right of 
privacy, opening the door to gay marriage; I was in Central America on the day that 
the decision was given, and the homosexual movement in the country I was visiting 
had a fiesta – as America goes, so goes the world (for good or evil).’31  
Euteneuer’s recognition of the colossal influence of the US indicates the degree to 
which he sees the rest of the world following the path the US sets. Though HLI 
makes a great effort to support grassroots movements in developing countries that 
are aligned with its views, in this text the most important battle for the future of the 
developing world is still being fought in the US. 
 
James Dobson and Focus also share this sentiment, namely that the innocent in 
other countries must be protected from the spread of corrupt US culture and 
politics. In his ‘Eleven Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage,’ Dobson warns that 
‘America continues to be the fountainhead of filth and immorality, and its influence 
is global.’ 32  Like Euteneuer, Dobson sees the US as a global leader in the 
liberalisation of the moral order. ‘If we take this step off a cliff,’ continues Dobson 
with reference to legalising gay marriage, ‘the family on every continent will 
splinter at an accelerated rate.’ 33  US-lead globalization, for ‘pro-family’ 
organisations, is synonymous with the spread of liberal culture.  
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Even when ‘pro-family’ groups are concerned about the role of the US in leading 
economic globalization, it is because of the impact that economic globalization has 
in transmitting cultural norms, not because of the effects globalization is having on 
families in poor countries. In a 2003 text, for example, Euteneuer writes that 
societies in the developing world are helpless to resist the importation of US culture 
as they trade with the US:  
‘The advertising on billboards is all Western wannabees, too. It is sad, not because 
the West is bad, but because the culture of death and materialism comes with 
everything we export over there.’34 
Euteneuer clearly sees global trade as connected to the proliferation of a set of 
values which he opposes, though he is careful not to say that there is anything 
wrong with the West. The distinction between the propagation of Western exports 
and advertising (bad) and the West itself (not necessarily bad) appears to hinge on 
materialism. 35  In this ‘pro-family’ depiction of economic globalization, it is 
impossible for countries which trade with the West to resist the slide towards 
materialism. In HLI terms, this is a part of the transmission of the ‘culture of death,’ 
a term used frequently in HLI texts to describe abortion specifically, and more 
generally to describe the global spread of values which HLI finds hugely 
objectionable. For Euteneuer, materialism and ‘the culture of death’ go hand in 
hand with globalization.  
 
Globalization as materialism 
Like Euteneuer, most ‘pro-family’ leaders are concerned with the link between 
global trade and the values that appear to accompany it. Materialism is a major 
issue for HLI, and bears much of the blame for declining birth rates in the 
industrialised world in HLI texts. I return to this subject in chapter six. 
 
In the Religion and Society Report from 2000 cited above, the Howard Center 
author also sees the material excesses of globalization as a serious problem. 
                                                 
34
 Euteneuer, T. J. (2003) ‘Pro-Life Missionary Trip: India,’ Human Life International, 19 November 
2003. Accessed at http://www.hli.org/mission_india_2003.html [last accessed 17/11/06]. 
35
 Given that the ‘culture of death’ is something of an intrinsically irredeemable label, akin to ‘evil’ 
or ‘pro-death’, I would argue that the difference here hinges on materialism, the more redeemable 
term, from which cultural change is at least possible. 
 102 
‘Globalization,’ he states, ‘is pillage on a planetary scale.’36 Three years later, the 
same author condemns the ‘lust for profit today,’ which is ‘driving whole nations to 
the loss of their national identity to the forces of globalization, which certainly 
profit the few, but not so certainly the many.’ 37  The warning is clear: if 
globalization is harmful, people need to be protected from it. It is not clear whether 
the authors see US corporations as the ‘few’ behind this ‘planetary pillage;’ the 
forces of globalization remain obscure. 
 
In addition to this concern for the ‘many,’ who presumably come from all over the 
world, there is a strong sense here that economic nationalism is at work as well. 
Like the author above, conservative icon Paul Weyrich is concerned that the 
benefits of globalization are not worth the costs. In his 2005 series on ‘The Next 
Conservatism,’ published – though not endorsed – by CWA, Weyrich suggests that 
it is more important to keep manufacturing jobs in the US than it is to increase 
economic efficiency through free trade. Moving away from a service economy is 
desirable, Weyrich suggests, because it would enable average Americans to survive 
on one income, so that ‘mom can stay home and take care of the kids.’ ‘Life is not 
just about getting more stuff,’ he recommends, and would like to ‘restore thrift 
[rather than consumption] as a virtue’ in US conservative culture.38 Weyrich, like 
Carlson and his Howard Center colleagues, would rein in multinational corporations 
which, in his view, care little about the future of the US.39  
 
Although it appears on CWA’s website, Weyrich’s approach to this topic differs 
starkly from Crouse’s approach to globalization. In her 2006 critique of the United 
Methodist study described above, Crouse derisively notes that: 
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‘The study suggests that the key to solving the problems of globalization is to buy 
from artisans, shop at locally owned businesses, buy only fair-trade coffee, and wear 
only sweat-free-label clothing.’40 
Crouse seems unable to stomach this attitude, labelling this kind of approach as 
‘demagoguery.’ Her response suggests that she sees these as hackneyed solutions to 
a problem that is bigger than the authors of the study admit. She ends her article 
sarcastically, parodying the study’s recommendations: ‘if everyone would just quit 
drinking bottled water, the word would be a better place and we could end poverty 
and injustice.’ 41  Though she appears to accept that there is a problem with 
globalization, Crouse has a strong aversion to what she characterises as ineffectual 
solutions offered by left-wing religious people. Crouse may have moved on from 
seeing globalization as synonymous with globalism, but the phenomenon is still 
identified in terms of how it helps her opponents advance their causes. To put it 
another way, globalization is still a part of the Left’s arsenal in CWA’s view. 
 
Unlike HLI and CWA, who tend to depict globalization as an exogenous 
inevitability, the Howard Center does not accept that the way the world economic 
system is changing is a given. Another option – though not one without drawbacks 
of its own – exists:   
‘The only alternative to this “globalization” is a measure of economic protectionism, 
and of course economic protectionism violates the great canon of globalization and 
cuts the profits of those most interested.’42 
This Howard Center author prefers barriers to trade to economic globalization, 
eschewing even a rhetorical commitment to development via free trade. That 
economic protectionism creates profits for other domestic parties and can 
disadvantage the poor outside the US does not concern the author; what is important 
is that impediments to free trade slow or prevent the advance of globalization. 
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Again, the Howard Center opposes globalization as a process, and uses 
justifications that hark back to traditional US isolationism to support its position. 
 
While all the groups reject globalization in a general sense, and take particular issue 
with the centralisation of power and any corresponding standardisation of culture, 
the groups themselves do seek to influence global norms. Thus the ‘pro-family’ 
objection to globalization is better understood as a reaction against particular 
aspects of the process that the organisations find offensive or threatening. The 
following section discusses these aspects. 
 
Globalization and the ‘culture of death’ 
Those behind the purported ‘attack on the family’ are characterised with different 
degrees of specificity by ‘pro-family’ organisations. HLI refers to its enemy as the 
‘culture of death,’ ‘anti-life,’ and ‘population controllers,’ while the other groups 
tend to prefer slightly different terms such as ‘radical feminists/NGOs,’ and the 
‘radical Left,’ among others. The majority of these texts stress the global reach of 
‘anti-family forces.’ Thus globalization is both blamed for expanding the reach and 
influence of the ‘culture of death,’ and used as a justification for the expansion of 
‘pro-family’ activities beyond the US. Consider the following excerpt from an HLI 
Special Report: 
‘…the anti lifers simply cannot leave people alone to just live their lives as they wish. 
The population controllers and other anti-lifers are fanatic meddlers who are 
absolutely driven to impose their will upon every human being on earth.’43  
HLI sees itself as struggling against a powerful, technologically advanced, 
obsessively driven opponent. The report goes on to claim that ‘anti-lifers’ have 
‘travelled to the most remote villages imaginable’ to disseminate their ‘warped 
gospel of sterility and biophobia.’44 In this way, HLI places itself in defence of life 
and traditional culture, on a global scale. This theme is repeated time and again in 
HLI texts, with the group stressing the need for people to ‘understand the 
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worldwide assault of the culture of death against God and man.’45 Euteneuer gets 
more specific when he names ‘abortion revolutionary groups like International 
Planned Parenthood Federation, Marie Stopes International, IPAS and other 
feminist and homosexual non-governmental organisations’ as the force behind this 
assault.46 He contends that these groups ‘wield millions of dollars and exist for the 
singular purpose of pushing their own hedonistic agendas on the rest of the 
world.’47 For HLI, it is the relatively newfound global abilities and influence of 
progressive NGOs that are the major problem with globalization, and it is they who 
are fuelling the ‘culture of death.’ 
 
HLI makes much of the infringement of national sovereignty by international 
NGOs, maintaining that these groups press for laws that will both undermine the 
will of the populace and further their own self-interest and funding base. The group 
sees progressive NGOs as using their global reach to force their ideologies on 
unwilling populations, bypassing national boundaries.  
 
HLI authors are particularly interested in protecting developing countries against 
‘new’ and ‘radical’ ideologies. Many poor countries’ experience of globalization is 
deeply destabilising. The Philippines, for example, is the site of a number of 
battlefronts for ‘pro-family’ organisations, and a country HLI sees as something of 
a bellwether for the ‘culture of death.’ Seeking a global agent to blame for the 
cultural and family upheaval of this country, HLI points its finger at NGOs. In an 
account of an attempt to pass a Bill intended to guarantee universal access to 
reproductive health services in the Philippines, HLI’s Brian Clowes is disturbed to 
report that: 
‘One of the most frightening provisions of HB 3773 is that, if it is enacted, the 
population program would not even be run by the Philippine government. 
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Instead, it would be operated by a bureaucracy overseen by three non-elected 
officials from non-governmental organizations like International Planned Parenthood 
Federation or Family Health International.’48  
HLI’s objection in this case is thus wholly against progressive NGOs, who they see 
as foisting their ‘polluted influence’ on an innocent populace.49 That progressive 
NGOs have, in HLI’s view, come to be responsible for the troubles faced by 
Filipino families speaks to the desire of ‘pro-family’ groups to find culprits other 
than the process of global economic integration to blame for the negative effects of 
globalization. 
 
It is, of course, highly unlikely that HLI would look favourably on the same Bill 
even if it were planned and implemented by the sovereign government. In such 
cases, government decisions that run counter to HLI’s value set tend to inspire 
accusations of official corruption. Consider the following excerpt from Euteneuer’s 
trip to Venezuela: 
‘[the forces of darkness] lurk in the background until they gain enough political 
power to impose their will on the population, which remains pro-life despite the 
corruption of its government officials, judges, intelligentsia, medical profession and 
media.’50 
It is not so much that the policies are encouraged or imposed by an external agent 
that is problematic for HLI, it is the nature of the policies themselves. When laws 
are the result of an elected government, and formed with domestic legal, academic 
and medical involvement, as in this Venezuelan case, and HLI still argues that they 
are forced on an unwilling public by corrupt elites, we can be fairly certain that at 
the heart of the matter, HLI’s complaint is not about national sovereignty. As 
Euteneuer puts it: ‘Anywhere the anti-life mentality takes root is mission 
territory.’51 In HLI’s view, globalization may facilitate the spread of ‘the anti-life 
mentality,’ but it is progressive agents that are to blame for the problems that 
accompany it.  
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Globalization as secularism 
To put it another way, though HLI may appeal to notions of national sovereignty, 
their grievance is with any efforts to alter society in a way in which the organisation 
does not approve, from inside or out. UN resolutions are always a problem for HLI, 
for example, because they are unmistakeably secular and thus an aspect of the 
‘culture of death.’ Thus HLI sees it as imperative that Christian conservatives react 
to fight the global spread of secular organisations and their ideologies. 
 
One way HLI has reacted against the diffusion of secular values is to appeal to what 
it sees as the natural, hard-wired, ‘pro-family’ principles of people in the 
developing world. Thus although official channels may be ‘corrupted’, as in the 
Venezuelan and Filipino examples above, all is not lost, because HLI sees its values 
as being aligned with the ‘natural’ values of people all over the world. ‘Nature’ will 
eventually win the day. The following quote on the implementation of 
comprehensive sex education in Malawi demonstrates: 
‘What gives me hope is that most teachers are RELUCTANT to teach their pupils 
this new value-free sex education. There is still shame in the eyes of most teachers. 
What they are asked to do contradicts their embedded authentic cultural 
values.’ 52  
This HLI author believes that his organisation must only re-ignite the innate values 
of people in developing countries to fight off the global onslaught of secularism. 
HLI’s own values are characterised as natural and authentic: those of progressive 
NGOs are juxtaposed as amoral, bizarre and alien. The same HLI report again takes 
the side of ‘traditional values’ over all others, stating that the cultural morality that 
progressive groups seek to jettison in Malawi ‘were always upheld by the entire 
society.’53 Putting the factual status of this assertion aside, the permanence and 
universalism of these values that HLI alleges are worth noting. Such a stance is not 
only in opposition to globalization, which is seen as an outside force that can only 
damage the moral cohesion of society, but hides the possibility that some ‘tradition 
values’ may themselves be different to those held by HLI. 
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C-Fam takes a similar stance on tradition, seeing secular NGOs as a threat to 
‘traditional values.’ Responding to a Population Action International (PAI) study on 
population and development in Africa, C-Fam asserts that ‘…traditional societal 
and religious practice vigorously approve of large families, which Africans view as 
a sign of wealth. PAI calls for eradicating these traditional notions.’54 Here again 
we see a secular NGO depicted as a would-be destroyer of traditional and 
indigenous value. Secularism is contrasted with variety, and portrayed as a force 
that prevents the acquisition and practice of traditions. 
 
Focus is also concerned that the international realm is growing progressively more 
secular, or in one author’s words, ‘our global society has become increasingly more 
liberal, with a substantial change since the late 1990s.’55 The article goes on to 
lament that ‘traditional sexual values are disintegrating’, leading to the increase of 
‘many social ills.’56 Thus a battle is framed on a global scale with tradition, religion 
and morality on one side and secular liberalism on the other.  
 
In this way, seemingly harmless ideas like women’s and children’s rights are 
recognised by ‘pro-family’ advocates as attacks on the family. Globalization is 
implicated in this attack. According to a 2008 FRC article, there has been ‘an 
increasing trend against parents’ rights,’ which ‘exists under the guise of 
globalization and the innocuously-named “children’s rights movement.”’57  FRC, 
like CWA, persists with the idea that there are socialist or ‘globalist’ actors behind 
globalization, who seek to infiltrate the family and weaken parents’ control of the 
way that children are raised.  
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Taking a slightly different approach, in a lecture on T. S. Eliot, one Family 
Research Council (FRC) contributor agrees with the famous poet and author that 
the drift towards secularism is towards ‘a life of boredom, alone on a blasted plain.’ 
This, he suggests, is the inevitable result of ‘a purely materialistic civilization with 
all of its technical achievements and its mass amusements.’58  In the context of 
capitalist globalization, which hugely increases the number of material things that 
can be used to amuse oneself, globalization, associated as it is with secularism and 
materialism in the ‘pro-family’ vision, is a serious concern for FRC. 
 
It would appear, then, that every ‘pro-family’ organisation has something negative 
to say about globalization. Whether it is alarm at the perceived direction of social 
and economic change, or anxiety about what a future globalized world might be 
like, all the ‘pro-family’ organisations take issue with certain aspects of 
globalization. Are there any aspects that they celebrate?  
 
Part II: Globalization as redeemable 
‘Pro-family’ texts advancing the merits of globalization range between tacit 
approval of the new abilities of ‘pro-family’ groups to extend their influence 
beyond US borders, a grudging commitment to free trade, and a kind of prim 
approval of globalization purely for the reason that the Left sees it as a problem. No 
‘pro-family’ group explicitly praises globalization; rather they seem to consent to its 
going on, or see no alternatives to it. The groups are encouraged by the global 
transmission of ‘pro-family’ norms and values, the increasing ability to permeate 
national boundaries and generally approve of international trade as a means to 
prosperity. This section is organised under five headings, each describing an aspect 
of globalization of which ‘pro-family’ organisations appear to appreciate. 
 
1. Globalization facilitates the widespread proliferation of ‘pro-family’ values 
Even while criticising its opponents for the violation of national sovereignty in 
developing countries, HLI is heartily satisfied with its own enhanced ability to 
interact with people in the farthest corners of the globe. On a ‘pro-life mission’ to 
Tanzania, for example, Euteneuer exclaims that he is ‘constantly amazed to see 
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HLI's reach - even to little Zanzibar!’59  HLI also credits itself with preventing 
abortions in developing countries: the author of one HLI publication suggests that 
‘without HLI, many babies in the third world would be killed by agents of the 
devil.’60 HLI is able to travel to these remote destinations, influence their officials 
and report back from them only because of innovations in global communication 
and transport technology. The reports repeatedly thank the sponsors of HLI for their 
funds, collected through HLI’s donation webpage, which finance ‘pro-life missions’ 
to previously inaccessible areas.  
 
HLI’s mission reports show that HLI and its partner organisations in developing 
countries are extremely satisfied with the global network that they have created. In 
a trip to Paraguay, Euteneuer writes that ‘the pro-lifers there are so glad to belong to 
an international pro-life organization. It gives them a sense of belonging, 
encouragement and great support in their efforts.’61 HLI clearly sees itself as invited 
to act without concern for national boundaries, seeing its actions as justified both by 
its network in the countries in which it is active and the righteousness of its cause. 
Indeed, Euteneuer states unambiguously: ‘the fight for life is a global one and is not 
just limited to what happens in one culture or another…’62 The organisation sees no 
problem with working in defiance of state authorities. In a trip to Hong Kong, for 
example, Clowes is pleased to report on the successes of the underground Catholic 
movement in China. 63  For HLI, national sovereignty is easily trumped by 
globalization, when it is HLI with the trump card. 
 
The same can be said of HLI’s approach to tradition. As was noted earlier, HLI and 
C-Fam both enthusiastically offer themselves as the guardians of tradition and 
‘authentic cultural values.’ However, where these values conflict with those of HLI, 
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cultural change and progress are heartily welcomed. In a mission trip to Malaysia, 
for example, Clowes notes that: 
‘Conversions [to Catholicism] are even more numerous among the different 
indigenous tribes who had previously practiced various forms of animist religions 
and who were infamous for such practices as head-hunting and ritual cannibalism.’64 
Similarly, Euteneuer in Costa Rica writes: 
‘Catholicism has always taught pagan societies how to form marriages and families 
because it has always known that these are the primary stabilizing forces of 
society.’65 
HLI is choosy in the range of cultural values it sees as authentic: ancient practices 
that do not fit with HLIs values are best relegated to the past. Where the 
globalization of secular values is seen by HLI as an affront to the cultural values of 
traditional societies, social change produced by the globalization of Catholicism is 
seen as valuable and legitimate. 
 
2. Globalization means the ‘spirit-rich’ South can evangelise the materialist West 
Another aspect of globalization of which HLI approves is the possibility that people 
from developing countries can and will ‘re-evangelise’ the West. HLI’s Brian 
Clowes writes that  
‘A century ago, the West evangelized Africa, and now the young and lively Faith of 
the Africans is evangelizing the dying West. Isn't it wonderful how the Holy Spirit 
has everything planned out? We win in the end: I've read The Book.’66 
Characterising the West as ‘dying’ turns development on its head: for HLI, the 
West is ‘…the so-called “developed” world (economically but not spiritually 
developed)…’67 As such, HLI sees globalization as providing the means for ‘spirit-
rich’ Africa to enlighten and re-orient richer countries towards Christianity, as an 
inevitable and predictable part of God’s divine plan. The ‘young and lively’ are 
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juxtaposed with the West, almost certainly a reference to the ‘demographic winter’ 
depicted by ‘pro-family’ organisations, which is discussed further in chapter six. 
Euteneuer makes a related comment during his aforementioned trip to the 
Philippines: 
‘Fr. Marx used to comment that the Philippines has supplanted Ireland as the world's 
primary exporter of Catholicism and missionary of Catholic culture through the 
millions of Filippino [sic] Catholics who take their Faith with them when they 
leave.’68 
Seeing the diaspora of (usually female) Filipinos and the global promulgation of 
Catholicism as positive are undoubtedly evidence of HLI’s enthusiasm for 
globalization, albeit of a certain type. This happy disregard for national boundaries 
even appears to supersede the ‘pro-family’ concern that the ‘export’ of Filipino 
Catholics often leads to the long-term separation of family members. At any rate, 
while HLI may not explicitly state that globalization is a positive occurrence, it has 
no staunch loyalty to the ideals of national autonomy or democracy. In terms of 
ideology, compared to the other organisations examined here, HLI is pro-
globalization.  
 
3. Globalization gives ‘pro-family’ organisations a voice in international policy-
making 
The Howard Center takes a far more cautious approach than HLI, preferring to find 
international allies and appeal for some semblance of international approval before 
it takes its values to the people of the developing world. Thus the Howard Center’s 
support for globalization can be understood in terms of the potential top-down 
propagation of norms that it supports. In Carlson’s reaction against the secular 
standards he sees as implicit in the Children’s Convention, he offers his own 
alternative universal doctrine. He suggests that 
‘…in place of the current UN “Children's Rights” Convention, we could call on the 
nations of the world to secure to each child the Rights to a mother, a father, a home 
built on marriage, siblings, ancestors, posterity, religious faith, a healthy community, 
innocence, and tradition... These goals are what the governments of the world should 
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seek and a focus on this list of rights would return the United Nations to its original 
and healthy pro family position.’ 69 
In this effort, Carlson seeks to universally advance ‘pro-family’ ideals as the 
instruments to improve the well-being of children. Rather than state that children 
have a (direct) right to security, health and material abundance, Carlson offers the 
divorce-free, fertile, heterosexual marriage as the means to achieving these tangible 
ends. Carlson’s promotion of his set of ‘pro-family’ global principles is a direct 
effort to press for global norms of which he and his allies approve. That he finds it 
consistent with the intentions of the founders of the UN – contrasting it with the 
hijacking of the UN by his ideological opponents – suggests Carlson sees a role for 
‘pro-family’ advocates in returning the UN to its ‘proper’ course. I return to this 
sentiment in the following chapter. 
 
C-Fam is less clear in its advocacy for its own political positions. The documents 
that can be interpreted as being somewhat in support of globalization are of two 
types: those that promote universal rights which the group sees as ‘pro-family,’ and 
those that support free trade as the means to development. Whilst C-Fam presents a 
general impression of aversion to new applications of UN human rights documents 
as a matter of principle, the organisation is aware of the footholds it may gain as 
these documents are renegotiated and applied, as in the following 2006 example: 
‘Conservatives are disappointed, however, that the new [UN] resolution excludes the 
protection of children before birth, despite the fact that the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) explicitly states: “Whereas the child, by reason of his physical 
and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth.”’70 
C-Fam’s intention is to protect the unborn on a global scale. Thus it is clear that 
whether C-Fam prefers the world to be organised into self-governing nations or 
morphed into a global village, it has decided to press for its political and social 
goals in the most influential global forum available, the UN General Assembly. It 
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could be argued that the organisation, taking globalization as a given, is simply 
defending or promoting the ‘pro-family’ way of life. However, I suggest that C-
Fam is using globalization as an opportunity to promote its policies on a global 
scale. Indeed what may have begun as a defensive effort may now have evolved 
into a global offensive. In its discussion of a then upcoming WCF, C-Fam writes 
that its organisers intend to ‘craft a declaration and platform of action to serve as 
guides to family protection and renewal around the globe.’ 71 As pro-active as the 
effort to create a new declaration appears however, the organisers still frame their 
efforts in antagonistic terms. If C-Fam (and indeed all the groups) can be said to be 
promoting globalization of a kind, its characterisations are not sketched in any 
positive substance, but simply defined in terms of what it is not: not ‘anti-family,’ 
and not ‘population “bomb” ideology.’  
 
4. Economic globalization is the means to prosperity 
Similarly, while C-Fam texts do tend to promote economic globalization as the 
most appropriate path to development, their arguments tend to be framed in 
opposition to their adversaries rather than in favour of the freedom or prosperity 
that free trade may bring. C-Fam expressed support for open markets in 1999, 
positioning itself with the developing world, against the Clinton Administration and 
the EU: 
‘The real breakdown came with the call for free trade and open markets. This is a 
priority of the developing world and one looked upon generally favorably by the 
west. In this instance, however, the US and EU flatly refused to negotiate on this 
point.’72 
During the Bush Administration, however, C-Fam’s texts promoting free trade as a 
means of development tended not to mention the US government directly. 
 
In 2005, C-Fam supported the following Heritage Foundation document which 
promoted ‘economic freedom’: 
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‘The document stresses that developing countries need more than international aid to 
end poverty. It declares that “economic freedom, good governance and the rule of 
law” are necessary for economic growth and that appropriate emphasis must be 
placed on the role of the private sector. “Development will not occur unless 
developing and developed countries alike open their markets and encourage private 
investment and entrepreneurship.”’73 
C-Fam’s endorsement suggests that the organisation is comfortable with the idea of 
economic globalization as a means to development. Whether ‘good governance’ 
and ‘the rule of law’ in this quote are intended only in the domestic realm, or may 
also apply to international regulatory bodies, is uncertain. While free markets still 
largely remain a key rhetorical tool in ‘pro-family’ discussions about development, 
there are very few ‘pro-family’ texts that openly discuss the capitalist aspects of 
globalization. Bringing support for increased global trade (and corporations) 
together with the idealised ‘pro-family’ society is a task that has been left largely 
unaddressed in ‘pro-family’ texts. 
 
5. Our enemy’s enemy must be our friend: globalization is better than what the 
Left wants 
As has already been discussed, CWA advocates on the side of freeing up 
international trade as the most important means to prosperity. CWA’s stance is 
firmly against international regulation, which Crouse and her colleagues frame as 
an attempt to bring about a world government. While CWA does suggest that 
‘value-based investing’ – in which conservative Christian shareholders invest in 
companies that fit ‘pro-family’ criteria – is a suitable response to what the group 
deems a moral crisis within American capitalism, the organisation does not make 
the same suggestions when it comes to the problems associated with global 
capitalism.74 It seems likely that Crouse in particular, and CWA in general, are torn 
between anxiety about the effects of globalization on the US populace and a deep 
dislike of all of the solutions offered. Unsurprisingly, CWA struggles to balance its 
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allegiance to free enterprise and fairness and its commitment to US national 
sovereignty. Crouse’s study of the National Council of Churches study on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) concludes that: 
‘… the NCC is saying that the United Nations, not Jesus Christ, is the salvation of the 
world. The NCC is surrendering leadership to a secular entity and offering utopian 
solutions, instead of Biblical ones, to the world’s problems. To add insult to injury, 
the NCC is using its member churches as foot soldiers to carry forward the UN 
agenda around the world.’ 75 
Opposing church support of the UN here overrides any concern that Crouse may 
have with the material benefits to families in poor countries that might be achieved 
with widespread support of the MDGs. Like C-Fam, CWA’s approach to 
globalization remains, for the most part, reactionary.  
 
Increasingly, however, CWA has enlisted in more activist ‘pro-family’ global 
initiatives, notably the WCF. Crouse has been a plenary speaker at these events and 
writes that the (then upcoming) conference in Poland 
‘will bring together an international network of leaders who work to strengthen the 
family around the world. Not surprisingly, many of the problems facing the family 
here in the US are also problems in other countries. As we network together, each of 
us is strengthened in our work in our own nation. Having WCF IV in Poland makes a 
strong statement to other European nations about the world-wide support for pro-life, 
pro-marriage and pro-family policies.’76 
Like the other organisations studied here then, CWA perceives the advantages in 
creating a ‘pro-family’ global network to actively press for their policies. Claiming 
world-wide support for its political views, CWA is repeating Carlson’s assertion 
that ‘pro-family’ organisations have the backing of the majority of the world’s 
people. Though the emphasis is on taking the experiences gained at the international 
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level back to strengthen ‘our work in our own nation,’ the Congress is also intended 
as a strong statement to opponents of the ‘pro-family’ view. 
 
Part III: Tensions 
This chapter has shown that although ‘pro-family’ organisations define 
globalization in mostly negative terms, they are actively promoting a set of ‘pro-
family’ positions with which they intend to influence debates on development and 
human rights well into the future. The ‘pro-family’ groups studied here are 
increasingly behaving like progressive NGOs in their attempts to form global ‘pro-
family’ networks and gain the support of like-minded delegates from developing 
countries. They are undeniably globalizing their activism, even as they claim to 
oppose globalization. 
 
Many ‘pro-family’ advocates still see the role of international ‘pro-family’ 
organisations as defending the world from the onslaught of secular global forces. In 
this way, ‘pro-family’ activists see themselves not as proponents of their own 
ideological views, rather they are simply representing the ‘normal’ view in contrast 
with those of their ‘radical’ opponents. In the chaos of globalization and the 
ascendancy of liberalism, ‘pro-family’ advocates suggest that people have lost their 
bearings about what is right and what is wrong, and it is the job of the ‘pro-family’ 
movement to point the way.  
 
Characterisations of globalization as culture-less, value-less and confusing has 
considerable currency for ‘pro-family’ activists. These organisations portray 
themselves as resisting a kind of social nihilism that threatens variety and freedom 
and only values profit and gratification. Yet this leads ‘pro-family’ opponents of 
globalization towards unification of purpose with the political Left, who have a 
parallel antipathy to the profit-driven and culturally destructive direction of 
economic globalization. CWA avoids discussing issues around which it shares a 
position with its archrivals, except to criticize their opponents’ positions whilst 
keeping their own obscure. HLI’s yardstick is abortion (and to a lesser extent, 
contraception and sex education), and whilst other issues arise in their texts, the 
organisation’s stance on globalization depends entirely on whether it contributes to 
or opposes ‘the culture of death.’ C-Fam chooses its fights more carefully than HLI, 
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hiding any approval of ‘pro-family’ globalization behind its critical approach. Yet 
in this, C-Fam has the same problem as CWA: its condemnation of its enemies only 
partially conceals its deep ambiguity about what globalization means and what to 
do about it. Focus and FRC, for their parts, have very little to say about 
globalization except that it can be equated with the spread of secularism and the 
breakdown of national boundaries across the world. Yet, more than any of the other 
groups, Focus on the Family wields significant influence beyond the US through its 
chapters in other countries. This must be taken into account when considering that 
organisation’s view of globalization. 
 
Of the groups under scrutiny here, only the Howard Center has considered the 
meaning of globalization in any depth. This organisation prefers not to embrace 
aspects of global capitalism which it sees as potentially detrimental to family 
structures, and has chosen to enter into a meaningful discussion about the dangers 
that new global power structures hold for freedom the world over. It is also wary of 
the sacrifice that any truly representative global democracy would demand of US 
hegemony. For these reasons, the WCF (which is organised by the Howard Center) 
could be seen as a global effort to resist certain aspects of globalization. I would 
suggest, however, that the Howard Center’s foray into the global arena since the 
first WCF in 1999 is more ambitious than this, reflecting an increasingly ardent 
desire to win the world over with the persuasive power of ‘pro-family’ arguments. 
The WCF and Carlson’s ‘natural family manifesto’77 is evidence of the desire to 
combat secular globalization in a broad sense. The manifesto is a platform for an 
inter-faith, conservative alliance which is intended to advance an alternative future 
for the world: ‘a world restored,’ in Carlson’s words.78  
 
HLI, at the other end of the scale, sees the problems with globalization as being 
entirely related to global agents propagating values and practices HLI abhors. As 
much as HLI resents the global achievements of feminist NGOs, the organisation 
unreservedly uses and values that same potential for its own purposes. For this 
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group, the structure or system driving globalization is not of particular concern. 
Indeed HLI seems almost uninterested in the workings of international institutions, 
capitalism and information technology, instead choosing to focus its disapproval on 
NGOs and occasionally national governments which support access to reproductive 
health services. 
 
CWA stands out as the least able to come to a clear position on globalization either 
from a structural perspective or in terms of the agents involved in the phenomenon. 
Its authors are clearly divided between the threat of growing social instability that 
they see as inherent in the process of globalization, and a rejection of regulatory 
bodies other than the nation-state that might be put forward to alleviate this 
instability. CWA plainly has the strongest rhetorical commitment to open markets 
and entrepreneurship as the path to progress. Yet this standpoint clashes strongly 
with its firmly pro-US stance, evident even in the name of the organisation. Thus 
the most we can say for this organisation is that insofar as globalization is 
interpreted as being synonymous with decreasing US control – and the relative rise 
of UN influence – CWA is opposed to the process. However, CWA is involved in a 
number of international campaigns on issues that it sees as being of global 
importance. One of these is the effort to end human trafficking and prostitution, 
which CWA would argue is a necessarily global response to a problem that is 
caused or exacerbated by globalization. CWA also strongly supported an abandoned 
US-introduced resolution at the UN condemning sex-selected abortions, which 
would have effectively forced countries to change their domestic laws by UN fiat. 
Again we see the same pattern: like all other ‘pro-family’ organisations, CWA 
discourse combines rhetorical anti-globalization with vigorous global activism and 
claims to universal moral authority.  
 
Conclusion 
Of the three characterisations described in the introduction to this chapter, the ‘pro-
family’ picture of globalization most fits McMichael’s approach, in which 
globalization is seen as a political project undertaken by a set of elites 
unsympathetic to the needs of society (as ‘pro-family’ organisations define those 
needs). This is sometimes because the groups see rising economic inequality and 
instability as a problem in itself, but more often it is because the organisations pit 
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themselves against globally active ‘anti-family’ elites, be they corporations, 
governments or international institutions. In this way, the ‘pro-family’ approach to 
globalization can be understood in much the same way as other counter-
globalization movements: they condemn the disappearance of local industry, they 
abhor the idea of global central planning, and they are deeply concerned about the 
normative changes wrought by globalization all over the world. In 2004, Carolyn 
Gallaher summed up a common perception about how ‘the Religious Right Reacts 
to Globalization,’ writing that  
‘Religious Right leaders have responded to globalization by invoking nationalist 
rhetoric, over time consolidating their position under the discursive umbrella of 
national sovereignty and calls for its protection.’79 
Though this is broadly true of many in the Christian Right, this chapter has shown that 
‘pro-family’ leaders are struggling to maintain this stance. This is because of a 
number of broadly held ideological commitments. This tendency towards 
isolationism clashes markedly with ‘pro-family’ global activism. Economically 
speaking, the rhetorical importance of open markets and deregulation over aid is a 
key aspect to the way ‘pro-family’ organisations believe development should occur. 
Uncertainty about whether or how to criticise US corporations for their role in 
globalization pervades the few texts in which the author is willing to broach the 
subject. Perhaps most importantly, in accepting the invitation by Bush to influence 
and represent US positions on development and human rights, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations can no longer remain wholly critical of international cooperation, the 
growing global influence of civil society, or the global broadcasting of norms and 
ideas.  
 
Time and again ‘pro-family’ groups show that they both dislike globalization and 
welcome it at the same time. Each group has its own take on what globalization is, 
and each has its own set of issues that motivate its global activism. And, as noted 
previously, all these groups are enthusiastically active at the global level. Yet the 
overwhelming majority of ‘pro-family’ discourse is in opposition to globalization, 
however it is defined. I would argue that there are two ways to understand this 
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discord. The first is to see ‘pro-family’ global activism as evidence that the groups 
accept that social norms must now be contested at the global level. Though they 
would prefer to maintain national sovereignty and fight for their policies in the 
domestic arena, they feel that they can only defend their way of life by mounting a 
full-scale global offensive. This perspective characterises the way ‘pro-family’ 
organisations presented their activities in the early stages of their global emergence, 
and lingers in the discourse of CWA in particular, and C-Fam, to a lesser degree. 
Global activism, in this sense, is a reluctantly embraced defensive strategy. 
 
The second way of understanding this is that ‘pro-family’ activism is actually better 
suited to the global sphere than the US. Globally, ‘pro-family’ organisations may be 
freer to advance their views than they are in the US domestic sphere. Nevertheless, 
for ‘pro-family’ groups to continue to promote their global agenda, they will have 
to either change the way they talk about globalization, or mute their criticisms of it, 
as we have seen in the case of the Howard Center.  
 
In terms of understanding this change, we can revisit Peter Beyer’s contention that 
globalization wears away older identities and encourages the creation of new ones, 
in order to gain control over power in the global system.80 In the confusion of ‘pro-
family’ discourse on globalization depicted in this chapter, we can see that 
globalization is indeed eating away at aspects of older Christian Right politics. 
Opposition to rival religions is softening, as is the ‘pro-family’ stance on 
development. A new, Global South-friendly ‘pro-family’ politics is emerging that 
places the families of all countries ahead of more local political issues. Thus the 
older ‘pro-family’ identity is being replaced by a globally ambitious movement that 
appeals to many different kinds of social conservatives. In time, we may see the 
‘pro-family’ movement rearranging its priorities even further, to better facilitate the 
inclusion of more and more conservatives from all over the world. But this process 
is a messy one. It requires considerable ideological flexibility and the recasting of 
old enemies – and allegiances – in new roles. Over time, however, if this movement 
is successful, it will bring ‘pro-family’ organisations together into a global network 
with shared aspirations that extend far beyond the US political scene. As we are just 
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beginning to see, the ‘pro-family’ movement is acting on a profound desire to 
reshape the way people all over the world think about their lives, their families and 
the role of religion in society. With this in mind, the following chapters show the 
ways in which three old global enemies, the UN, feminism, and population control, 
are being reframed in ‘pro-family’ thought.  
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Chapter Four: The United Nations in ‘pro-family’ thought 
 
‘Nationhood as we know it will be obsolete [and] all states will recognise a single, 
global authority.’ 
Strobe Talbott, quoted by Concerned Women for America, 1998.1 
 
‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state.’  
Allan Carlson quotes the UN Declaration of Human Rights2  
 
The UN looms large in the ‘pro-family’ view of the global realm. Originally seen 
by Christian Right activists as an institution too weak to ‘stand up’ to communism, 
after the Cold War, the UN came to embody a communist threat in itself. 
Perceptions of the institution are still changing, with ‘pro-family’ leaders now 
investing time and energy into the UN system as they seek to ‘return’ the UN to its 
‘proper’ ‘pro-family’ role. To understand the changing role of the UN in ‘pro-
family’ thought, I briefly sketch the history of Christian Right approaches to the 
institution before describing how academics have interpreted the ‘pro-family’ 
agenda at the UN.  
 
Since its inception, the UN has been tainted by its association with communism in 
US Christian Right thought. This is both because it has contained communist states, 
and because of its own non-religious character and allegedly totalitarian ambitions.3 
In the view of early Christian Right activists, the UN has always lacked the 
religious foundations that would make it a strong and legitimate force for good in 
international affairs. The ‘failure’ of the UN to criticise Russia and China during the 
Cold War confirmed Christian Right suspicions that it was in the service of 
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communism. Some Christian anticommunists denounced the institution, with Barry 
Goldwater calling on the US government to pull out of the UN.4  
 
During the Cold War, this view merged with Christian Right apocalyptic beliefs in 
the minds of some Christian Right leaders. Pat Robertson, for example, saw the UN 
as an agent of a satanic conspiracy ‘to bring about a godless, socialist one world 
government.’5 More temperate conservative Christian activists still called on their 
government to take action against the UN’s acquiescence to communism, with 
William F. Buckley calling on then-president Nixon to stop the US delegate from 
voting in the General Assembly because of its acceptance of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1971.6 Nixon did not, leaving Buckley to despair that the US had ‘lost –
irretrievably – any remaining sense of moral mission to the world.’7  
 
By the end of the Cold War, Christian Right attitudes to the UN began to change, 
with the UN depicted as a rising global power. Conservatives expressed their 
concern that their leaders, both Democrat and Republican, were in thrall to the UN.8 
This sentiment increased over Clinton’s presidency, with Christian Right leaders 
alarmed at the speed with which cooperation between their government and the UN 
made headway promoting policies they strongly opposed. Seeking to bring this to a 
halt, ‘pro-family’ organisations began to attend UN meetings (as discussed earlier), 
which marked the beginning of organised Christian Right opposition to the UN. As 
Butler notes, ‘pro-family’ leaders were alarmed by the conferences both because of 
the inclusion of sexual and reproductive rights language, and because ‘liberal 
activists were successfully advancing their agenda through such bodies and 
exporting that agenda to other parts of the world.’9  
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The ‘pro-family’ presence at UN conferences grew from this time, and included 
neo-conservative organisations as part of a broader alliance intended to direct the 
work of the UN towards conservative goals. Butler quotes a Heritage Foundation 
document from 2001 which justified its association with the UN by stating that its 
‘presence will break the “Liberals only” roster of present NGOs.’10 
 
Some ‘pro-family’ organisations still advocated that the US should not be involved 
with the UN, despite their own association with it. In a 1999 interview with Buss 
and Herman, for example, Sheila Moloney of Eagle Forum stated that her 
organisation believed that the US ‘should completely get out of the UN.’11 In spite 
of this sentiment, Eagle Forum had already sought and been granted Special 
Consultative Status at the UN in 1998.12 
 
The UN still embodies a socialist/communist threat in ‘pro-family’ thought in the 
post-Cold War context because it is seen as ‘big government’ writ large. As Buss 
and Herman put it, the UN is ‘a force for the international centralisation of 
power.’13 The UN is seen as dangerous not only because its conferences have the 
potential to change domestic law and public policy, but also because it represents to 
‘pro-family’ organisations the growing threat of enormous institutional power 
outside of the US. One Christian Right organisation, for example, condemns ‘the 
astounding international takeover of the control of children.’14 Combined with this 
suspicion of the UN, however, is a growing acknowledgement that NGO status at 
the UN is a source of legitimacy for ‘pro-family’ organisations. In turn, their 
involvement legitimises the UN to their ‘pro-family’ base, making the relationship a 
dynamic and complicated one. With these conflicting approaches and history of 
hostility, how can we best understand the ‘pro-family’ agenda at the UN? 
 
Academics are divided as to how to understand ‘pro-family’ intentions when it 
comes to their activism at the UN. Stuart Croft argues that the Christian Right is 
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inherently hostile to the UN. In his analysis, conservative Protestants attempt to 
manipulate the processes of the UN for the purpose of promoting their social 
agenda at the global level. 15  He acknowledges the number of Christian Right 
organisations that are active in the UN development arena is now considerable, but 
argues that this does not necessarily mean that the Christian Right is increasingly 
supportive of the UN. In Croft’s view, the UN is ‘merely a tool.’16  
 
By contrast, Buss and Herman characterise ‘pro-family’ organisations as deeply 
ambivalent about the UN. Both Croft’s and Buss and Herman’s examinations of the 
Christian Right acknowledge the importance of the UN in the worldview of the 
Christian Right, but arrive at quite different conclusions as to what Christian Right 
groups want to achieve through their activism in this organisation. In Buss and 
Herman’s view, the UN is depicted in two quite different ways by ‘pro-family’ 
organisations. In the first, the UN is a global entity that is attempting to gain control 
over the countries and people of the world. In Buss and Herman’s words, the UN is 
‘corrupt to its core and implicated in the global consolidation of power.’17 If this 
interpretation is correct, it follows that the ‘pro-family’ agenda at the UN must be 
understood as highly antagonistic. Their second depiction sees the UN as a forum 
that has been hijacked by ‘anti-family’ forces.18 In this reading, the role of the ‘pro-
family’ movement is to retain the good aspects of the organisation and remove the 
bad ones. Writing in 2003, Buss and Herman see the movement as still struggling to 
decide on its role at the UN.  
 
Buss and Herman’s more complex understanding of the dynamics affecting the 
Christian Right and the UN sees tensions and opportunities emerging within the 
movement because of its activities there. In their analysis ‘pro-family’ involvement 
at the UN thus has the potential to change the ideology and agenda of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations in a way that Croft’s interpretation does not allow.  
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Butler discerns three stages in the activism of Christian Right NGOs at the UN. The 
first she describes as ‘symbolic protest,’ in which the organisations’ efforts were 
directed at encouraging conservative countries to demur from consensus with 
liberal proceedings at the UN.19  This stage is closely connected to ‘pro-family’ 
justifications of their involvement at the UN as acting as a ‘UN watchdog.’ The 
second stage Butler describes is where ‘pro-family’ groups become ‘insiders’ in the 
UN arena, with the help of President Bush. The third is what Butler calls ‘a 
proactive agenda on the issue of family.’20 By this final stage, Butler writes, ‘pro-
family’ groups found themselves in the position of using a UN legal structure they 
have always opposed to advance policies that they support.21   
 
Butler also notes the interest some Christian Right groups have in ‘returning’ the 
UN to its ‘proper work,’ and sides with Buss and Herman’s interpretation that ‘pro-
family’ organisations see the UN as ‘corrupt but salvageable.’22 Yet if Swinski is 
correct in her observation that ‘pro-life’ groups at the UN do not work towards the 
‘greater legitimacy of the UN,’23 then it may be that Croft’s view, that ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are simply using the UN, remains valid. 
 
What this chapter seeks to uncover is what role the UN plays in ‘pro-family’ global 
activism. To do this, I consider the ways that different groups in the ‘pro-family’ 
movement have depicted the UN and its activities, and how this is changing over 
time. The first part of this chapter discusses the ways which the UN is characterised 
in ‘pro-family’ texts. The first set of depictions of the UN show the institution as a 
would-be hegemon, which must be attacked and defeated. The second set portrays 
the UN as a potentially redeemable organisation which has been hijacked. From this 
perspective, the UN needs to be changed rather than eradicated. With the continued 
involvement of ‘pro-family’ organisations at the UN, it is possible to discern a 
movement from the first type of depiction to the second, though both perspectives 
remain present in ‘pro-family’ discourse. The last part of the chapter considers the 
tensions in the conflicting ‘pro-family’ approach to the UN.  
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Part I: How do ‘pro-family’ organisations characterise the UN? 
The UN as a world government-in-waiting 
Despite its increasing involvement with the institution, ‘pro-family’ organisations 
have taken issue with the UN and its branch organisations, often arguing that it is a 
power-hungry organisation that seeks to govern the world. ‘Pro-family’ texts of this 
kind can be roughly divided into two categories. The first objection is that the UN is 
a socialist organisation, using economic redistribution to consolidate its power. In 
this framework, development funds are seen as a way of forcing poor countries to 
obey rules laid out by the UN. The second ‘pro-family’ complaint is that the UN is 
trying to increase its power by destroying the family, through the promotion of 
women’s and children’s rights. These rights are seen as efforts to ‘individualise’ the 
people of the world, part of a ploy to do away with any traditional social structures 
powerful enough to resist the establishment of a ‘new world order’ headed by the 
UN. 
 
Development assistance in the first ‘pro-family’ framework is a form of welfare 
dependency on a global scale, used to bribe or discipline countries in order to make 
them conform to the will of the increasingly powerful UN. In a 2006 article, Crouse 
accuses the UN of using development assistance as a way of interfering in the 
national sovereignty of poor countries. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
CWA has frequently depicted the UN as a globalist entity, attempting to control the 
world through its role as a regulatory body, and warns that ceding any power to the 
international organisation necessarily harms the US and its citizens. In Crouse’s 
analysis, the UN has become a source of ‘easy money,’ which has enabled it to 
grow in power at the expense of poor countries’ ability to govern their own affairs. 
According to Crouse, the UN ‘maintains international control’ using a carrot and 
stick approach to reward compliance and punish non-compliance.24  
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HLI, for example, sees its role as protecting small countries from the overarching 
power of the UN. In a 2006 Special Report, HLI informs its readers that the UN 
strategically applies pressure to small countries to change their abortion laws, as 
part of an ‘aggressive international culture of death.’25 HLI sees this culture as 
intimately connected with the rise of progressive NGOs associated with the UN. In 
Nicaragua, Euteneuer warns of an alliance between ‘leftist’ socialist NGOs and the 
UN, who are carrying out ‘their new plan to dominate the world with the culture of 
death.’26 The idea that left-wing NGOs are using abortion to dominate the world 
may seem fanciful to some observers of the ‘pro-family’ movement, but it reveals 
the degree to which sexual and reproductive issues have the capacity to save or 
destroy the world in Euteneuer’s view. HLI, denied accreditation at the UN, has not 
significantly changed its view of the organisation; the UN is still seen as a bullying 
and corrupting Goliath, forever tainted by association with the ‘culture of death.’ 
 
Early CWA texts were similarly hostile to the UN. In a 1997 article entitled ‘United 
Nations attempts to steal US sovereignty,’ the author argued that the US should cut 
funding to the UN, due to ‘gross financial mismanagement’ and ‘radical social 
policies which most Americans do not agree with.’27 Environmentalism was also 
seen as a means by which the UN sought to increase its ideological control over the 
US in CWA texts. ‘Sovereignty under siege: the United Nations’ plan for your 
home’ is one such article.28 CWA warns its readers of the Clinton Administration’s 
collusion with the UN, facilitating a ‘UN land-grab.’ 29  Early CWA texts were 
profoundly sceptical of the intentions of the UN as an institution, seeing gains at the 
UN as necessarily problematic for the US. 30  Though this characterisation is 
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changing with CWA’s increased involvement at the UN, it persists as a theme in the 
discourse of this organisation.  
 
CWA authors also see the UN as corrupted by socialist tendencies, although unlike 
HLI, the focus of CWA’s criticism changes over time. In her critique of the 2002 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development, Crouse denounces the Summit as yet 
another attack on affluent nations, with every session calling for the redistribution 
of wealth from rich to poor countries. 31  Crouse sees the UN as opposed to 
capitalism itself, complaining in 2002 that ‘every United Nations conference turns 
into ... attacks against capitalism and free trade.’32 Her analysis of this event goes 
on to describe a North-South divide that prevented consensus on development, due 
to the ‘bitter, angry delegates’ from the South who wanted to ‘rub the North’s 
affluence right back in the faces of the developed nations.’33 She concludes her 
description of the event firmly on the side of the North, writing that ‘as long as they 
[the South] refuse to accept personal responsibility, there can be no healing and no 
restoration.’ 34  This echoes an older Christian Right approach to foreign aid 
mentioned in the introduction, which sees poor countries as suffering because they 
lack the moral values required for successful economic development. 
 
CWA depictions of the UN can not be said to improve after the inauguration of 
George W. Bush, but they do change in a noticeable way. Numerous earlier articles 
had warned that Clinton was strongly allied with the UN and together, they sought 
to augment their power over the people and families of the world.35 From 2001, 
CWA continues to depict the UN as power-hungry, but it becomes less of a threat to 
the US, thanks to the protection provided by the new Bush Administration. 
Reporting on the World Summit for Children in 2001, CWA writes that many ‘pro-
family’ people had ‘wondered about US/UN policies’ under the new 
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Administration. Happily for CWA, the new delegation appeared to toe the ‘pro-
family’ line, and the reporter has the following to say about the delegations new 
emphasis on ‘parental authority:’ 
 
‘You can imagine the sigh of relief among pro-family NGOs – as our children return 
from the grasp of the “global parenting” movement.’36 
 
Contrasting the collusion of Clinton with the staunch resistance of the new Bush 
Administration, CWA’s assessment of the ‘pro-family’ role at the UN begins to 
change around this time. CWA continues to criticise the UN, but in the name of 
defending families in other countries, rather than defending the US. Perhaps sensing 
that American families were now well defended (thanks to the ‘new sheriff in 
town’37) CWA felt able to pursue a new offensive in its attack on the UN. ‘Pro-
family’ discourse during the Bush Administration begins to appeal more and more 
to an audience outside the US, calling on this audience to resist the ‘anti-family’ 
agenda of the UN. 
 
This is because the UN’s agenda, say ‘pro-family’ activists, is completely out of 
touch with what the people of the world want. ‘Despite efforts to undermine the 
natural family in the United Nations,’ suggest Dobson and Carlson in 2000, the 
world’s people agree ‘that the natural family is the fundamental social unit.’38 The 
alleged ‘anti-family’ effort at the UN is seen as a strategy which will bring about a 
global standardisation of culture and society, made in the image of the 
individualistic and godless global citizen. Against this purported endeavour, Focus 
on the Family states its steadfast opposition to ‘any and all domestic or international 
efforts of social parenting movements that would define children as wards of the 
state.’39 In this way, Focus implies a desire on the part of its opponents for a world 
in which governing agencies control childrearing, with parents relieved of this role. 
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In this dystopic scenario, having control of the education and upbringing of 
children, the UN grows in power at the expense of families, tradition and variety. 
 
‘Pro-family’ authors posit the ‘natural family’ as the most important bulwark 
against the growing power of a hegemonic UN. One speaker at the Mexico WCF 
even notes in the introduction to his speech that ‘the family is more important than 
the United Nations,’ to the survival of human society.40 In fact, in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse, the UN is not just outranked by the family in importance, it is jealously 
trying to eliminate it. For this reason, UN treaties, conventions and declarations that 
purport to advance the cause of women and children are eyed with suspicion by 
‘pro-family’ activists. In one example, responding to the Children’s Convention in 
2002, Carlson suggests that the Convention not only undermines parents’ authority, 
it also favours ‘radical’ social science approaches to ordering society over religion 
and tradition, and ‘prevents nations and peoples from sheltering their own unique 
cultures.’41 Though he does not explicitly say who or what it is that cultures must be 
sheltered from, it is clear that Carlson still has some global standardising ideology 
in mind that keeps him wary of the UN. Carlson laments that the UN now functions 
within a ‘post-family’ framework.42 The job of ‘pro-family’ activists, then, is to 
challenge the UN’s application of its ‘anti-family’ influence. 
 
HLI definitely sees itself as defending the world against the UN and its agencies. In 
a 2003 ‘pro-life missionary trip’ to Colombia, Euteneuer suggests that the UN’s 
way of preventing the spread of HIV among children is ‘to throw condoms at 
them.’43  ‘It’s absolutely unbelievable,’ exclaims Euteneuer, ‘what lengths these 
people will go for the sole purpose of destroying a culture.’ 44  Consequently, 
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Euteneuer declares that ‘it is HLI’s mission to at least slow the advance of these 
satanic forces in the rest of the still-sane world.’45 
 
Early CWA texts agree that the world needs to be protected from the UN. As has 
already been noted, globalization has often been considered as an item on the UN’s 
agenda in CWA texts (rather than a process that occurs beyond the control of the 
organisation). One CWA author writes in 1998 that  
‘In equating peace with globalization, and ultimately, a world government, the UN is 
proposing a radical government of tyranny, wherein “tolerance” is only a byword for 
those who support the establishment.’46  
Here CWA takes a classic conservative position against tolerance: conservative 
values will not be deemed worthy of toleration by those who hold power in the UN, 
whereas the ideas espoused by ‘UN radicals’ will be protected.  
 
Parts of the UN are corrupted and must be exposed 
‘Pro-family’ organisations frequently attack UN agencies and treaty implementation 
committees as the tools of totalitarian elites, arguing that they are attempting to 
destroy traditional family structures. By breaking up families, this argument goes, 
the UN disables the major obstacle in its path towards world domination. 
Development agencies are thus cast as pleasant façades concealing a darker 
purpose, and the role of ‘pro-family’ organisations is to expose the ‘true’ agendas of 
UN agencies. 
 
A 1999 CWA article on the UN’s activities in Kosovo accuses the UN Population 
Fund (UNFPA) and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) of 
‘taking advantage of suffering women to further their own agenda.’ Criticising the 
supply of emergency contraceptive health kits for rape victims in the region, CWA 
accuses UNFPA of increasing the suffering of refugees by supplying them with 
equipment that endangers their lives.47 CWA draws attention to Kosovo’s relatively 
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high birth rate, suggesting that the country is ‘a prime target for population 
controllers like UNFPA.’48 The article concludes that  
‘… UNFPA and PPFA are taking advantage of desperate, vulnerable refugee women. 
They are attempting to program them with the UN’s ideas about sexuality and 
abortion.’49 
CWA texts on CEDAW also stress the threat that the UN poses to vulnerable 
women. In 2002, in an article entitled ‘CEDAW preys on needy women,’ Crouse 
complains that CEDAW is actually a decoy, through which radicals seek to impose 
their extremist ideology on unwitting nations: 
‘The CEDAW treaty is just a red herring that cloaks radical social engineering in so-
called women's concerns in order to draw attention away from its heavy-handed 
imposition of a radical ideology.’50 
CEDAW is depicted as a ‘radical’ UN project that will replace ‘traditional values’ 
with a new sterile ideology that tries to erase any essential differences between men 
and women. CEDAW threatens women in developed countries too, says CWA, 
because it ‘unravels America’s families and forces women to model themselves 
after global feminists’ ideal image.’51 In a 2004 article, Crouse states that CEDAW 
is a 
‘...leftist utopian wish list: comparable worth, paid maternity leave, a national 
network of child care, free maternity-related health care, gender-blind military 
service, and quota-determined political parity for women.’52 
Crouse takes the position that women would be better served by improving 
sanitation and medicine (presumably not in the areas of sexual health), and, more 
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elusively, working to provide them with ‘the freedom that brings human dignity.’53 
She argues that CEDAW is attempting to re-define the family, through its 
promotion of the idea that the responsibility for children rests on the wider 
community, not just parents. ‘Feminists,’ Crouse writes in 2004, ‘are at the 
forefront of those who are trying to convince the world that “father and mother” are 
just words.’ 54  Believing that feminism challenges the very identity of parents, 
Crouse, like Focus, sees CEDAW and its architects at the UN as threatening to 
deliver the responsibility of raising children from parents to the state, and thereby 
further centralising power in the hands of UN elites. 
 
In 2002, the Howard Center takes a similar stance in opposition to CEDAW, with 
Carlson concerned that 
‘Taken as a whole, CEDAW strips the family of all autonomy and authority.  It gives 
moral legitimacy solely to the isolated, radical individual.  And it grants sweeping 
power to the state to regulate, restructure, and even abolish the natural family.’55 
Carlson’s rendering of the Women’s Convention paints the document as a 
revolutionary tool indeed. Carlson sides with moral collectivism over the more 
liberal agenda promoted by CEDAW, derided here as the promotion of the 
‘isolated, radical individual.’ Like Crouse in her statement about feminists rejecting 
the terms ‘father’ and ‘mother,’ Carlson depicts CEDAW as a tool that pits 
individuals against families as the social units of value. This individualism is seen 
as an item on the UN’s ‘post-family’ agenda, and supports the UN in its alleged 
efforts to dismantle ‘natural families’ and pursue its ‘radical ideology.   
 
By stressing that UN ideologues are advancing their own agenda ahead of what 
women want or need, C-Fam activists claim that the UN is now embarking on a 
massive overhaul of familial, societal and political relations. Suspicious of UN’s 
emphasis on sexual and reproductive rights, C-Fam author Douglas Sylva argues 
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that UN development agencies have replaced essential development services with 
an ideologically charged agenda.56 Sexual and reproductive rights, then, are seen as 
part of a project that is intended to undermine motherhood and family, and UN 
agencies are at the forefront of this effort. 
 
This focus on UN agencies and conventions allows ‘pro-family’ organisation to 
isolate the ‘bad guys’ away from the UN in general, and enables them to view the 
UN as potentially salvageable. Though this is by no means a clean break, around 
2002 and 2003, many ‘pro-family’ organisations begin to depict the UN as 
organisation that has been captured by ‘radical’ ideologues. Having differentiated 
between the parts of the UN that they see as redeemable and those they argue 
should be dissolved, ‘pro-family’ organisations begin to represent the UN in a more 
favourable light. The General Assembly and the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
start to be elevated as potentially beneficial, whilst certain UN agencies are singled 
out for sustained ‘pro-family’ hostility. The following section discusses the 
different ways that ‘pro-family’ organisations frame the UN as hijacked by ‘anti-
family’ enemies, rather than being an inherently sinister and power hungry 
organisation in itself. 
 
The UN must be rescued 
‘Pro-family’ organisations increasingly depict the UN as a legitimate organisation 
that has been captured by enemy organisations and ideas. There are a number of 
potential hijackers in this ‘pro-family’ framework. Feminists are the most 
prominent, but homosexuals, environmentalists and liberals are also charged with 
being part of the ‘anti-family’ alliance that has taken over the UN. A major aspect 
of this takeover in the ‘pro-family’ view is that the ‘real needs’ of people in 
developing countries are ignored and even made worse by the activities of UN 
agencies. ‘Pro-family’ activists suggest that UN elites – often feminists – are using 
the suffering of women in developing countries to further their agenda and increase 
their global influence. 
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Leaders in the ‘pro-family’ movement argue that the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights conveys a ‘pro-family’ set of values. Activists who take this view 
see the problem with the UN in the form of a group of UN-savvy progressive 
organisations and individuals aligned in their efforts to impose their ideological 
agenda on the rest of the world. These progressives, say some ‘pro-family’ activists, 
have made the most headway in UNFPA, the World Bank, and UNICEF. As Buss 
and Herman and others have observed, the General Assembly is the ‘pro-family’ 
movement’s preferred venue for its UN activism. The UN is thus dissected into 
acceptable and unacceptable parts. The role of ‘pro-family’ organisations then, is 
not to bring down the UN, but to return it to its original ‘pro-family’ mandate. 
 
In the introduction to a 2002 C-Fam ‘White Paper’ on the activities of UNFPA, 
veteran Christian conservative activist Patrick Fagan condemns ‘the new sex 
alliance,’ which he claims is pitted against ‘the old universal family order.’57 This is 
a theme that is repeated time and again in ‘pro-family’ discourse: there were once 
universally accepted family conventions and identities which served to benefit 
society, but these must now be defended by ‘pro-family’ organisations.58 
  
Criticising this ‘new sex alliance,’ ‘pro-family’ organisations seek to ‘expose’ UN 
activities to public scrutiny as a way of shoring up resistance to the international 
recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. In this same White Paper, Fagan goes 
on to suggest that: 
‘Few policies could be so insidiously hostile to other nations than ones that interfere 
with their intimate family lives. UNFPA is at the forefront of this distortion, this 
grand experiment of the “new sex” camp to create a new world order.’59 
                                                 
57
 Fagan, P. F. (2002), in Sylva, D. A. (2002) ‘The United Nations Population Fund: Assault on the 
World’s Peoples,’ Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, The International Organisations 
Research Group, White Paper Series Number Three, p. III. Available via http://www.c-
fam.org/publications/id.327/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 20/08/09]. 
58
 Buss and Herman make a similar point in Globalizing Family Values, in reference to the semantics 
around the Christian Right’s opposition to homosexuality: Christian Right activists see the social 
world so changed that ‘normalcy is on the defensive.’ See Buss and Herman, op. cit., p. 4. 
59
 Fagan, P. F. (2002), in Sylva, D. A. (2002) ‘The United Nations Population Fund: Assault on the 
World’s Peoples,’ Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, The International Organisations 
Research Group, White Paper Series Number Three, p. III. Available via http://www.c-
fam.org/publications/id.327/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 20/08/09]. 
 138 
Fagan emphasises the ‘newness’ of this liberal ‘experiment’ in juxtaposition with 
older conservative moral laws surrounding sex, as well as suggesting to his 
audience that these ideas are not old enough to be entrenched, so can still be fought 
off. Interference is also stressed: in Fagan’s view, nations and families would be 
better off without the interference of the UN. Feminists at the UN, says Fagan, 
dream of a ‘scientific socialist controlled utopia of just the right number of people, 
of health, efficiency, and plenty.’60 
 
CWA also depicts feminists as seeking to control the UN. ‘Is there no end to the 
power grabs of the women at the United Nations?’61  asks Crouse in 2006, in 
response to a proposed UN office for women’s affairs. Concerned at the degree to 
which ‘the feminist agenda’ has been mainstreamed at the UN, Crouse protests that 
‘for decades the feminists have dominated sessions at numerous other UN 
conferences.’62 All this has done, in Crouse’s view, is increase the influence of 
feminists at the UN at the cost of addressing real issues faced by women in poor 
countries. In later CWA texts, depictions of the UN as an evil entity have given way 
to representations in which the organisation could do some good if feminists were 
removed from it.  
 
C-Fam has taken this position for some time, charging feminists at the UN with 
seeking to extend their authority far beyond the areas in which a focus on women is 
appropriate. One Friday Fax notes that feminists have significant influence within 
UN committees which discuss: 
‘population, children, housing, aging, the disabled, women, human rights, refugees, 
and the family. UN feminists, years ahead of pro-family forces, have found ways to 
include their agenda in all of these areas.’63 
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Many feminists might find it surprising that anyone would find their input 
inappropriate in any of these areas, given that they do all affect women, and often in 
ways that are different from men. For C-Fam, however, they are not women’s 
issues, and trying to make them so shows the degree to which parts of the UN have 
undergone a ‘feminist takeover.’64 In this way, C-Fam portrays its international 
responsibility as holding back the interfering and bullying65 feminists within the 
UN, and protecting smaller nations from their influence. 
 
CWA frequently takes this position. In a response to a call for increased US funding 
for UN-administered vaccinations and antibiotics to combat the spread of childhood 
diseases, Crouse suggests that these diseases are as widespread as they are because 
of UN feminists’ narrow-minded focus on abortion: 
‘For at least the past decade, the United Nations has been so focused on abortion that 
it has totally neglected other health issues that could have been reduced by now -- 
and that sad fact has caused millions of deaths around the world.’66 
Seeing advocacy for reproductive health and safe motherhood as coming at the cost 
of other health interventions, CWA accuses the UN of prioritising feminist ideology 
above saving lives. Similarly, numerous C-Fam publications accuse UN agencies of 
wasting health dollars on promoting equality. In one author’s words, the UN 
children’s agency UNICEF is ‘wander[ing] further and further from its official 
mandate to feed and medically treat suffering children.’67 Similarly, commenting on 
the five-year review of the International Conference on Population and 
Development, C-Fam argues that developing country representatives also disagree 
with what they see as the UN’s emphasis on overpopulation. In C-Fam’s 
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framework, developing countries are frustrated by UN agencies’ lack of interest in 
‘legitimate’ development concerns.68 
 
Another reason C-Fam sees ideologues at work at UNFPA is the continued 
emphasis on policies that C-Fam believes ‘haven’t worked,’ as exemplified in the 
following Friday Fax: 
 ‘UNFPA admits that AIDS has not been brought under control, noting that, “Despite 
expanding prevention activities, some 5 million new infections are occurring each 
year.” However, the report then goes on to endorse policies that have not worked, 
most notably “promoting the correct and consistent use of condoms.”’69 
Both UNFPA and UNICEF have been targets of investigation by C-Fam’s 
International Organisations Research Group, with the paper on UNFPA calling for 
suspension of funding pending a thorough investigation by donor countries into the 
organisation’s alleged support of human rights abuses. 70  The UNICEF paper: 
‘women or children first?’ characterises a feminist takeover of the organisation, in 
which the needs of children are now totally subjugated to the needs of women in 
this institution. The author, Sylva, writes that  
‘These ideological shifts – seismic shifts for an agency once interested in teaching 
mothers home economics as a practical method of promoting the welfare of children 
– have not gone unnoticed.’71 
Seeing the desires of women and children in zero-sum terms, the paper ultimately 
recommends a number of policy changes, including the removal of ‘radical 
feminism’ as the UNICEF’s guiding principle.72 
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Focus takes the same line when it condemns UNFPA for sending contraceptives to 
Myanmar after the Boxing Day tsunami, before assistance with ‘food, shelter and 
medication.’73 Only a world nearly devoid of God,’ says a Focus spokesperson, 
‘could give supplies denying life before necessities to sustain life.’74  For ‘pro-
family’ groups, then, even if parts of the UN are benign, agencies such as UNICEF 
and UNFPA remain beyond the pale. 
 
‘Pro-family’ organisations accuse UN elites of wilful anti-democratic behaviour 
which promotes sexual and reproductive rights against the will of the global 
populace, and in opposition to the intentions of the UN’s founders. The Howard 
Center, in particular, looks back with nostalgia to a time in which the UN steered 
clear of family issues, before what Carlson refers to as ‘the UN press into social and 
family policy.75 His view, which forms a part of the justification for the WCF, is 
that the UN has been profoundly altered since its inception. He states that  
‘... the rise of a militant secular, anti-family political ideology transformed the United 
Nations from an initially friendly venue into a vehicle dangerous to families, to 
parents, and to children.’76 
The danger posed, in Carlson’s view, is that the UN has become an end in itself, an 
engine of social change reaching far beyond the scope of issues for which it was 
created. Because this change is liberal in nature, appealing to the rights of 
individuals rather than families, Carlson sees the family and indeed ‘natural 
society’77 as being undermined by the UN. ‘Pro-family’ organisations seek to meet 
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this threat at its source – the UN – with a broad base of international support, to 
oppose the further liberalisation of sexual and reproductive norms at the global 
level.   
 
In order to do so, ‘pro-family’ organisations accept that they must make their 
arguments on non-religious grounds. Believing strongly in the broad efficacy of 
their policy positions, there is no evidence to suggest that the organisations see 
defending them in a secular forum as a problem. What ‘pro-family’ organisations 
do object to is what they see as the bias of UN elites towards established 
progressive organisations and ideas in the debates around and implementation of 
policies at the UN. 
 
 The ‘pro-family’ lobby at the UN still sees itself as a reviled group, with its 
activists struggling against a tide of animosity and stealth tactics as they attempt to 
have their perspectives heard. ‘Welcome to the United Nations’ states Crouse dryly, 
as she complains that liberals avoid the democratic process by moving debates to 
‘private, unannounced meetings.’ ‘Such shenanigans,’ says Crouse, are par for the 
course’ at the UN.78 Similarly, Focus asks its followers to pray for its staff and other 
‘pro-family’ activists at the UN: ‘It can be a daunting challenge to stand up for 
righteous principles in what is often a hostile environment; but ... our presence there 
can – and does – make a difference.’79 
 
C-Fam also complains about unfair treatment in UN meetings. A 2001 Friday Fax 
complains that ‘pro-family’ lobbyists were ‘harassed’ by UNICEF personnel as 
they attempted to register for a UN summit on children. 80  Illustrations of UN 
agencies’ hostility towards ‘pro-family’ organisations contribute to the ‘pro-family’ 
sentiment that secular entities and individuals seek in order to dominate UN 
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proceedings. C-Fam is particularly affronted by what it perceives as a procedural 
bias against ‘pro-family’ groups in the UN arena, in which ‘anti-family’ forces 
within the UN manipulate the processes and the language of debates in the UN to 
suit their own agendas.81 
 
Part II: Tensions  
The General Assembly is legitimate but ‘anti-family’ forces still control the process  
‘Pro-family’ groups are increasingly viewing the General Assembly as a legitimate 
place in which the ‘pro-family’ perspective is respected. In their work in this arena, 
‘pro-family’ organisations rely on delegates from developing countries to represent 
their views and now frequently portray the General Assembly as an arena of lively 
debate. Though they do not see it as perfectly democratic by any means, ‘pro-
family’ organisations now focus most of their energy on influencing resolutions in 
the General Assembly and other UN meetings with a large number of developing 
country delegations. This reflects the contention of ‘pro-family’ organisations that 
their message has a receptive audience in the more religious and less developed 
world.  
 
‘Pro-family’ efforts in the General Assembly do not always translate into 
satisfactory results, however. When outcomes are not consistent with ‘pro-family’ 
views, the groups react by either rekindling their general anti-UN stance or their 
argument that the procedure is biased against them. An example of the first 
approach is Crouse’s 2006 criticism of the National Council of Churches, in which 
she calls the UN a ‘corrupt and bloated international organisation with a long record 
of ineffectiveness and corruption.’82 By contrast, Crouse’s account of the General 
Assembly’s 2005 decision to ban human cloning makes the following assessment of 
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what this portends: ‘it is reassuring that the UN vote signals an international 
commitment to moving forward in a way that respects the sacredness of human 
life.’83 
 
An example of the second approach is C-Fam’s complaint that UN elites 
circumvent definitions hard-won by ‘pro-family’ organisations and their allies in 
the General Assembly. ‘Pro-family’ groups argue that treaty compliance 
committees use liberal interpretations of key words in documents relating to 
sexuality and reproduction when they oversee their implementation. For example, 
in a 2004 discussion about the activities of the UN Human Rights Council, C-Fam 
complains that treaty implementation committees wilfully misinterpret the term 
‘reproductive health’ to include abortion ‘and other new rights,’ even while the 
General Assembly excludes abortion from its definition of reproductive health.84 In 
a 2004 Friday Fax, a C-Fam author suggests that a number of government 
representatives were concerned that efforts to move a discussion on cloning out of 
the General Assembly were ‘deeply anti-democratic,’ suggesting that the move was 
‘an effort to circumvent three years of public and open debate on cloning at the UN 
and replace it with the closed-door work of “experts.” ’85  
 
A similar case is made over the use of the term ‘gender,’ recalling that both times 
the word has been considered by the General Assembly, it has been defined in a 
way that ‘pro-family’ groups accept. Despite this, C-Fam is frustrated that the UN 
Gender Advisor still defines ‘gender’ as a ‘social construct,’ because to ‘pro-
family’ organisations, this means that it can be changed.86 Hence even though C-
Fam has enjoyed increasing influence at the UN, it is still concerned that the 
structure of the UN produces ‘anti-family’ outcomes. Despite this, C-Fam clearly 
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sees an advantage to having issues in which it is involved debated in the relatively 
open forum of the General Assembly. ‘Pro-family’ investment in the General 
Assembly is an important indication of the degree to which the groups are now 
committed to changing the UN, rather than attacking it. Moreover, the consistent 
appeal to democracy and open debate at the international level shows either a quiet 
confidence in the popularity of conservative principles at this level, or a tactical 
decision on the part of C-Fam to at least appear confident of the widespread appeal 
of its positions. Either way, the organisation sees itself as protecting democracy at 
the international level, or in the words of a document endorsed by C-Fam, 
preventing UN officials from undermining ‘the values and sovereignty of individual 
nations.’87 For ‘pro-family’ activists, then, the General Assembly is the source of 
the UN’s legitimacy and the primary target of ‘pro-family’ organisations’ activism 
in their attempt to change the UN.  
 
‘Pro-family’ efforts at the General Assembly and appeal to the UN’s founding 
documents require the organisations to break with some of their past 
characterisations of the UN. If they continue to press for their policies at the UN 
level with increasing success, while encouraging an increase of ‘pro-family’ 
activism there, elites in the movement must acknowledge that they are having an 
impact on the UN. They must acknowledge that they are at least to some degree 
responsible for the outcomes that they have helped to bring about. In doing this, 
images of the UN as a ‘globalist’ entity with a totalitarian agenda are reframed to 
pinpoint particular enemies within the UN system, rather than the UN as a whole. 
But who are these enemies? 
 
Will the real ‘anti-family’ forces please stand up? 
As in the past, ‘pro-family’ activists are still uncertain about who is playing the lead 
role of ‘anti-family’ influence at the UN. Given that most of the policies that ‘pro-
family’ organisations oppose are advanced by feminists, one might suppose that 
feminists would be singled out as the movement’s main enemy at the UN. Yet ‘pro-
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family’ organisations seem surprisingly reluctant to concede that much power to 
feminists. 
 
One exception to this is a 2001 article written by Patrick Fagan for the FRC. In this 
article, Fagan states that feminists and their policies are indeed a major force behind 
the ‘anti-family’ changes at the UN. He writes that ‘the United Nations has become 
the tool of a powerful feminist-socialist alliance that has worked deliberately to 
promote a radical restructuring of society.’88 In this reading, feminists and socialists 
are in the driver’s seat at the UN. Fagan suggests that UN ‘agents’ now promote a 
sexual code of conduct that is indistinguishable from those sought after by 
feminists: ‘they are becoming the tenets of a new “moral” code against which all 
religions, domestic policies and cultures would be judged.’89 Fagan rounds out his 
argument by stressing what he sees as the weakness of non-traditional family 
structures, suggesting that ‘if the objective is to increase state control of all 
functions of society, then the UN approach makes sense.’ 90  Making these 
connections, Fagan hopes to stimulate ‘pro-family’ action against what he sees as 
the combination of two ‘anti-family’ ideologies which now control the UN. 
 
Interestingly, however, Fagan’s direct clarification of who is to blame at the UN has 
not been picked up by ‘pro-family’ discourse: searches of ‘pro-family’ websites for 
‘feminist/socialist alliance’ and similar terms show either a lack of awareness of 
this framework or an unwillingness to use it to describe what has been going on at 
the UN. The only ‘pro-family’ activist who comes close to this degree of clarity 
about the enemies directing the UN is Carlson, who for his part, blames the 
‘militant secular alliance’ (of the Clinton Administration and the EU) in the 1990s 
for the ‘anti-family’ outcomes of the ‘originally pro-family’ UN. And indeed, Fagan 
himself appears to change his mind about the role of feminists at the UN, describing 
their activities as cover for other actors at the UN in the following year. In 2002, 
Fagan, this time writing for C-Fam, suggests that UNFPA bureaucrats are able to 
disguise the major changes to family, tradition, culture and population they seek to 
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bring about by hiding ‘behind the skirts of the new radical woman.’91 Thanks to 
feminists, says Fagan, UNFPA’s ‘assault’ is difficult to challenge because UNFPA 
‘spins criticism of these practices as oppression of women and their rights’ (in other 
words, using feminist arguments as ‘spin’ rather than truly believing in them).92 
Feminists make these changes possible, in the ‘pro-family’ view, but they are not 
actually responsible for them: feminists function as puppets for people within the 
UN who wish to promote radical social change on a global scale.  
 
In ‘pro-family’ discourse, then, women’s and children’s rights activism at the UN is 
still often considered a smokescreen for some other objective, perhaps even done on 
behalf of some other actor. In this conspirational view, women’s and children’s 
rights allows agents of the UN to hide their ‘true’ culturally imperialistic intentions. 
CWA takes this position in an article entitled ‘The Stalking Horse named 
CEDAW.’ In her 2004 article, Crouse denounces the Women’s Convention and its 
proponents as testing the water for sweeping social change controlled and directed 
by the UN. Crouse is concerned that ‘elitists with a radical vision’ within the UN 
are ‘eagerly awaiting the opportunity to interject their power into the most intimate 
seams of the fabric of our personal lives.’93 This vision of UN elites making and 
enforcing rules to govern our intimate lives – yet concealed behind innocuous 
sounding treaties – is a repeatedly voiced concern in ‘pro-family’ discourse. This 
view also sees the UN as using feminists to further their goals of domination, rather 
than feminists using the UN to do so. 
 
Why are ‘pro-family’ organisations so unsure about how to portray the role of 
feminists at the UN? One possibility is that ‘pro-family’ leaders do not want to 
acknowledge that feminist ideologies have been successful or appealing. Moreover, 
if feminists are in charge, ‘pro-family’ groups must continue to see the UN in a 
negative light, rather than as a potentially beneficial organisation within which ‘pro-
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family’ groups can broadcast their ideas. Another possibility is that blaming 
particular rather than general enemies can come across as paranoid; undermining 
the efforts of ‘pro-family’ elites to move away from this kind of politics. Perhaps 
most importantly, they are still struggling to decide how to work within the UN 
system given their ideological constraints: while they are driven to promote binding 
public moralities and the strengthening of ‘tradition,’ they are also inclined to 
oppose the redistribution of wealth and traditional or cultural practices that they see 
as un-Christian. In this light, it may be easier to keep representing their enemies as 
unseen, lest they commit themselves fully to a particular course of action that might 
upset this fine ideological balance. 
 
The UN is bad – but we need it anyway  
Regardless of this uncertainty, ‘pro-family’ organisations are increasingly willing to 
support the UN. As one ‘pro-family’ author puts it, ‘the United Nations does some 
crazy things, but also some very good things. And we have to be prepared to 
support the good things.94 The FRC is similarly supportive of some of the UN’s 
policies, suggesting that while the UN has faults, it has also been a pioneer in the 
campaign against female genital mutilation, and in attempting to secure ‘equal 
rights for women throughout the world.’95  FRC is also pleased to see the UN 
facilitating cooperation between Muslims and Christians.96 
 
Likewise, a 2007 article by Crouse firmly declares that the UN is ‘worth fixing.’ 
Among other reasons, Crouse defends her position by stating that  
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‘there are thousands of people around the world who need to know that they are not 
alone. At a minimum, the UN provides a platform where their views can be affirmed 
and reinforced.’97 
Thus the UN is portrayed as a structure that has the potential to protect people from 
oppression, rather than having the UN as the oppressor. Crouse does not explicitly 
say what her alternative to ‘fixing’ the UN is, but she has clearly sensed the need to 
defend the ‘pro-family’ presence there.  
 
As has already been discussed, the Howard Center is also committed to reforming 
the UN, rather than rejecting it as an illegitimate entity. Like many other ‘pro-
family’ organisations, the Howard Center is institutionally attached to the UN, 
having a strong sense of purpose there and deriving legitimacy from its association 
with it. Likewise, C-Fam’s mission and function would arguably make little sense 
without the UN, even if it were to decide that the organisation was irredeemable. 
 
Conclusion 
‘Pro-family’ organisations have for some time depicted the attempts of UN agencies 
to promote women’s and children’s rights, redistribute income from rich to poor 
countries, and promote environmentalism as evidence that the UN as a whole is a 
power-seeking totalitarian entity. In many ways, this is a predictable result of using 
an anti-communist global framework to promote ‘family values’ beyond the US. A 
link between totalitarianism and the liberalisation of sexual mores explains the UN 
‘agenda’ in earlier ‘pro-family’ texts.  
 
More recently, however, a new perspective on the UN has begun to emerge in ‘pro-
family’ discourse. ‘Pro-family’ groups affiliated with the UN have begun to frame it 
as a previously ‘family-friendly’ and even potentially beneficial organisation that 
has been hijacked by nefarious ‘anti-family’ and ‘anti-American’ forces. Put 
crudely, the ’pro-family’ agenda is changing from ‘attack’ the UN to ‘fix’ the UN.  
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In both frameworks, the ‘natural family’ is a centrepiece of the battle. In the earlier 
view, the ‘natural family’ is seen as the target of oppressive forces within the UN, 
and the shield that must be strengthened to protect innocents against the 
organisation’s encroaching power. In the latter view, the ‘natural family’ is the 
means by which the ‘evil’ elements within the UN can be distinguished from the 
worthwhile ones, and thus the ‘natural family’ serves as a platform for UN reform 
and renewal. 
 
Even renewed, however, the UN is ultimately a poor fit for the ‘pro-family’ 
movement. Certainly UN policies with which ‘pro-family’ activists approve are 
seen as worthy of support. Yet ‘pro-family’ leaders baulk at wholehearted 
investment in the UN as an organisation that can be used to bring about ‘good’ 
outcomes. A 2004 CWA article asks its readers the following question: ‘What does 
the mission of the church have to do with the UN?’ It concludes that  
‘the mission of the church is to lift up to a suffering world the “Prince of Peace”… 
hearts are changed and peace is attainable only though the true Gospel message.’98 
 In the words of one FRC author writing in 2004, the ‘pro-family’ movement needs 
to remember that: 
‘... we are not closer to the Kingdom of God today than in the early Roman Empire 
just because we have democracy, human rights, and the United Nations.’99 
This author, reminding the ‘pro-family’ movement of its Christian roots, sums up a 
serious question for ‘pro-family’ activists: what is the purpose of ‘pro-family’ 
activism at the UN? This chimes with Buss and Herman’s view, that a legitimate 
international government is impossible without ‘Christ at the helm.’100 In pursuing 
success at the UN, ‘pro-family’ organisations buy into the potential of human-led 
progress, an idea that sits uncomfortably with many Christian conservatives. By 
acting at the UN, the ‘pro-family’ movement may gain some control over systemic 
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power, as Beyer puts it, but this may be at the cost of losing sight of their ultimate 
aims and their identity as conservative Christians. 
 
Their identity as political activists does benefit from their activism at the UN, 
however. The organisations who have it clearly relish their NGO status, which is 
another complication for a movement that is still, at its core, ambivalent about the 
worth of the UN. NGO accreditation has the effect of ‘mainstreaming’ 
organisations, in that it both constrains behaviour and language – manifest in the 
difference between the discourse and activities of HLI and C-Fam, for example – 
and announces to ‘pro-family’ peers and opponents the legitimacy of the 
organisation, which through its UN status is recognised well outside its ideological 
community. 
 
Thus while they are still sceptical of the UN, the groups now see themselves as 
being inextricably connected to the organisation. From seeing the UN as an entity 
which threatens to annihilate the world’s families, tradition, and culture, the 
organisations now see the UN as a forum in which they can support some parts and 
policies while they condemn others. In this way, the ‘pro-family’ justification for 
globalizing is changing. Originally stepping up because of a perceived threat from 
the UN, ‘pro-family’ organisations can now justify their activities at the UN as 
making a difference by changing the philosophy of the organisation from within.  
 
It could be argued that the changing ‘pro-family’ views of the UN largely depend 
on the government which is in charge of the US. I suggest, however, that it has 
more to do with ‘pro-family’ investment and involvement in the UN system. While 
has coincided with who is in the White House, in the sense that Bush facilitated a 
greater ‘pro-family’ presence at (and influence on) the UN than Clinton, the 
organisations would not have changed their views about the UN without being 
involved in it. By making alliances at the UN, the organisations not only show the 
developing world that ‘they are not alone,’ as Crouse puts it, they also re-affirm the 
widespread popularity of their message amongst themselves.101 This suggests that 
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Croft’s analysis of Christian Right organisations at work within the UN is incorrect. 
It overlooks the degree to which ‘pro-family’ organisations are changing as a result 
of their presence in that forum: they have become stakeholders in the UN. While it 
is not difficult to find evidence that some ‘pro-family’ organisations still look to the 
UN with distaste, and still see UN elites controlling the processes despite the 
successes of ‘pro-family’ organisations at the General Assembly, this chapter shows 
that there has been a trend towards the desire to retain and reform – rather than 
simply use – the UN. In this way, the continued presence of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations at the UN is justified. The UN offers ‘pro-family’ groups the 
opportunity to challenge arguments about the narrow applicability of their views, 
and provides them with additional networking possibilities in the developing world. 
Yet in being absorbed into the UN, the ‘pro-family’ movement has essentially lost a 
very important enemy. The ‘pro-family’ presence there legitimates the UN as a 
democratic forum in which conservative voices are now heard loud and clear. The 
UN can no longer be a threatening entity in ‘pro-family’ discourse; something else 
must take that role. 
 
The findings of this chapter raise important questions about the role of feminists in 
the ‘pro-family’ worldview. In some ‘pro-family’ articles, Feminists, with their 
liberal, socialist, and environmentalist allies, are accused of pressing for an ‘anti-
family’ agenda through the UN. They are charged with inserting their agenda into 
areas well beyond their mandate, for seeking to advance a gender-free ‘new world 
order,’ and for numerous other assaults on the ‘natural family.’ Yet feminism is also 
ridiculed as a bizarre ideology in ‘pro-family’ discourse, and feminists are sidelined 
as the pawns of a more powerful (and as yet unnamed) foe. If the UN is to be 
redeemed or defeated, and more generally, if ‘pro-family’ organisations are going to 
achieve the global renewal of ‘natural family’ values, their ambiguity about 
feminism and the global role of feminists must be addressed. It is to this ‘pro-
family’ effort I now turn. 
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Chapter Five: Radicals and Basket-Cases: ‘pro-family’ characterisations of 
feminism  
 
‘…the feminists had infiltrated the meeting and planted their operatives around the 
perimeter of the room like a feminist noose.’ 
Thomas Euteneuer, Human Life International, 20021 
 
Resisting the influence of feminism at the global level has been a key aspect of the 
expansion of ‘pro-family’ activism beyond US borders. While ‘liberals,’ 
‘globalists,’ ‘socialists’ and others do feature as ‘anti-family’ forces (and are often 
associated with feminism), ‘pro-family’ organisations have most often justified 
their global activism through their opposition to feminist advances and the 
international organisations that they believe are in thrall to feminist ideas. This 
chapter considers the ways in which international ‘pro-family’ organisations 
characterise feminism, and whether this is changing over time. 
 
Observers of ‘pro-family’ groups agree that while earlier texts were uniform in their 
disparagement of feminism, there has been a growing tendency to marginalise only 
certain types of feminism in the discourse of the Christian Right. Buss and Herman 
suggest that Christian Right groups split feminism into ‘radical’ or ‘gender’ 
feminism, and another kind of feminism they find acceptable.2 They quote Sara 
Diamond, who notes that ‘even on the Right, it is no longer politically correct to 
make direct attacks on women’s equality.’ 3  Butler agrees that ‘pro-family’ 
organisations dissect feminism into a version they find tolerable and ‘radical 
feminism,’ which ‘pro-family’ groups see as an effort to turn women against men, 
among other things.4 This separation, Butler suggests, may be an acknowledgement 
that feminist perspectives have become normalised, or it may reflect the ‘capacity 
of religious conservatives to integrate new ideas’ into their agenda.5 Both Buss and 
Herman and Butler note that many ‘pro-family’ organisations now depict feminism 
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as a ‘noble cause,’ hijacked by ‘radicals,’ (similar to the way that the UN has been 
depicted in ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
 
Buss and Herman observe that feminist activism provokes two contradictory 
responses in ‘pro-family’ politics: feminists are both the actors most often identified 
as the force behind ‘anti-family’ changes, while at the same time they are not really 
taken seriously as a threatening force.6 This observation provides an important way 
of understanding how feminism fits into the ‘pro-family’ view of the world. If 
feminists and their ideas are powerful, then international ‘pro-family’ activism can 
be understood as opposing the kind of feminism they do not like, and promoting a 
‘pro-family’ form of feminism in its place. On the other hand, if feminists are a 
minimal threat, it falls on ‘pro-family’ activists to seek out the real forces behind 
the ‘anti-family’ changes they oppose, and target those agents instead.  
 
In this second case, are Herman’s ‘unseen enemies’ – those presumed to be‘hiding 
behind’ feminism – sustaining ‘pro-family’ interest in the global realm over time, or 
is feminism becoming a specific and visible ‘anti-family’ enemy in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse? With this question in mind, ‘pro-family’ discourse on feminism in this 
chapter is divided between characterisations of feminism as a powerful agent of 
‘anti-family’ change, versus depictions of feminism as a symptom of other (more 
powerful) ‘anti-family’ forces. The last part of this chapter considers the issues 
raised by ‘pro-family’ characterisations of feminism.  
 
Part I: Characterisations of feminism in ‘pro-family’ texts 
The first part of this chapter looks at how feminists and feminism are characterised 
by ‘pro-family’ organisations.  Noting the frequency with which the groups attach 
the term ‘radical’ to feminism, this section begins with a discussion of the ways 
‘pro-family’ groups attempt to marginalise feminist NGOs who promote sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. Related to their charge of radicalism is the 
characterisation of feminism as the rejection of all forms of sexual morality. This is 
seen as an effort to liberate men, women and children from the ‘traditional’ norms 
and responsibilities that ‘pro-family’ organisations see as vital to the cohesion of 
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society. This effort is depicted as a kind of worldwide social experiment conducted 
by powerful ‘radical’ feminists. Dangerous feminists have made considerable 
headway in the industrialised world, say ‘pro-family’ activists, and their influence 
needs to be stopped before people from the South suffer the same fate as the ‘dying’ 
West. 
 
Another common ‘pro-family’ response to the increasing influence of feminism and 
feminist NGOs has been to argue that their political successes come at the cost of 
meeting peoples’ ‘real needs.’ By pressing for the inclusion of sexual and 
reproductive health and rights in development debates and outcome documents, say 
‘pro-family’ activists, feminists ignore issues like nutrition, sanitation and literacy. 
In this way, feminist NGOs involved in the UN are depicted as powerful bullies, 
who do not listen to the needs and desires of women in poor countries, and harass 
conservative NGOs who seek to offer alternative perspectives.  
 
Feminists are accused of being ideologues who pursue their agenda regardless of 
the realities of poor women. In many texts, feminism is linked with other political 
ideologies condemned by ‘pro-family’ organisations. Some ‘pro-family’ 
perspectives see feminists using Marxist ideas to bring down the ‘natural family,’ 
whilst others stress the liberal capitalist interests working in conjunction with 
feminist NGOs to bring about a more self-serving, individualistic, consumer-driven 
society. Still others see feminism combining with a radicalised imperialist agenda 
that seeks to alter the very fabric of social life. Each of these characterisations is 
discussed in depth in the following section. 
 
Feminists are responsible for ‘anti-family’ changes 
The term ‘radical feminism’ is prolific in ‘pro-family’ discourse. ‘Radical’ is used 
as a prefix which separates ‘bad’ feminist ideas from ‘good’ ones. Though it 
sometimes refers to particular feminist philosophies of patriarchy and oppression, 
‘radical’ is more commonly used to marginalise a variety of different kinds of 
feminist arguments. The term ‘radical’ is frequently found as a prefix to feminism 
in ‘pro-family’ texts, and appears to be interchangeable with ‘gender’ feminism.7 
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As a brief illustration of the wide use of these terms, of the articles on CWA’s 
website that contain the term ‘feminist’ or ‘feminism,’ nearly a third also contain 
one or both of these qualifiers.8  
 
‘Radical’ feminism, according to ‘pro-family’ activists, bears the blame for 
normalising comprehensive sex education, contraception and abortion. This, say 
‘pro-family’ organisations, is a massive social experiment that feminists are 
conducting on a global scale. The ‘radical’ feminist experiment has ‘sex without 
consequences’ as its end goal. In this view, ‘radical’ NGOs who press for this goal 
through their advocacy for sexual and reproductive rights have no genuine interest 
in the real needs and desires of women. ‘Radical’ feminism is portrayed as distorted 
and unnatural and leads to acceptance of (and conversion to) homosexuality. This 
comes about because ‘radical’ feminists’ seek to meddle with nature and remove all 
vestiges of ‘traditional masculinity.’ From this perspective, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations see themselves as having knowledge of the ‘real’ agenda of ‘radical’ 
feminists and the ability to protect the world from their machinations. 
 
‘Radical’ is used in opposition to a set of feminist arguments which ‘pro-family’ 
groups find reasonable, such as political and civil rights won by first wave 
feminists. These prefixes also protect ‘pro-family’ leaders from association with 
their ideological opponents when they speak about themselves as feminists or ‘pro-
woman.’ 9 CWA, for example, supports the empowerment of women, but derides 
the pursuit of ‘sameness in the name of equality.’10 In this way, a ‘pro-family’ 
feminism emerges – what its proponents call an ‘authentic’ feminism that celebrates 
difference, appreciates the constraints of human nature and ascribes to ‘gender 
complementarity’ – and can be rescued from its association with ‘radical’ feminism.  
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As has been discussed by other observers of the Christian Right, ‘pro-family’ elites 
seek to ‘return’ feminism to its ‘pro-life’ origins. One HLI author writes that during 
a lecture in Goa, he ‘spoke of women’s empowerment – how it started beautifully, 
and how it was and is being ruined by radical feminists.’11 According to CWA, this 
is because feminism has ‘gone the wrong way, baby.’12 Arguing that feminism has 
lost sight of the real needs and desires of women, Crouse suggests that the majority 
of American women find the term ‘feminist’ offensive.13 ‘Experts agree,’ writes 
Crouse, ‘that women are growing more and more uncomfortable with the current 
feminist movement.’14 
 
Capitalising on this discomfort, Crouse and LaHaye seek to reinvent feminism in 
the form of the conservative Christian woman. In A Counterfeit Strength, the pair 
write that ‘radical feminists did not invent the idea of the powerful woman. God 
did.’15 As LaHaye and Crouse see it, great women are also humble, faithful and 
obedient, and true power is found through God. The authors contrast this kind of 
strength with feminist’s struggle for equality in other, more public, areas. ‘Radical’ 
feminists, in CWA’s view, in seeking power through their careers, their 
relationships and through the acquisition of money, do not actually come any closer 
to fulfilment or equality with men.16  
 
Focus on the Family takes a similar line, isolating ‘pro-family’ feminism from its 
‘anti-family’ contemporaries. Highlighting the anti-abortion stance of ‘Susan B. 
Anthony: pro-life feminist’ one Focus author offers a number of contemporary 
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examples of feminists who have opposed abortion.17 The era of ‘pro-life’ feminists 
is not in the past, stresses the author; there are still numerous feminists who 
condemn abortion as harmful to women.  
 
Dobson himself suggests that feminism was once a beneficial force, with 
‘legitimate grievances, such as equal pay for equal work and discrimination in the 
workplace.’ 18  According to Dobson, however, feminism went far beyond these 
injustices, to the point where we are at now, in which ‘radical feminists and elitists 
tell us that men are fools and boys are fools too.’19 Another Focus commentator 
sums the distinction within feminism succinctly: ‘Authentic feminism,’ she 
suggests, ‘celebrates the dignity of women ... radical feminism refuses to 
acknowledge differences between men and women, idealizes androgyny and 
denigrates marriage and motherhood.’20  
 
C-Fam is even clearer about the difference between ‘radical’ feminists and their 
acceptable counterparts. As an explanation, C-Fam author Douglas Sylva suggests 
that the term ‘radical feminist’ distinguishes feminists who condone abortion, and 
understand gender as a social construct, from other types of feminism.21 Abortion 
and homosexuality, as ever, remain the most important issues on the political 
horizon for ‘pro-family’ groups. 
 
Feminism is often depicted as a form of Marxism that pits men and women against 
each other. ‘Pro-family’ authors associate Marxist concepts of conflict with 
feminism in a number of different ways. For the FRC, Patrick Fagan and others 
write that marriage is the key distinction between feminism that is unacceptable, 
and ‘moderate, mainstream’ feminism. The latter kind, suggest the authors, ‘have 
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long rejected [the] animus against marriage … and are focused on a worthy 
concern: removing obstacles to the advancement of women in all walks of life.’ 
‘Radical’ feminists, by contrast, go far beyond this: According to Fagan et al., 
‘radical’ feminists ‘seek to undermine the nuclear family of married father, mother, 
and children, which they label the “patriarchal family.” ’22 The ‘radical’ feminist 
vision of marriage, in the words of these authors, is ‘man’s war against women.’ In 
the author’s view, this vision explains the ‘shrillness’ of feminist opposition to 
policies that promote ‘healthy marriage.’23 
 
In a 2005 article, CWA links feminist efforts to the communist consolidation of 
power. ‘Make no mistake,’ she warns:  
‘like Lenin who talked idealistically about the Communist state "withering away" 
while he was ruthlessly consolidating his tyrannical control over the people of 
Russia, these so-called “advocates for women's rights” are really about gaining the 
power to dictate how societies all over the world will organize and rule.’24  
Crouse still sees feminists as implicated in ‘globalism,’ conflating their efforts to 
improve public health with advocacy for more government control, and eventually 
world government control. These feminists (‘many of whom are neo-Marxists,’ 
says Crouse) pit their utopian socialist schemes against a ‘real-world’ system.25 In 
this light, the liberation advanced by feminists in the form of sexual and 
reproductive rights masks their attempt to control people through the UN and its 
member states. HLI also picks up this theme, running courses in which Brian 
Clowes teaches his seminarians about ‘the Marxist Roots of the Anti-Life 
Movement (see photograph below).’26 
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(Human Life International, 2006) 
 
In a trip to Nicaragua, Euteneuer equates contraceptive distribution with tyranny; a 
‘leftist Marxist revolution called contraceptive imperialism.’ 27  Though most 
references connecting feminism to Marxism are left unexplained in HLI texts, 
Euteneuer does delve deeper in a trip to Central America in 2003. He condemns 
‘radical feminism’ as a ‘plague on the family,’ offering his view that it is ‘the 
feminist face of Marxism’ in which ‘feminists pit man against woman as a form of 
class hatred within the family and it too is a struggle to the death.’28 
 
The Howard Center uses the words of self-described Marxist feminists to argue that 
feminism is in fact ‘anti-family.’ In a 2005 Religion and Society Report, one 
Howard Center author offers a plethora of Marxist feminist quotes showing that 
‘burying the family at long last,’ and ‘the complete destruction of traditional 
marriage and the nuclear family,’ are the ultimate goals of ‘radical’ feminism.29 
That these quotes have come to stand for ‘the feminist agenda’ in the view of ‘pro-
family’ organisations is not particularly noteworthy, however. It is not uncommon 
to marginalise one’s political opponents by associating them with extreme forms of 
their ideologies. What is important to note here is the implication that it is this 
particular form of feminism that is seen as globally ascendant, and in control of key 
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international political institutions such as the UN and the World Bank. In this 
appeal to oppose a massive global Marxist/feminist threat, then, the Howard Center 
justifies its activism on behalf of the ‘natural family.’ 
 
Feminism is also depicted as a massive social experiment which promotes ‘free 
love’ with ‘no consequences.’ As was touched on in the previous chapter, in 
destroying the family, ‘radical’ feminists are pursuing the goal of building a ‘post-
family order,’ according to ‘pro-family’ observers. This is imagined as a grand 
experiment, in which feminists within the UN (and beyond it) seek absolute sexual 
freedom. In the ‘pro-family’ framework, this is the purpose of the dissemination of 
contraceptive technologies: ‘radical’ feminists seek to reduce the body to a 
consequence-free play area, dedicated to the pursuit of enjoyment.   
 
Austin Ruse, for example, suggested in 1998 that ‘feminists believe the traditional 
notion of the family – father, mother, and children – must be permanently altered 
because it hinders the advance of complete sexual and reproductive freedom.’30 
Crouse, for her part, sees ‘free love’ – which she defines as ‘sexual activity that is 
unconstrained and without consequences’ – as the central aspect of the women’s 
liberation movement. 31  Normal women find ‘modern feminism’ problematic 
suggests Crouse, because it ‘ignores the relationship between decisions/choices and 
consequences.’32  
 
In this reading, feminists’ advocacy for reproductive and sexual rights is an appeal 
to people’s desire to gratify themselves, encouraging dangerous and selfish 
behaviour and ultimately leading to the ‘radical’ feminist’s end goal: the destruction 
of the family. For ‘pro-family’ organisations, then, their job is to defend the 
threatened moral fortitude and traditions of developing countries from the 
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hedonistic and corrupting effect of feminists and their ideas. HLI is one such 
organisation, painting itself as defending the world against what it calls a ‘feminist 
onslaught.’ 33  Feminist NGOs appear in HLI texts as ‘armies of well-financed 
liars’34 ‘loaded with money,’35  who ‘wield millions of dollars and exist for the 
singular purpose of pushing their own hedonistic agendas on the rest of the 
world.’36 HLI declares its resistance to what it calls the ‘militant atheistic feminist 
movement.’37 Euteneuer writes that feminists enjoy ‘perverse glee’ when they enter 
countries in order to ‘undermine and destroy the fabric’ of societies.38 Chief among 
the ‘pro-death’39 feminist NGOs in Euteneuer’s view is Planned Parenthood, which 
‘prowls about like a roaring lion looking for someone to devour.’40 Representations 
of feminist NGOs moving into developing countries and corrupting the innocent are 
frequently used in appeals for financial support for HLI’s global activism. 
 
One of the main ‘pro-family’ complaints about feminists is that they push policies 
that poor countries do not need or want. ‘Pro-family’ groups cite the legalisation or 
legitimisation of prostitution, abortion and homosexuality as the most problematic 
of the policies that feminist NGOs are trying to force developing countries to 
accept. ‘Pro-family’ organisations see developing countries as helpless to oppose 
the liberalisation of their laws because feminists have managed to make 
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development assistance and funding for health services conditional on the adoption 
of liberal norms surrounding sexuality and reproduction.  
 
In a 2003 article, CWA is concerned that HIV prevention funds would be made 
available to groups that advocate for the legalisation of prostitution. Giving 
condoms to prostitutes, in this organisation’s view, ‘would be like placing a Band-
aid on a cancer patient: what these women need is bold assistance to help them out 
of prostitution.41 CWA sees prostitution as a trap (frequently equated with human 
trafficking) rather than a choice. In this way, feminists are depicted as disregarding 
prostitutes’ desperation to escape their situations, and in fact increasing and 
prolonging the suffering of women.   
 
Feminists are accused of the ‘promotion of a victim status’ for women in a number 
of ‘pro-family’ texts, especially by CWA activists. ‘Pro-family’ activists see men as 
the chief beneficiaries of reproductive rights. One CWA author argues that the 
feminist pursuit of reproductive rights has increased the victimisation of women 
because it 
‘has more ironically benefited men who no longer bear responsibilities for 
impregnating girlfriends as long as there's a women's clinic handy. Women may have 
more power and clout in the boardroom but not over their lives.’42  
This position is also broadly shared by other ‘pro-family’ groups. In 2006, Carlson 
writes that ‘frequently, boyfriends or male family members pressure women into 
having abortions.’43 Thus reproductive rights are portrayed as a means of increasing 
the suffering of women, rather than empowering them.  
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This concern is transferred to women in developing countries in ‘pro-family’ texts 
with vigour. Contraceptive technologies have had a devastating effect in areas 
where women enjoy very limited decision-making autonomy, say ‘pro-family’ 
organisations. They offer a number of historical examples of how women are 
victimised by contraceptive technologies, most notably in the coercion of women 
by their governments in the name of fertility reduction targets. This form of abuse –
which also concerns many feminists – has received considerable attention in ‘pro-
family’ discourse. For their part, however, ‘pro-family’ organisations blame sexual 
and reproductive rights language for providing window dressing for this form of 
abuse. 
 
Similarly, ‘pro-family’ activists are deeply concerned at the degree to which 
economic pressures may result in abortion where it is available, stressing that in 
these situations, access to abortion actually reduces the status of women.44 The 
‘pro-family’ view of women’s bodies sees them as fundamentally inviolable or 
sacred. However, the presence of contraceptives and abortion renders these bodies 
vulnerable to economic forces which have no regard for their sacred status. This 
economic pressure to prevent or terminate pregnancies may come from forces 
external to the family, or may come within it; like some feminists, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are concerned that reproductive health services actually victimise 
women because of their relative powerlessness within their relationships. 
 
‘Pro-family’ organisations occasionally argue that feminists are cultural 
imperialists. 45  Western feminists are accused of holding up progress on 
development because they refuse to omit liberal terms and passages from 
international agreements. One CWA flyer distributed at the UN – despite the 
activities of what CWA describes as ‘members of a lesbian caucus, [who] tried to 
stop the distribution’ – informed delegates that ‘if the West would stop pushing 
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homosexual and abortion “rights” on unwilling countries, the document would be 
done.’ It continues: ‘Don’t blame the developing countries for the courage to defend 
their values and their right to self-government.’46  
 
Ruse also depicts feminists as contemptuous of the political process in their efforts 
to exert their influence on the policies of developing countries. Labelling his 
opponents as ‘aggressive radical feminist NGOs,’47  Ruse suggests that Western 
feminists amuse themselves by ‘openly laughing’ at developing country delegates 
who do not speak English as a first language. ‘In fact,’ suggests Ruse, ‘radical 
social activists at the UN count on this confusion to intrude their extreme agendas 
into documents.’ 48  
 
In a 2006 Friday Fax, C-Fam accuses feminist NGOs of seeking to build a global 
network of ‘supranational tribunals’ that will implement their agenda, ‘bypass[ing] 
representative government and national sovereignty.’49 Europe is a major part of the 
feminist threat in C-Fam texts, with the European Union portrayed as a domineering 
bully, disregarding the desires of developing countries. One Friday Fax in 1999 
states that 
‘When the G-77 tried to change only one word in the “women and health” section, 
the German chairman of the general session, supported vociferously by the powerful 
EU, tersely instructed the G-77 nations that they must abide by the agreement.’50 
                                                 
46
 CWA (2000) ‘CWA Presents Petition Upholding the Home, Marriage and Family to Ambassador 
Linda Tarr-Whelan,’ Concerned Women for America, 6 August 2000, available at 
http://www.cwfa.org/articles/1917/CWA/nation/index.htm [last accessed 01/06/09]. 
47
 Ruse, A. (1999) ‘Overreaching by US and EU Angers Developing World, Stalls Cairo+5,’ 
Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute Friday Fax, April 9, 1999, vol. 2, no. 23, available 
http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.86/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 24/08/09]. 
48
 Ruse, A. (1999) ‘UN Double Standard Favors Western Nations Against Developing World,’ 
Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute Friday Fax, March 19, 1999, vol. 2, no. 21. See 
http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.83/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 24/08/09].  
49
 Yoshihara, S. (2006) ‘Left and Right Agree, UN Compliance Committees New Front Line in UN 
Abortion Debate,’ Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute Friday Fax, September 29, 2006, 
vol. 9, no. 41. Available http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.480/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 
24/08/09]. See also Ruse, A. (2002) ‘UNFPA Executive Director seeks additional funding for 
beleaguered agency,’ Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute Friday Fax, March 22, 2002, vol. 
5, no. 13, http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.83/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 24/08/09]. 
50Ruse, A. (1999) ‘UN Double Standard Favors Western Nations Against Developing World,’ 
Friday Fax, March 19, 1999, vol. 2, no. 21. See http://www.c-
fam.org/publications/id.83/pub_detail.asp [last accessed 24/08/09]. 
 166 
Seeing feminists as pushing their unwanted agenda on increasingly frustrated 
developing countries rather than helping them, C-Fam calls on ‘pro-family’ 
organisations to rally against feminism at the global level.   
 
Smaller European countries which oppose the liberalisation of homosexuality and 
abortion laws must also be protected from feminists within the EU in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse. ‘Pro-family’ organisations appeal to choice and diversity in their support 
for the conservative stances of small countries. In one example, on the Latvian 
government’s conservative stance on homosexuality, Carlson praises its decision 
‘not to be bullied into acquiescing to the New Erotic Order.’ Carlson calls on the 
EU ‘to accept diversity of values among its members.’51 Similarly, entering the 
Portuguese abortion debate, Carlson criticises the ‘European Bureaucracy’ for 
‘eradicating choice among nations, when it comes to protecting the unborn child.’52  
 
All kinds of feminism (except ‘pro-family’ feminism) are seen as part of a slippery 
slope in ‘pro-family’ discourse. Acceptance of ‘even the tiniest portion of the anti-
life agenda,’ says Euteneuer, ‘is invariably fatal to a nation's soul and well-being.’53 
Commonly, ‘pro-family’ leaders see the work of feminists as a kind of social 
engineering that attempts to homogenise men and women through interference in 
the upbringing of children. In this effort, feminists are messing with human nature, 
say ‘pro-family’ activists. As Carlson puts it, 
‘women and men are hardwired to be different.  Denying these differences can only 
result in violations of human nature, doing particular harm to existing and potential 
children.’54 
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In this view, feminist promotion of gender equality denies or minimises the 
differences between men and women; feminism is not only distorted and unnatural, 
it is part of a slippery slope towards homosexuality. 
 
‘Pro-family’ groups are divided as to whether nature is strong enough to endure 
these violations, or whether over time, feminists will achieve their supposed goal of 
a homogenised social order. Discussing UNFPA, Fagan (this time for C-Fam) 
confirms that feminists within the organisation are conducting an ‘experiment in 
playing god – against the natural order, which will not change, no matter what 
advances man makes.’55 In this framework, the ‘natural order’ is strong enough to 
resist the ‘feminist ideologues’ who wish to ‘re-engineer human nature.’56 
 
In other ‘pro-family’ texts, human nature is not so resilient. Reacting to the 
‘feminist’ idea that ‘kids need fathers like fish need bicycles,’ Dobson argues  
‘feminists have ‘sniffed out’ male pride and uprooted it and the result is that men 
don’t know how to be responsible grown-ups anymore. Without the influence of a 
father or other responsible male role model ... disastrous consequences – such as 
homosexuality – may follow.’57  
The ‘natural order’ is thus not always seen as strong enough to prevent feminists 
from achieving their goals, in this case, the destruction of the family and the 
conversion of heterosexual children to homosexuality.  
 
In some texts, HLI sees feminism as so unnatural that it is easy for societies steeped 
in ‘traditional’ and ‘natural’ values to shrug off feminist initiatives as the bizarre 
ideas of an alien culture. But in others, feminists are ‘prowling lions,’ and the 
people they infect with their ‘corrupt’ agenda are poor, simple and vulnerable to 
feminist ideas. In one case, feminist ideas are seen as ‘programming.’ In Peru, 
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Euteneuer is pleased to report the successful teaching of ‘natural family planning’ 
to rural couples. ‘Rural couples are the easiest to teach,’ he says, ‘because they 
don’t come pre-programmed against the message of NFP by the media-controlled 
culture.’ 58  As was discussed in chapter three, there is hope for HLI, because 
‘shame,’ and ‘embedded, authentic cultural values’ make people reluctant to 
embrace feminist ideas. Yet they are still considered dangerous.  
 
In a ‘pro-life missionary trip’ to Costa Rica, Euteneuer accuses feminists of 
portraying ‘the natural roles specific to their gender’ as ‘forms of social repression 
that men have used for ages to keep women subjugated to them.’59 In Euteneuer’s 
view, this is intimately connected to homosexuality. He continues his discussion on 
the feminist influence in Latin America by noting that he is not surprised that with 
this ‘rabid leftist-feminist ideology being pumped into Hispanic societies, there is a 
rapid growth of homosexuality.’ 60  In this reading of the situation, ‘natural’ or 
‘traditional’ repulsion of feminism and homosexuality is not always enough; 
acceptance of one leads to the other. 
 
CWA also links feminism to homosexuality, as part of a continuum. In her 
historical critique of feminism, Crouse suggests that the feminist movement began 
to fall apart when some feminists started to advocate for the unhindered expression 
of sexual desire, and ‘it completely came unglued when it began to focus so 
intensely on promoting lesbianism.’ 61  That homosexuality (and lesbianism in 
particular) is an end result of feminism is a virtual truism in most ‘pro-family’ 
discourse. This is framed in a number of ways. In some ‘pro-family’ texts, tolerance 
of feminist ideas leads to tolerance of homosexuality in a broad sense. A 2005 
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Religion and Society Report reminds its readers that ‘the ordination of women has 
been followed in several cases by the acceptance of homosexuals in the ministry.’62  
 
Alternatively, feminism leads to ‘conversion’ to homosexuality at an individual 
level too. A 2001 Religion and Society Report makes the case that if sex roles are 
constructed and can be changed, then homosexuality is also the result of cultural 
construction and can be changed. Moreover, the argument goes, gay pride activities 
‘may condition people not otherwise so inclined or determined to become 
homosexuals.’ 63  Thus it is inferred that feminists and homosexuals intend to 
reconstruct people’s gender identities in their own image. Feminist efforts to brand 
gender as a construct, then, are an attack on the heterosexual identity of children, 
and thus an assault on the ‘natural family.’ 
 
In all of these different characterisations, feminists are seen as powerful agents 
promoting their own agenda. This agenda does coincide with the goals of other 
organisations, but feminists are granted at least a degree of ambition and influence. 
In the characterisations that follow, feminists may have some agency, but they and 
their ideas are not the real enemy that ‘pro-family’ organisations face. Feminism is 
the product of (or the facade for) some other force: but what? 
 
There is already a problem with modern society, and feminism is just a symptom 
In the second type of characterisation, in which feminism is just a symptom of some 
other malevolent ‘anti-family’ force or forces, there are a number of other ‘anti-
family’ agents and ideas offered as the real problem. In many ‘pro-family’ texts, the 
cultural elevation of self-gratification and consumerism is depicted as leading to 
feminism and homosexuality, not the other way around. The alleged devaluation of 
motherhood is part of this problem, in which selfishness in modern industrialised 
society is connected to the desire of young people to pursue careers and postpone or 
forgo family life. The mother, say ‘pro-family’ leaders, has been lost as a symbol 
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and role model of selflessness, and this places society in a vicious cycle in which 
individualism and materialism sustain ‘anti-family’ outcomes, and vice versa. 
 
In this view, women from developing countries need to be protected from feminists 
because they encourage self-serving individualism – in the form of demanding their 
rights – as an antidote to patriarchy. ‘Demographic Winter,’ a ‘pro-family’ 
framework discussed at length in the following chapter, is the end result of this kind 
of individualism. Secularism is also responsible for declining fertility, blamed 
alongside feminism for the ‘birth dearth’ in the developed countries which have 
turned their back on religion. In one ‘pro-family’ text, industrialisation and 
modernity are to blame for feminism. Finally, some ‘pro-family’ intellectuals see 
feminism as a small part of a larger relativising phenomenon, which is a far bigger 
problem than feminism because it trivialises religion and questions the very 
existence of God. The next part of this chapter describes these issues in detail. 
 
There are a number of ‘pro-family’ texts which see feminism as a product of 
selfishness. Materialism bears a lot of the blame for the problems faced by families, 
in Carlson’s view. He identifies advertising as a means of destroying the family 
economy. By stimulating the desire for more manufactured products, he argues, 
consumerism works to export family members from the home into the paid labour 
force.64  Echoing many critics of capitalism who have gone before him, Carlson 
bemoans the standard measures of economic growth, which he argues have come to 
rely on ‘the steady transfer of ever more tasks from the uncounted household 
economy to the fully accounted industrial orbit.’65 
 
In a lecture in 2005, Carlson expands further on this: 
‘Working mothers are also a great short-term boon to the economy.  In place of home 
cooked meals, these households now buy fast food. Instead of the home care of small 
children, they buy day care. The negative effects of these changes on children—in 
forms of physical and emotional health—only show up in the long run. These 
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examples do point to a common rule: as families lose functions, the Gross National 
Product goes up…for a time.’66 
In this article, Carlson suggests that families need protection from three main 
sources of intrusion: the centralising state; modernity; and ‘anti-family’ ideologies 
(of which feminism is one). Carlson highlights working mothers, day care and 
‘marriage penalties’ in the tax code as evidence that business-friendly policies are 
not necessarily ‘family-friendly.’ ‘Capitalism itself,’ concludes Carlson ‘needs true 
“family friendly” policy to protect its own long term interests.’67 In this view, rather 
than emancipating women, feminist successes simply provide more fodder for the 
market. 
 
Carlson is treading a path that many feminists have walked before him, and defends 
his position in a lecture in the same year by declaring that ‘Christian Democracy 
has formally opposed economic materialism, in both its socialist and liberal 
capitalist manifestations.’ 68  That Carlson connects economic materialism in the 
Marxist sense with the capitalist impulse towards consumption, and disregards both 
options, is a part of his search for an alternative to materialist way of thinking about 
social change. In its place, Carlson offers tenets of Christian Democracy – church-
run health, education and welfare, for example – as a guide for successful political 
and economic change. Christian Democrats from across the spectrum, writes 
Carlson, believe that the  
‘spontaneous, organic structures of human life – villages, towns, neighbourhoods, 
labour associations, and (above all) families – need protection from the levelling 
tendencies of modern life.’69  
In addition to his desire to protect human institutions beyond the family (even 
unions) Carlson attacks individualism, in the name of protecting the variety of 
social groups. Abortion and contraception, to expand on Carlson’s metaphor, are 
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steamrollers of modern life, in the sense that they attempt to make adjustments to 
flatten out even the biological differences that prevent the realisation of parity 
between the sexes. In order to combat the advance of ‘the culture of death, 
institutionalized egoism, and population decline,’ 70  Carlson pins his hopes on 
Christian family life, which he believes acts as a guarantor against both mass 
conformity and individual selfishness. 
 
Carlson’s opposition to individualism is at the root of his aversion to the world 
order he sees being promoted by feminists and development policymakers at the 
UN. Claiming the ‘natural’ family as ‘the one anarchist institution’ that is able to 
withstand the repressive capabilities of the modern state, Carlson fears for the 
family’s survival against what he calls  
‘the “soft” totalitarianism of the early twenty-first century, now packaged around a 
militant secular individualism, but still seeking to build a marriage-free, post-family 
order.’71   
That he pits himself so firmly against individualism helps to explain why his 
organisation, and indeed the ‘pro-family’ movement as a whole, so abhors the 
(individually held) human rights agenda advanced by feminist proponents of sexual 
and reproductive rights. 
 
In Carlson’s view, then, reproductive rights are a result of a drift towards secular 
individualism, or they are at least complementary social forces. Contraception and 
abortion grant people the ability to prevent the formation of families. This, in 
Carlson’s view, means that individuals will no longer appreciate the essential worth 
of self-sacrifice, which being in a family imparts. In a fully contracepted and 
family-free world (which Carlson imagines is desired by feminists) the 
responsibility for making people act in the best interest of others then falls on 
society, or worse, the state. This is an outcome he finds vile. In this way, Carlson 
justifies his strong anti-liberal stance, putting the ‘natural family’ – and not the 
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freedoms and capabilities of the individual man, woman or child – as the highest 
priority of development efforts.   
 
Women-as-mothers represent the core of the ‘natural family.’ As ‘pro-family’ 
organisations see it, re-valuing motherhood is the key to reversing ‘anti-family’ 
individualism in both developed and developing countries. Mothers as role models 
of selflessness appear as feminine ideals in many ‘pro-family’ texts. In a C-Fam 
‘white paper,’ Douglas Sylva despairs over UNICEF’s ‘feminist revolution,’ 
declaring that  
‘In the view of feminists, a mother who subsumed her own interests to the interests of 
her children, a person always elevated by UNICEF as an archetype, a person to be 
celebrated and assisted, was now considered to be guilty of perpetuating “male-
defined stereotypes.”’72 
Feminists, Sylva argues, see motherhood as a pigeonhole that needs to be eradicated 
through education. ‘The mother’ is under threat in ‘pro-family’ discourse, both 
figuratively, as a symbol of selflessness, and literally, thanks to contraception and 
abortion. 
 
Part of the problem ‘pro-family’ organisations say they have with feminism is that it 
venerates the independent, individual woman and consequently ‘devalues 
motherhood.’ CWA texts are particularly scathing of feminism for this reason, 
suggesting that the kind of woman produced by feminist ideas is an ‘alienated and 
abandoned individual.’ 73  By contrast, according to Crouse, the WCF offers a 
‘different vision of female empowerment... the interconnected, socially and 
religiously embedded woman.’ 74  In this fashion, ‘pro-family’ authors juxtapose 
religion and companionship with secularism and isolation, in the dichotomised 
forms of feminism they portray. 
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Secularism plays a very important role in ‘pro-family’ discourse. Feminism is just 
one of many issues highlighted by ‘pro-family’ groups, in which its proponents 
trace the root cause of ‘anti-family’ outcomes back to the drift away from religion. 
In ‘pro-family’ texts, secularism, feminism and fertility decline all exist in a co-
constitutive cycle. This is no accident: Carlson suggests in 1999 that advocates of 
what he calls the ‘diminished child, post-family order’ are well aware of the 
demographic trends that secularism encourages:  
‘They look for the levers that will engineer fertility decline and result in fewer 
children. They understand, all too well, that the values behind the second 
demographic transition face only one real opponent: vital religious faith. They know 
that if religion can be defeated, marginalized, or “converted” to their side, they will 
win.’75 
In this text, Carlson depicts religion and fertility locked in a fierce battle against 
secularism and contraception: fewer children signal the demise of religious faith, 
and vice versa. And it is not only religious faith, but uncompromising orthodoxies 
that are required to reverse the ‘virulent secular individualism’ Carlson sees 
threatening to ‘complete its work’ in the near future.76  
 
C-Fam’s Sylva bemoans what he calls ‘the steady drumbeat to eliminate the 
influence of Christianity from international political affairs,’ which he argues is 
continuing ‘among radical pro-abortion non-governmental organizations.’77  Here 
again, sexual and reproductive rights are seen more as symptoms of the effort to 
eject God from public and private life, rather than being the cause of this ejection. 
Seeing the presence of religion as the key to preserving morality in the international 
sphere, ‘pro-family’ groups see themselves as maintaining a space for religion in 
global affairs. 
 
For CWA, a crucial test of the acceptability of feminist ideas is whether they are 
religious or not. As was touched on earlier in this chapter, more recent CWA texts 
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on this topic state that ‘modern feminism has abandoned its religious founders.’78 
Secular progressives, in this view, have ‘hijacked’ feminism, and it is up to 
‘Conservative Christians,’79 and ‘Godly women’80 to return it to its religious roots. 
 
Feminism is attributed to industrialisation in a 2002 speech by Carlson. In his view, 
development has caused feminism because the movement of work away from the 
home deprives women of their economic purpose. In an article entitled ‘When 
Feminism Was a Mental Illness: Tales and Lessons from the 1950s,’ Carlson offers 
a parallel between what he sees as feminist angst, and the suburban neuroses 
suffered by bored housewives. In his view, both of these result from the excesses of 
the industrial revolution, which continues to drive work out of the home and into 
factories. This reorganisation of production, says Carlson, renders work done at 
home less valuable, makes women bored, anxious and disturbed, and deprives them 
of the social support wives and mothers in more agrarian settings once enjoyed. He 
carries his analysis of feminist neuroses back to Mary Wollstonecraft, arguing that 
she was a ‘masochist,’ whose secret heart’s desire was that her lover would marry 
her and that they would have a large family. Carlson concludes his article by 
offering the following advice to his ‘pro-family’ friends:  
‘…the next time you confront an angry feminist–be it in court, in Congress, or in 
public debate–you might remember Mary Wollstonecraft and perhaps see that you 
actually face another woman looking desperately for her true and real home.’81 
The solution to feminism, Carlson suggests, is to de-industrialise some parts of our 
lives, to allow mothers to fulfil meaningful economic and social functions from 
home. Carlson has chosen to pity feminists here, offering his readers an analysis 
which ranges from psychology to economics as a means of explaining why 
feminists are the way they are.  In this reading, Carlson is either unwilling or unable 
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to see feminists as the drivers of social change, preferring to represent them as 
victims of an economic system that no longer values them. Like the most ardent of 
Marxists, Carlson sees the mode of production in society as being causally 
connected to the social relations of the people within it. Using this framework, we 
could say that Carlson perceives feminism as an instrument of false consciousness, 
superficially promoted as a means of increasing women’s freedoms, but actually 
serving the interests of those who stand to benefit from the use of women’s bodies, 
be they industry, individuals or officials.   
 
Though perhaps not perfectly representative of the ‘pro-family’ position on 
feminism, Carlson’s understanding of the psychology of feminists (as produced by 
the way the world has become) shows the degree to which he prefers to see 
feminism as a symptom, rather than a cause, of the outcomes to which he so 
strongly objects. This renders feminists less powerful in Carlson’s view, leading 
him to seek a greater authority for his ‘pro-family’ forces to attack. Carlson has no 
qualms in pointing the finger at aspects of capitalism (particularly consumerism and 
excessive individualism) and secularism, as the primary contributors to the 
problems he sees in society today. From this perspective, feminists are to be pitied 
for their deranged views, which Carlson sees as being brought about by a social and 
economic system that forces women to conform to an unnatural state of existence. 
 
Feminism is frequently associated with postmodernism in ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
Mainstream society is ‘post-modern’ according to most ‘pro-family’ observers, and 
this condition is a much bigger problem than feminism, because it trivialises 
religion and questions the very existence of God. By the term post-modern, ‘pro-
family’ organisations mean ‘morally relativistic thinking’ and the rejection of ‘all 
notions of authority and overarching meta-narratives.’82 This is contrasted with the 
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‘time-honored, Judeo-Christian principles’ 83  espoused by ‘pro-family’ 
organisations.  
 
In its promotion for the 2007 WCF, a C-Fam author writes that the Congress was 
originally founded ‘in response to a militantly anti-family ethos prevalent in the 
“post-modern” West, and explains the conference’s purpose as restoring the family 
as the ‘seed-bed of a sane society.’84 In its perceived attempts to sever society from 
the norms of the past, feminism is again linked to social chaos and insanity. 
 
A number of Focus authors see feminist ideology as a product of post-modernism, 
with the individual left to work out how to best live his or her own life.85 Seductive 
in its appeal, the ‘postmodern world’ pulls individuals 
‘…into a vacuum of self-centeredness, whispering, "It’s all about you." It’s all about 
your own pleasure, peace, prosperity, and comfort. It’s all about what you think. It’s 
all about your own self-actualization, your individual pursuit.’86  
This pursuit for ‘worldly success really is a big lie,’ says the author. He attributes 
depression, drug use and other social ills to the self-serving worldview which he 
believes is brought about by post-modern thought. The FRC also sees post-
modernism’s ‘guiding principles’ as leading to a ‘me’ culture. These principles – 
‘equality overseen by experts and a relentless consumerism’ – are placed in 
opposition to belief in a Christian God.87  In this light, post-modernism and its 
associated ideas are a larger cause for concern to ‘pro-family’ groups than feminism 
alone. 
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Part II: Tensions 
A number of issues arise in the ‘pro-family’ reading of feminism. Though feminism 
was frequently portrayed as an assault on society, increasingly ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are taking a more sophisticated view, seeing feminism as connected to 
(and a result of) other enemy ideologies. In this way, feminism has become both 
salvageable as a potential ‘pro-family’ political force, even though it may always be 
tainted by its association with ‘anti-Christian’ ideas. In this section, I consider some 
of the problems raised by ‘pro-family’ stances towards feminism. 
 
Cultural imperialism versus protecting women 
One major problem for ‘pro-family’ groups who take issue with feminists is that in 
arguing with feminists, the organisations often take an opposing stance that is itself 
a feminist one. In arguing that their ideas are better for women than the policies 
espoused by feminists in positions of power, ‘pro-family’ organisations end up 
using radical feminist arguments to best liberal ones, and vice versa. A focus on 
families, sexuality and reproduction seems destined to produce feminist arguments 
of some kind, even from the most ardent of ‘anti-feminists.’ 
 
Many of the major successes ‘pro-family’ organisations have enjoyed have been in 
areas which divide Western feminists. One such example is sex-selective abortion. 
In the ‘pro-family’ view, abortion is a choice that should not exist, so sex-selective 
abortion appears as yet another morbid symptom of the widespread availability of 
the practice. Though they speak about the trend with sadness, however, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations struggle to restrain the victorious tone with which they discuss sex-
selective abortion. On a ‘pro-life missionary trip’ to India, for example, Euteneuer 
declares that he yearns to find a ‘radical American feminist’ to confront with the 
issue  
‘… and ask her if abortion is still a woman’s sacrosanct right when it targets girl 
children in the womb. This is the radical feminist’s Catch-22: to them abortion is a 
fundamental right necessary for women’s self-realization, but it is more like self-
destruction when it is used to search out and destroy women before they are born.’88 
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In her discussion of the UN’s dilemma over this issue, Crouse catches the UN in 
what she calls a position of ‘cognitive dissonance,’ in which the UN is forced to 
admit ‘the humanity of unborn girls.’89 She concludes her article with confidence 
that ‘in due time, the bitter fruit of “choice” will be recorded in the pages of 
history.’90 ‘The notion of sex-selection abortion challenges the liberal concept of 
abortion as an innate human right,’ argues Ken Blackwell of the FRC. 91 As can be 
seen here, for ‘pro-family’ organisations, pre-natal sex selection ‘shows’ anyone in 
doubt that abortion is wrong. The trend is portrayed as a serious chink in the armour 
of Western feminists, which can be prised open to show that the whole Western 
feminist project is in disarray. Yet ‘pro-family’ organisations do acknowledge that 
there is more to this issue than abortion alone. Most articles on sex-selective 
abortion also mention infanticide, and recognise that a major aspect of the problem 
is the status of women and girls in those countries in which the practice is a serious 
problem. Euteneuer, for example, emphasises the culpability of Indian culture in his 
appraisal of the problem, although he also blames Western ‘hate-mongers’ who 
‘constantly preach overpopulation’ to a receptive Indian audience.92  
 
Female genital mutilation is another issue in which ‘pro-family’ organisations, like 
many feminists, end up condemning cultural practices in favour of a set of higher 
universal values. Some experienced members of the ‘pro-family’ movement are 
aware of potential traps here, however. In a WCF speech on the activities of the 
‘anti-family faction’ at the UN, veteran ‘pro-family’ activist Kathryn Balmforth 
warns that feminist treatment of this practice should be treated with caution. 
‘Feminists,’ says Balmforth,  
 ‘…always insist on condemning “female genital mutilation and other harmful, 
traditional practices.” This phrase has always seemed to me to be a potential source 
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of mischief. Sure enough. I recently obtained a report of an NGO meeting held in 
Nigeria… which lists “virginity” among the “other harmful, traditional practices.’93 
However, if Balmforth senses the danger in condemning traditional practices 
because they are harmful, this warning has not been picked up by other ‘pro-family’ 
activists who see cultural relativism as a serious weakness of the political Left. 
Crouse quotes with approval one commentator’s view of Western feminism ‘as 
“soft” in its “romanticization of other cultures” and its relativism on critical 
issues.’94 
 
The resolute stances of ‘pro-family’ organisations, in cases like those described 
above, make the movement appear strong and decisive compared to its feminist 
opponents. However, such clear resolutions favour universal approaches to morality 
rather than local traditions and religions: the same ‘cookie-cutter’ standard which 
‘pro-family’ organisations have frequently opposed. In choosing between cultural 
variety and universal morality (which depends on the issue in question) ‘pro-family’ 
organisations struggle to decide whether women in the developing world should be 
treated as victims or as responsible rights-bearers. Deep at the heart of this 
conundrum is a basic indecision about freedom, especially women’s freedom. 
Western feminists also struggle with this, and like Western feminists, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations must choose a course between mothering innocent women in the 
South or leaving morally culpable women to suffer their fate.  
 
Is feminism ‘the problem’ or not?  
Although they all state their opposition to ‘radical’ feminists, the ‘pro-family’ 
groups studied here struggle to say whether feminism is a powerful presence in 
world affairs or not. That some ‘pro-family’ organisations depict feminists in a 
‘new sex alliance,’ a supposed global effort to overhaul family relations, is perhaps 
the clearest indicator of the ‘pro-family’ movement’s acknowledgment of feminism 
as a serious power in world affairs. Carlson and his colleagues in 2003 stated that 
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‘liberal or equity feminism’ was perhaps the most successful ideology of the 20th 
century.95 However, having both exaggerated and discredited feminist ideas, it is 
odd that the groups consider such a deranged ideology to be so appealing, and 
dangerous in its potential to change human relations all around the world.   
 
The groups all have slightly different takes on why feminism is so dangerous. HLI 
sees the influence of feminists in terms of their ability to corrupt, whilst C-Fam 
prefers to stress the procedural deception of feminists at the UN as the reason for 
their political successes in the development arena. In this way, C-Fam sees 
feminists’ strength in their tactical expertise rather than in the appeal of their ideas. 
While CWA comes close to accepting that the type of feminism they deride is in 
some way tempting to young women who want careers and independence, the 
organisation baulks at conferring feminism with any genuine legitimacy in the 
debate about what is best for women. Focus and FRC stress the difference between 
what they see as legitimate feminist gains and ‘radical’ feminist attacks on the 
family. The latter are appealing to women and men because they offer the selfish 
individual the opportunity to gratify their desires without guilt in a self-centred, 
morally relativistic society. Of all the groups discussed here, it is the Howard 
Center that comes closest to appreciating why women might embrace feminism, 
and seeing feminism as a powerful force for change. Yet this organisation, more 
than the others, consistently looks beyond feminism in an attempt to find a greater 
power that has brought about the ‘anti-family chaos’ it so desperately seeks to 
reverse.   
 
This uncertainty about the influence of feminism makes it difficult for the groups to 
decide exactly how to deal with it.  ‘Pro-family’ groups searching for a global 
nemesis seem to settle for feminism some of the time, but continue to search for a 
more powerful or more satisfying enemy.  In this we can see recognition on the part 
of ‘pro-family’ groups that either feminists simply cannot be blamed for all the ills 
of the world, or that they do not want to grant feminists that degree of influence. 
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But to look beyond feminists as the enemy means finding a better culprit to blame 
for society’s ills. This most often results in criticism of global capitalism, the UN 
system, or a general unease about individualism and liberalism. These are things the 
‘pro-family’ movement struggles to condemn without raising a host of other issues. 
Criticism of global capitalism means an uncomfortable lean away from free trade, 
and the problem of what to advocate in its place.96 Condemning the UN means 
attacking the institution that serves as a platform through which they can forge new 
alliances and pursue their goals. Criticising individualism is perhaps the most 
potentially problematic, as ‘pro-family’ values still attach great importance to 
individual responsibility (and consequently, choice).   
 
Pro-woman opposition to feminism is feminism 
In the last decade and a half, ‘pro-family’ organisations have turned their customary 
opposition to feminism into a movement that can in fact be described as a version of 
feminism. In criticising feminist successes in improving women’s access to health, 
‘pro-family’ organisations actually employ feminist arguments, entering debates 
within feminism about what is best for women.  
 
In the ‘pro-family’ view, women need to be valued in their capacity as wives and 
mothers because that is how women naturally find the most fulfilment. This view 
owes much to John Paul II’s call for a ‘new feminism,’ which values the ways that 
women are ‘functionally’ different from men. ‘Pro-family’ organisations use 
arguments based on ‘gender complementarity’ to contest liberal feminist policies 
that they see as harmful to women. But in seeking to value women in all the ways 
that they are different to men, ‘pro-family’ groups advance a form of feminism that 
is not dissimilar to the ‘radical’ feminists they treat with such contempt. In 
opposing prostitution, for example, ‘pro-family’ organisations take a political stance 
with which many feminists agree. When ‘pro-family’ organisations claim that 
women’s bodies are exploited through contraceptives and abortion, they are making 
the same arguments that radical feminists have made since the dissemination of 
these technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, in their opposition to 
quotas and legislative ‘special treatment for women,’ ‘pro-family’ groups take a 
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libertarian feminist perspective. When they oppose Western feminism as 
maternalistic, they borrow from postcolonial feminism. That they cover a broad 
range of feminist arguments in their rebuttal of feminism shows that even a 
rhetorical ‘pro-woman’ standpoint makes conservatives speak like feminists to 
some degree.  
 
This may be a reflection of the fact that international ‘pro-family’ organisations 
have entered these debates through the development arena: arguments about 
women’s health may have to be made from a ‘pro-woman’ perspective to be heard 
in development circles. ‘Pro-family’ concern about fertility decline in developed 
countries, for example, is an acknowledgement that issues around sexuality and 
reproduction, once considered by some conservatives as a private matter, are now 
justifiably in the public domain (in many cases, thanks to religious conservatives). 
 
Are women victims? 
‘Pro-family’ organisations appear to be torn as to whether women – and especially 
developing country women – are able to exercise free will and personal 
responsibility or not. In some cases, Western feminists are accused of making 
victims out of the women they are purporting to help. Crouse paraphrases Betty 
Friedan to show her audience that women are victims, according to feminists.97 In 
others, women in developing countries are depicted as needing bold assistance to 
help them out of their conditions, rather than access to a set of choices that ‘pro-
family’ organisations see as useless at best, and morally indefensible at worst. In 
other words, feminists make women victims in need of rescue, but in some cases, 
‘pro-family’ organisations feel compelled to rescue these same women, and 
sometimes for similar reasons. 
  
Most ‘pro-family’ discourse around the ‘real needs’ of women in developing 
countries, intentionally or otherwise, relies on the victim status of women to a large 
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degree. Arguing that sexual and reproductive health services are offered where 
food, sanitation, medicine and shelter are called for, ‘pro-family’ organisations 
claim that proponents of sexual and reproductive rights are out of touch with the 
‘real’ needs of women. Seeing a dichotomy between women’s rights (as they are 
understood by progressives) and women’s needs, ‘pro-family’ organisations attack 
rights based approaches to development as coming at the cost of meeting real needs. 
 
In this way, ‘pro-family’ organisations do indeed see developing country women as 
victims of their situations. Western feminists cannot be lumped with all the blame 
for the problems faced by women in poor countries. Corrupt governments in 
developing countries are to blame for the poverty of its citizens according to a 
number of ‘pro-family texts.98  HLI’s Euteneuer blames ‘Indian culture’ for the 
‘second class status’ of women in that country.99 Some texts see ‘Islamic regimes’ 
as a major cause of women’s oppression. Many ‘pro-family’ texts acknowledge that 
poor development outcomes are caused by a combination of factors; in this sense, 
feminists have simply added fuel to the fire. 
 
Women are often framed as lacking the ability to make the right choices in ‘pro-
family’ discourse. In some cases, ‘pro-family’ organisations are able to portray their 
role as providing the choices that developing country women want to have, for 
example, through fighting against coercion and violence in the name of population 
control. This can also be seen in the efforts of ‘pro-family’ organisations to offer 
women what they ‘really need.’ Yet the ability to choose is in itself a problem in 
‘pro-family’ discourse. This is not just because certain choices are seen as immoral, 
such as abortion and homosexuality, but also because the very availability of 
choices results in the satisfaction of individual preferences rather than the pursuit of 
moral goods. For example, for ‘pro-family’ organisations, choice devalues 
motherhood because it renders motherhood a decision rather than a selfless 
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sacrifice. Where there is no choice, women may be victims, but they retain the 
potential for self-sacrifice, a virtue deeply valued in ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
 
At the heart of this issue is uncertainty about women in the developing world. 
Application of core ‘pro-family’ tenets like virginity before marriage assumes a 
degree of autonomy that women in poor countries do not universally enjoy. If 
women are victims of cultural oppression, economic underdevelopment, or brutal 
regimes, their ability to choose the ‘pro-family’ blueprint for development is 
severely compromised. That ‘pro-family’ groups do not see ‘women’s 
empowerment’ as the answer to this issue is clear. But what is the alternative for 
these self-proclaimed ‘pro-woman’ organisations?  
 
Conclusion 
Though it remains a key aspect of their global agenda, the research in this chapter 
shows that ‘pro-family’ characterisations of feminism are becoming more diverse. 
Despite the enormity of its twentieth century successes, feminism is still often seen 
as a symptom rather than a cause of social change in ‘pro-family’ texts. Feminists 
are sometimes the dupes of corporate capitalism and at other times mentally ill in 
the ‘pro-family’ worldview, but they are increasingly pushed aside as ‘pro-family’ 
organisations struggle to identify the real influence behind the ‘anti-family’ changes 
of the last few decades.  
 
More recent depictions of feminism see it as deriving from (or connected to) other 
ideological enemies of conservative Christianity: socialism, Marxism, liberalism, 
and postmodernism. Yet it should be noted that this expansion of enemies is still 
articulated in terms of women’s rights and roles. Marxism is a problem because of 
the role it plays in ‘pitting women against men,’ socialism is likewise derided 
because it ‘attacks’ the father-led family, and so on. In their development activism, 
‘pro-family’ groups reject feminism on behalf of poor women in the South, thereby 
saving them from materialism, consumerism, childlessness and other evils 
associated with this cluster of bad ideas. 
 
Like many feminists who have had second thoughts about the sexual revolution, 
‘pro-family’ organisations do pinpoint real issues faced by women as a result of the 
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liberalisation of sexuality and reproduction. In many ways, feminism has been at 
least partly responsible for increasing the pressures and multiplying the 
expectations placed upon women. Yet this is not the negative aspect of feminism 
that ‘pro-family’ groups use in their arguments. ‘Pro-family’ groups choose instead 
to talk in terms of the ‘corrupting’ effects of feminism. And feminism, ‘correctly’ 
applied, need not be corrupting at all, say the organisations. In the separation of a 
virtuous ‘pro-family’ feminism from a corrupting ‘radical’ feminism, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations highlight the influences of old foes (communism and secularism, for 
example) in the makeup of the feminism they do not like. In this way, feminism is 
diminishing as a ‘pro-family’ enemy, and being replaced with its alleged 
ideological support systems: individualism, secularism and materialism. 
 
These belief systems could be understood in terms of ‘unseen enemies,’ as Herman 
puts it, or even a tendency towards conspiracy, which looks beyond an evident 
global enemy to find something darker and more powerful. However, I suggest that 
the new enemies of the ‘pro-family’ movement may be unseen, but they are 
specified. Secularism, individualism and materialism have emerged as the global 
‘anti-family’ forces of the twenty-first century and feminists are again relegated to 
puppet status, but this time under the control of bad ideas rather than bad people. 
 
Nowhere is this clearer than in ‘pro-family’ discourse around ‘demographic winter,’ 
in which ‘pro-family’ organisations embark on an effort to save humanity from 
these forces. Fighting the feminist threat may be on the backburner, but the ‘pro-
family’ movement must be ever vigilant against the ideas that spawned feminism: 
the fertility and future of the ‘human family’ may depend upon it.  
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Chapter Six: From ‘population controllers’ to ‘demographic winter’: the 
changing threat to fertility in ‘pro-family’ discourse 
 
‘Our foes are dying, of their own choice. We have a world to gain. Natural families 
of all races, nations and creeds, let us unite.’ 
The Howard Center, 20051 
 
Fertility decline has nearly always been considered in negative terms in ‘pro-
family’ discourse. Since the time they became interested in the world outside the 
US, ‘pro-family’ organisations have tended to depict fertility decline the work of 
powerful global elites and nefarious (and often Marxist) forces under the rubric of 
population control. Various entities have been held responsible for population 
control in ‘pro-family’ discourse. Some ‘pro-family’ leaders have depicted 
environmentalists and academics as broadcasting a ‘population bomb’ message that 
has been picked up by elites and broadcasted throughout the world. Others 
emphasise population control as a joint conspiracy between NGOs, Western 
governments and the UN. Occasionally, the governments of developing countries 
have been blamed for their efforts to limit their population growth.  
 
Articulating population and development issues within a human rights framework 
(as epitomised in the Cairo conference) was the catalyst for the emergence of ‘pro-
family’ organisations into development politics. As already noted in chapter one, it 
was not population control per se that brought the ‘pro-family’ movement into the 
international arena, it was when reproductive rights became the framework through 
which population policy was discussed that ‘pro-family’ organisations entered the 
debate.  
 
Buss and Herman devote a chapter of Globalizing Family Values to Christian Right 
politics around population and development. They suggest that for ‘pro-family’ 
groups, population policy embodies the threats to ‘family, nation and church’ more 
than any other issue, because it brings together ‘abortion, contraception, women’s 
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rights, the “internationalization” of social relations and the global centralization of 
power.’2 Opposition to abortion is the core of the issue for ‘pro-family’ groups, as a 
number of observers have discerned.3 On top of this, Buss and Herman suggest that 
population policy is understood as part of a global ‘culture of death,’ and the source 
of other assaults on the ‘natural family.’4 
 
‘Pro-family’ organisations have depicted a variety of international entities – 
feminist NGOs, governments, and international development organisations – as 
working together to spread ‘the population control agenda.’ Environmentalism is 
also tainted by its connection with population control in ‘pro-family’ texts. 
Sometimes considered by ‘pro-family’ organisations as ideologically 
interchangeable with population control, environmentalists are accused of trying to 
protect the environment at the cost of human life. Though some feminists have 
sought to clarify their position vis-à-vis the environment – that women’s health 
rights ought to be enjoyed regardless of their effect on the environment – the 
promotion of sexual and reproductive rights has enjoyed the support of 
environmentalists because they allegedly relieve the environment of the burden of 
increasing numbers of humans.5 Environmentalism, in early ‘pro-family’ discourse, 
was seen as a device used by globalists to augment their power and bring about a 
‘new world order.’ Environmentalism has thus existed both as an enemy ideology in 
its own right, as well as a misused science implicated in what ‘pro-family’ 
organisations have viewed as the immoral and brutal practice of population control. 
Though ‘pro-family’ groups remain suspicious of environmentalism, over time they 
are changing the way they think about environmental issues, increasingly 
incorporating them into an agenda in support of the ‘natural family.’  
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As the ‘pro-family’ discourse around ‘globalists’ has changed, so too has the way 
that ‘pro-family’ groups oppose international development initiatives seeking to 
widen access to effective contraception and safe abortion. In their 2003 work, Buss 
and Herman trace a change in ‘pro-family’ rhetoric, from opposing population 
control and abortion as the ‘tool of an emerging Marxist world government to a 
“softer” focus on poverty, third world development, and ‘the rights of poor 
women.’6 Although this characterisation is correct, I suggest that there has been 
another significant shift in the way that ‘pro-family’ groups discuss population 
policy. In this chapter, I show the way that ‘pro-family’ population discourse is 
moving away from advocacy on behalf of women in developing countries, towards 
emphasis upon the demographic problems of the Western world. ‘Pro-family’ 
groups, I suggest, now see fertility decline as a cultural issue.7  
 
This is exemplified in a 2008 film produced by ‘pro-family’ activist Don Feder, 
entitled Demographic Winter: the decline of the human family. The makers of this 
‘pro-family’ documentary intend to show how ‘social science and economics come 
together to declare a looming demographic winter which threatens to have social 
and economic consequences.’ 8  Set to an unsettling score, Demographic Winter 
provides testimony from a range of social science ‘experts’ who warn their 
audience of what they can expect from the social and economic fallout which they 
argue will accompany depopulation. 
 
In this chapter, I illustrate the different ways in which ‘pro-family’ discourse 
portrays declining fertility – or as it is increasingly called, ‘demographic winter’ – 
and its relationship to the ‘natural family.’ The first part of this chapter considers 
‘pro-family’ characterisations of population control, and the way discourse on 
fertility decline is shifting to incorporate new issues about modern society that ‘pro-
family’ groups highlight as a problem. This part shows the way that ‘pro-family’ 
discourse on fertility has shifted towards discussion of ‘demographic winter,’ in 
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terms of its purported effects and what is causing it. The second part of this chapter 
considers the tensions and complications in this relatively new ‘pro-family’ way of 
talking about fertility. 
 
Part I: Fertility in ‘pro-family’ discourse 
Population Control 
With the Vatican, ‘pro-family’ organisations have rallied against population control 
and many still articulate their international policies in terms of opposing the 
practice. As other observers have noted, since their emergence on the international 
scene, ‘pro-family’ organisations have justified their international activity as 
protecting women, and particularly women in developing countries, from human 
rights abuses carried out in the name of ‘population control.’ Leaders in the ‘pro-
family’ movement often point to a time of population alarm – spanning the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s – in which women’s reproductive capacity was targeted as a 
problem. This time, writes Allan Carlson, was ‘a time of open war on human nature, 
and on human fertility, one directed in particular against women.’ According to 
Carlson, population control ‘ruthlessly condemned the gift granted to women of 
bearing new life.’9 
 
In ‘pro-family’ discourse, population control has been seen as a conspiracy between 
a set of global elites: feminist NGOs, Western governments, and international 
organisations, especially the World Bank and the UN. These ‘population 
controllers,’ ‘pro-family’ groups maintain, have used arguments about the carrying 
capacity of the Earth to increase the uptake of their message. Rather than bettering 
the lives of people in developing countries, say ‘pro-family’ leaders, the efforts of 
these elites have actually hindered development, because countries must now 
prepare for rapid depopulation. I discuss each of these ‘pro-family’ perspectives in 
detail in the following section. 
 
Population control is seen as a conspiracy between feminist NGOs, Western 
governments and international organisations in a number of ‘pro-family’ texts. As 
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was discussed earlier, ‘radical feminists’ and ‘population controllers’ are seen as 
staunch allies in many ‘pro-family’ texts. Where they have not been assumed to be 
the same people, feminists have been accused of working alongside ‘population 
controllers’ and international agencies to bring about stark reductions in fertility in 
the developing world, against the will of women and their families. In a flyer 
promoting the 2004 WCF, for example, ‘militant feminists’ were listed alongside 
‘population controllers’ and the ‘socialist Left’ as the foes of the ‘natural family.’10   
 
Connecting people from different ideological standpoints joining for the purpose of 
promoting the ‘anti-family,’ ‘anti-child’ agenda is common in older ‘pro-family’ 
texts. In a 1997 article, Focus condemned a number of Republicans for joining their 
Democrat opponents ‘in giving over $400 million to the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation and similar groups for overseas population control, 
including abortion.’11  
 
Similarly, in a 2006 text, HLI still sees a combination of different forces at work 
driving the population control agenda, in what it refers to as an ‘aggressive 
international culture of death.’12 In HLI’s view, ‘population controllers’ are a force 
external to national governments, who ‘move into’ countries.13 In a trip to Nigeria, 
HLI’s Brian Clowes reports that 
‘Regarding foreign aid, it is the usual story in Nigeria. Millions go without clean 
drinking water, electricity, basic health care, safe transportation, safe food, or any of 
the many other necessities of life that you and I take for granted. Yet the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and all of the 
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other anti-life groups insist on stocking village dispensaries with thousands of 
condoms, Norplant kits, and cycles of birth control pills. Their only concern seems to 
be turning large poor families into small poor families.’14 
Portraying their opponents as an international collection of different entities, each 
promoting their own agenda as well as the overall goal of fertility reduction, HLI 
sees enemies everywhere. ‘Population controllers,’ states Euteneuer in Kenya, ‘are 
killing our world,’ with support from ‘huge governmental and private interests 
promoting these nefarious agendas.’15  
 
Reflecting on population control in 2008, Carlson argues that the movement has 
been a ‘successful conspiracy.’ 16  In a panel discussion with other ‘pro-family’ 
intellectuals, he suggests that a small ‘wealthy cabal’ of Americans were behind the 
population control movement, and essentially ‘turned US foreign aid into a global 
birth control programme.’17 The actions of these elites, he reveals, have had an 
enormous impact on fertility rates all around the world. 
 
This ‘cabal’ has been assisted by international organisations in their efforts to 
broadcast the contraceptive message, say ‘pro-family’ leaders. ‘Pro-family’ groups 
are well aware that without international organisations, particularly the UN and the 
World Bank, fertility reduction programmes would have enjoyed less legitimacy in 
the developing world. C-Fam has been especially active in accusing international 
organisations of unauthorised meddling in the affairs of sovereign countries. The 
World Bank, UNICEF and UNFPA have been targeted in three separate C-Fam 
‘White Papers’ which accuse the organisations of going beyond their mandate in 
their promotion of population control.18 
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Environmentalism and population control are seen as ‘anti-people’ in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse. In many texts, population control is caricatured as an ideology that 
prioritises animals and plants over human lives. One CWA article from 2006 
explains that population control is ‘an ideology that considers human beings a 
blight on the Earth, rather than creative and resourceful individuals with unique 
worth.’19 As examples of population control, the author offers ‘forced abortions and 
sterilisations and infanticide,’ and goes on to paraphrase a widely misconstrued 
speech by Texan scientist Eric Pianka, who the author claims has advocated 
‘releasing the Ebola virus to wipe out 90 percent of the population.’20  
 
In a later article from 2006, a CWA author contrasts what he sees as the anti-human 
philosophical standpoint of religious environmentalists against the growing 
membership of conservative churches in the US. The author suggests that under the 
current leadership of an environmentalist, US Episcopalians will ‘hold fast to their 
noble environmental stewardship and maintain a steady, and eco-friendly 
downward membership spiral.’21 According to the author, the ‘growing Anglican 
communion,’ by contrast, ‘view[s] people as gifts from God, not as parasites on an 
exploited planet earth.’22  
 
This depiction of environmentalism as anti-human is still widely shared in the ‘pro-
family’ movement. HLI’s 2008 Special Report offers its subscribers an audio 
discussion that claims to offer scientific evidence rebutting the contention that an 
environmental crisis is looming. The advertised audio CD offers HLI supporters the 
opportunity to  
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‘know the truth and reveal it to others before the extreme population control and 
environmental movements advance further in their quest to degrade the value of the 
human person.’23  
The advertisement concludes by declaring that ‘people are not pollution.’24 ‘Pro-
family’ activists suggest that contrary to popular belief, the relationship between the 
number of people on Earth and the state of the environment is not inversely related. 
As such, they condemn efforts to spread contraceptives as a means of protecting the 
environment. In this way, environmentalism is portrayed in ‘pro-family’ texts as a 
false belief that puts people at the service of nature. 
 
Population control and environmentalism are so frequently conflated that CWA 
refers to ‘population-control environmentalists’ in a 2006 article.25 CWA quotes a 
likeminded institute as it explains how the ideology of environmentalists works:  
‘...since people use up natural resources, release CO2 into the atmosphere and 
otherwise pollute the environment, the fewer people, the less global warming and less 
harm to the environment.’26 
Wendy Wright, CWA’s president, answers this attitude as follows: 
‘While it is absolutely necessary that Christians be good stewards of the Earth, there 
is no Biblical basis for elevating the Earth above human beings in priority. We care 
for Nature so it can sustain God's crowning creation - the only thing made in His 
image - mankind. When the mission comes in conflict with the Biblical, pro-life 
stance that evangelicals live by, it negates itself.’27 
This ‘pro-family’ stance on environmentalism is broadly shared by ‘pro-family’ 
organisations: the environment is precious only because people live in it. Countries 
should embrace environmental initiatives to support a growing global population, 
rather than try to stem the growth of humanity, say ‘pro-family’ activists.28  
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By 2003, however, some ‘pro-family’ leaders began to acknowledge the potential 
for environmentalist principles to be used to support ‘pro-family’ arguments. 
Carlson suggests that the cultural aspects associated with fertility decline may 
actually be harmful to the environment. He quotes from an article in the journal 
Nature, which reports that even with declining fertility in the US and Italy (and in 
the case of the latter, a reduction in the absolute population) the actual number of 
households in both countries is increasing. 29  This contributes to greater 
environmental decay, says Carlson. He concludes: 
‘Counter-intuitively, it turns out that the retreat from marriage and fertility decline are 
actually the cause of urban sprawl and environmental decay. Why? Larger families--
on a per capita basis--use less land, fuel, building materials, and supplies than do 
singles and childless couples.  Large family households, in a sense, are both more 
efficient and more environment friendly. But there are precious few of these today.’30 
This theme is explored in some detail in the documentary Demographic Winter. 
Jianguo Liu of Michigan State University calculates that divorce and the rise of 
individual households are causing a significant increase in the total demand for 
water and electricity in the US, even though overall population levels are stable.31 
Liu and others make the case that population reduction policies are based on false 
premises about the relationship between people and the environment. This new 
approach puts environmentalism on the side of ‘pro-family’ politics. Just as they 
have done in other areas (feminism, for example), ‘pro-family’ organisations are 
increasingly finding ways to turn their opponents’ ideologies against them. 
 
Another example of this is the way that ‘pro-family’ organisations have attempted 
to turn an outcome desired by their adversaries – a global reduction in population 
growth – into a nightmare scenario that calls for the immediate establishment of 
‘pro-family’ political ‘solutions.’ Some commentators are quite candid about this. 
CWA, for example, sees changing fertility levels as a boon for the ‘pro-family’ 
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movement. In her analysis of a 2002 UN report that the world’s total fertility rate 
has declined to its lowest ever rate, Crouse is satisfied to read that ‘the focus has 
shifted to discussion about the end of population growth’ in international 
development politics. In her article, she quotes a ‘pro-family’ interviewee, who 
remarks that 
‘God has given us a new weapon in our pro-life efforts; these new population 
projections have changed the minds of a lot of countries already. It has the potential 
to revolutionize the abortion issue because nations can now see that the pro-abortion 
stance will destroy their nation.’32 
This link between abortion, nationhood and fertility decline is an important one in 
‘pro-family’ texts, because it brings together three issues which lie at the heart of 
discussions of both ‘population control’ and ‘demographic winter.’ This is not only 
because in ‘pro-family’ thought, nationhood is threatened both by abortion (in a 
spiritual sense) and reductions in fertility (in the sense of continued ancestral 
nationhood). It is also intimately connected to the contention that the recognition of 
sexual and reproductive rights owe their existence, at least in part, to the context of 
a global ‘population bomb’ mentality. 
 
C-Fam took an early interest in depopulation. ‘That the world is overpopulated has 
been a staple of education and media speculation for more than forty years,’ reads 
one Friday Fax from 1999.33 Concerned with ‘below replacement fertility,’34 the 
author, Austin Ruse, warns that ‘the ramifications of this project are only now being 
considered.’35 The introduction to C-Fam’s critique of the World Bank states that 
contrary to promoting fertility decline, ‘the World Bank should begin studying how 
to increase fertility rates.’36  The organisation opposes the link between fertility 
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decline and economic development that has been assumed in development circles, 
suggesting that ‘high fertility’ has historically been mistakenly viewed as a problem 
that needs correcting.37  
 
Focus on the Family makes a similar point. In its discussion of ‘the real problem’ 
with the Earth’s population, a Focus author writes that ‘for the last several decades, 
the threat of overpopulation has dominated the discourse on global 
demographics.’38 Although he acknowledges ‘an upper limit’ to the sustainability of 
the human population, the author goes on to say that ageing and low birth rates are 
the impending crisis, rather than overpopulation.39 
 
HLI has also seized on the concept of falling fertility to support its opposition to 
birth control and abortion. In 2008, HLI still sees ‘international death peddlars’ at 
large in the world,40 but is also coming around to the idea that there is an indigenous 
(or domestic) demand for contraceptives that is driving fertility decline. Thus 
instead of only speaking out against ‘population controllers,’ HLI is beginning to 
follow its ‘pro-family’ allies and appeal to nationalism and ethnic identity in its 
activism. On a trip to India, one HLI spokesperson warns that ‘India’s total fertility 
rate has dropped to a dangerously low 2.7,’ and in Goa the rate is 1.7.41 The author 
goes on to say that ‘I warned the people during my talks that if they continue 
having no children, there will come a time when there will be more foreigners 
than Goans.42 Although HLI does not (yet) use the term ‘demographic winter,’ this 
emphasis on out-breeding immigrants shows, at least to some degree, that HLI is 
moving beyond the older ‘population controllers’ framework to defend its policies. 
That HLI (which tends to lag the other organisations in adjusting its ‘pro-family’ 
discourse) is moving in this direction, suggests that amongst ‘pro-family’ groups, 
talk of population control may soon be confined to discussions about the past.  
 
                                                 
37
 Ibid, pp. 23 and 31. 
38
 Finger, R. (2005) ‘The Earth’s Population: What is the Real Problem?’ Focus on the Family Issue 
Analysis. Available at http://www.citizenlink.org/FOSI/worldview/A000001564.cfm [last accessed 
30/08/09].  
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Human Life International’s Special Report, no. 283, July 2008. Available at 
http://www.hli.org/sr_july _08.pdf [last accessed 29/05/09], p. 5. 
41
 Ibid, p. 4. 
42
 Ibid, p. 6 (emphasis in original). 
 198 
Demographic Winter 
Though opposition to population control was a central platform for the activism of 
‘pro-family’ organisations in the 1990s, discussions around fertility decline have 
changed significantly between 1997 and 2008. Leaders in the movement 
increasingly refer to depopulation as ‘demographic winter’ and have shifted much 
of their focus to the industrialised world, especially Europe. ‘Demographic winter’ 
is also referred to as the ‘birth dearth,’ a condition in which governments struggle 
with ageing populations and declining economies. In ‘pro-family’ discourse, 
‘demographic winter’ is caused by factors internal to the process of industrialisation 
and modernisation. These factors are discussed at great length by ‘pro-family’ 
intellectuals. The reasons offered for declining fertility in developed countries are 
multi-faceted: a general movement away from religion; welfare, ‘anti-family’ 
taxation and state education; tolerance of homosexuality, abortion, and 
contraceptives; and materialism and selfishness as cultural norms. I consider each 
of these areas in turn, before discussing complications with this relatively new 
aspect of ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
 
One of the first documented appearances of the term ‘demographic winter’ was at 
the second World Congress of Families in Geneva in 1999.43 The speaker, Senator 
Franscisco Tatad of the Philippines, warned his fellow ‘pro-family’ allies that  
‘In the West, a severe demographic winter has turned once vigorous societies into a 
murderous desert from which all celebration of conjugal love and human life has 
been banished forever. But unlike any other winter, it threatens to be permanent; 
there is no prospect of spring. One child will have to be shared by four lucky 
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grandparents; by contrast, a third world grandparent will have a riot of great 
grandchildren around him or her.’44 
Use of the term ‘demographic winter’ remained relatively infrequent until around 
2003, when the term appeared to quickly gain currency in ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
Europe has been singled out by most commentators as being in an advanced state of 
‘demographic winter,’ with Carlson suggesting the continent is in ‘demographic 
freefall.’45 Tatad, for his part, predicted in 1999 that ‘Asians and Africans who 
manage to learn the language well will become tomorrow’s Europeans.’46 As such, 
Europe is frequently used as a warning for the rest of the world in ‘pro-family’ 
discourse, especially as a lesson of what happens when societies abandon 
Christianity. 
 
‘Demographic winter’ is in some respects an echo of the eugenics movement from 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the US.47 Activists involved in 
opposing ‘race suicide’ advocated both restrictions on immigration and pro-natal 
policies for women of ‘desirable’ race. While ‘demographic winter’ does not 
include a fear that those of ‘uncivilised’ races will soon outnumber ‘civilised’ ones, 
it does emphasise the importance of maintaining nationhood in the form of ethnic 
ancestry. If out-breeding occurs, however, advocates of ‘demographic winter’ 
assure their audiences that it will be religious people out-breeding the faithless. 
‘Pro-family’ scholars of ‘demographic winter’ vigorously reject the notion that 
racism is driving their concern; rather, they say they are issuing a warning to the 
world of an impending crisis that will have far-reaching and detrimental effects.   
 
‘Pro-family’ organisations acknowledge their political interest in this phenomenon 
to varying degrees: the more scholarly seek only to describe ‘demographic winter,’ 
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whilst others openly encourage its use as part of the ‘pro-family’ arsenal against 
their opponents. In addition, leaders differ in their interpretations of how this 
impending catastrophe will impact on their movement and its relative influence in 
world affairs. Some portray the process as one that will be broadly devastating, yet 
others expect ‘demographic winter’ to usher in the eventual (ironically) 
evolutionary triumph of faith over secularism. Although ‘demographic winter’ has 
been broadly adopted in ‘pro-family’ circles, people in the movement vary as to 
their interpretations of what it means and their responses to it.  
 
An example of the more scholarly approach described above is a speech entitled 
‘World Population in the 21st Century: Last one out turn off the lights?’ given in 
1999 at the same WCF conference attended by Tatad. In this speech, ‘pro-family’ 
scholar Nicholas Eberstadt offered some demographic projections for the next one 
hundred years. In his 1999 description of what society will be like, he suggested 
that: 
‘… pervasive and prolonged sub-replacement fertility in a world of long life 
expectancy would presage a radical change in family structure along the lines of one-
child China. For the first time in the human experience, there could be societies in 
which the only biological relatives for many people would be their ancestors. With 
sufficiently low fertility for just two generations, people with blood siblings and 
cousins would become the exception. Exactly how a society would operate under 
such conditions – how, for example, children would be socialized – is difficult to 
imagine.48   
Despite this assessment, Eberstadt does not suggest that long-term fertility decline 
is necessarily disastrous; rather he warns that the process of ‘orderly global 
depopulation would require strange new adjustments.’49 Eberstadt’s prediction is an 
echo of the ‘pro-family’ fear of an increasingly individuated society, a social 
outcome which, as has already been shown, ‘pro-family’ organisations find deeply 
problematic. Rather than spell out the strange aspects of a cousin-less, sibling-less 
society with no aunts and uncles, this ‘pro-family’ demographer is content to let his 
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prediction of a childless and faithless future – the opposite of the fertile Christian 
family at the heart of the ‘pro-family’ vision – speak for him.  
 
Few ‘pro-family’ commentators are so reserved in their evaluation of ‘demographic 
winter.’ Catastrophic assessments of how ‘demographic winter’ will affect societies 
abound in ‘pro-family’ texts. Some ‘pro-family’ authors focus on economic issues 
associated with ageing societies. Some commentators see intergenerational conflict 
as likely under conditions of depopulation, and others predict tensions as increased 
immigration impacts on social stability. One even suggests the possibility that some 
international conflicts can be explained in part by low birth rates.50 While some of 
the more far-fetched ‘demographic winter’ scenarios have not been widely picked 
up in ‘pro-family’ discourse, ageing and immigration have become important issues 
in ‘pro-family’ circles. I discuss each of these before turning to ‘pro-family’ 
explanations as to why ‘demographic winter’ has occurred.  
 
‘Pro-family’ leaders stress the economic downturn they believe will be associated 
with declining fertility. As consumption decreases, say ‘pro-family’ economists, 
people in economies with shrinking populations will struggle to maintain their 
standards of living because relative to the elderly, the economically productive 
members of the population will be smaller. Economic stagnation is likely in 
Carlson’s view, ‘as the old inherit large parts of the earth.’51  
 
Population ageing is a major aspect of ‘demographic winter,’ and the one perhaps 
most immediately worrisome for government policymakers. ‘Pro-family’ activists 
have seized upon this anxiety and offer a plethora of advice to governments as to 
how they might reverse this trend by the adoption of ‘pro-family’ policies. ‘Pro-
family’ leaders promise higher birth rates through the criminalisation of abortion, 
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the reduction of tax burdens on one-income families, opposition to gay marriage 
and the promotion of home-schooling, to name a few.  
 
Promoting a book called ‘Gray Dawn’ in 1999, Ruse says that the book explains 
how ‘rapidly aging populations in the industrial countries’ will bring about ‘the 
collapse of medical and social pension systems and may eventually bring on 
intergenerational warfare.’52 Dobson also sees declining fertility in stark terms, and 
blames society’s hostility to families for what he sees as a very depressing future:   
‘The eventual result of this hostility to children and parents, as it spreads, will be a 
form of social suicide, leading to a world without springtime, regeneration, or the 
idealism of youth. Remaining will be an increasingly ageing community stumbling 
inevitably toward death and decay.’53  
Juxtaposing springtime, life and youth with winter, death and the elderly, 
‘demographic winter’ is a highly political and emotionally charged appeal to people 
of reproductive age to resist this trend and have more children. 
 
Although the elderly are routinely vilified in ‘demographic winter’ scenarios, 
euthanasia is not the answer to the ageing trap for ‘pro-family’ organisations. One 
Focus author does acknowledge the economic appeal of euthanasia, but condemns 
the practice as ‘a moral evil and societal curse’ which would not fix a country’s 
economic problems anyway.54 Because of the ‘devaluation of human life’ that this 
author sees as inherent in the practice, ‘far from solving the problem of excess 
elderly per worker, [euthanasia] introduces an undercurrent of death and fear 
throughout the country, outweighing any possible economic benefit.’55 That this 
author is willing to weigh up what he sees as an absolute ‘moral evil’ against its 
measurable ‘possible economic benefit’ is an example of a growing trend in ‘pro-
family’ discourse away from a steadfast reliance on absolute moral certainty to win 
the day. I return to this theme later in the chapter. 
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Immigration is also an inappropriate policy response to ‘demographic winter,’ say 
‘pro-family’ groups. Seeking to bolster the number of young workers to support 
their ageing populations, many industrialised countries have rapidly increased the 
numbers of immigrants they allow to settle within their national borders. A number 
of ‘pro-family’ scholars claim that Europe is losing touch with its culture as 
European governments respond to their declining birth rates with increasing 
immigration. This trend is seen as a serious problem in ‘pro-family’ discourse, with 
Europe again emphasised as a worrisome litmus test for the cultural and economic 
deterioration these groups associate with fertility decline.  
 
‘Pro-family’ intellectuals see immigration as detrimental to a nation’s identity, 
arguing that nations need sufficiently high rates of reproduction to be ‘racially and 
culturally connected’ to their histories. 56  Don Feder also makes this point, 
suggesting that as Europe takes in more and more immigrants their national 
character is changing.57 ‘Within a few decades, he argues, ‘England will no longer 
be England, and France will no longer be France… It could be ‘the Islamic 
Republic of France.’58 Feder is not alone in his efforts to capitalise on a rise in anti-
immigration sentiment in Europe: European audiences have been treated to an 
increasing number of ‘pro-family’ speeches, visits and conferences in recent years. 
Anti-immigration sentiment may also be connected to ‘pro-family’ groups’ 
opposition to globalization as a culturally homogenising force.59 That immigration 
increases the tendency towards cultural relativism may or may not be the case, but 
the appeal to national identity suggests that ‘pro-family’ leaders do seek a 
counterweight to the relativising effects of multiculturalism. 
 
Crouse sees the problem of immigration in terms of immigrants’ ‘refusal to 
assimilate’ into their new countries’ cultures. In a 2005 article attacking first world 
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feminists, she stresses the incompatibility of this feminist-inspired Western culture 
with the sensibilities of its new (non-Western) immigrants: 
‘It is ironic that the feminist leaders of advanced developed nations wish to spread 
their culture of abortion to all corners of the world; these privileged elites come from 
countries that are being so depopulated by low birth rates that they have had to 
import labor from Third World nations to keep their economies functioning. The new 
arrivals are refusing to assimilate into the decadent cultures of their host countries. In 
the end, Western culture, especially in Europe, is being threatened with extinction.’60  
In this assessment, Crouse again discusses abortion as a culture that harms 
nationhood (as she does in her 2002 article quoted earlier in the chapter), but this 
time makes an explicit connection with immigration. Crouse is not the only 
observer who sees irony in this situation: in ‘pro-family’ efforts to save ‘European 
culture’ from extinction, these organisations are trying to rescue what they 
elsewhere deride as a haven of secularism, feminism, and liberalism. That Crouse 
sees immigrants’ lack of assimilation as connected to the extinction of nationhood 
is significant, as it raises the question of whether successful integration into new 
cultures is even desirable in the ‘pro-family’ view. If Western culture were less 
offensive to its new citizens, Crouse would still be likely to reject immigration as a 
plausible policy response to population ageing. Although she appears to side with 
the ‘new arrivals’ – and hence with Islam – against Western depravity, Crouse is 
still uneasy about the situation she is describing. 
 
Crouse is not the only one siding with immigrants. Turning his focus to the US, the 
Howard Center’s Bryce Christensen’s view of new immigrants is also somewhat 
positive. After warning that the Social Security and Medicare demands of ageing 
baby-boomers will demand the influx of as many as five million new immigrants 
per year to the US,61  Christenson considers the implications of this increase in 
immigration. He considers the relatively more religious and ‘pro-family’ Mexican 
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immigrants already in the US to be a desirable addition to a country that he sees as 
drifting away from religious and traditional values. The immigration ‘problem,’ he 
writes, ‘is about us, not them.’ Had the ‘natural laws of the home economy’ not 
been flouted, Christenson writes, the US would not need immigrants to sustain its 
ageing population. 
 
Moreover, say ‘pro-family’ experts, immigration causes the removal of productive 
citizens from their homes in the developing world. In this way, ‘pro-family’ 
analysts argue that ‘demographic winter’ adds to the problems of people in 
developing countries.62 Maria Sophia Aguirre, interviewed in Demographic Winter, 
suggests that immigration is a problem for developing countries for two main 
reasons. Firstly, she suggests that the labour productivity in developing countries 
goes down as its productive citizens leave. Secondly, as the majority of workers 
who leave are men, she suggests that there is a ‘human capital’ cost, because more 
children from developing countries grow up without their fathers. Spanish 
economics professor Alban d’Entremont has this to say about the situation: 
‘It would be ironic, and it would be very unjust, that the poor countries should come 
to bail out the rich countries because the rich countries have been delinquent in doing 
their homework, in keeping up stable and strong families, and then they themselves 
would lose theirs, bailing us out.’63 
Immigration, in this view, is not just an economic issue, it is a moral one. The 
policies of delinquent governments have helped to produce fatherless, dysfunctional 
families at home, and the economic incentives they have created will produce 
fatherless families in third world countries by a different means. 
 
Not far beneath the surface, ‘demographic winter’ is an affirmation of the positive 
role of religion in society. ‘Demographic winter’ discourse is connected to the trend 
away from explicitly religious references in most ‘pro-family’ discourse. The two 
trends are linked in different ways: deductively, by conflating children and religion 
with selflessness, and contrasting these with faithlessness and materialism; 
statistically, with children being disproportionately born to people of faith; and 
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culturally, through increasing individualism and the rejection of conservative 
Christian sex morality. 
 
In a speech in 2003, Carlson makes it clear that the movement away from religion is 
the ‘key variable’ in understanding fertility decline. 64  In Carlson’s view, 
‘demographic winter’ should not really be considered as something new: it is 
simply a continuation of the Western world’s long term shift away from Christian 
morality. Where ‘responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, and sanctity of long-term 
commitments’ used to be paramount, Carlson says, society is now moving towards 
the prioritisation of ‘a militant “secular individualism” focused on the desires of the 
self.’65  
 
Fagan concurs, observing that this trend can be seen where religious and non-
religious family sizes are compared. ‘The future,’ he argues, ‘belongs to those who 
have children.’66 This point is reiterated a number of times in Demographic Winter. 
Echoing this and Crouse’s warning to Europe, Phillip Longman, a prominent 
speaker in the film, states that ‘people, who for lack of faith, don’t go forth and 
multiply, are on the road to extinction.’67  
 
HLI makes the connection between the retreat from religion and declining fertility 
quite explicit. Promoting a CD talk by HLI’s founder Paul Marx, entitled ‘The 
World Sex Mess Confirms Catholic Teaching around the World,’ HLI offers 
listeners the opportunity to   
‘travel around the world with Fr. Marx as he explains how the world’s population 
crisis—and by that I mean the declining populations of so many countries—is 
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directly linked to the world’s rejection of traditional Catholic teachings on abortion 
and birth control.’68  
Though ‘the world’ is responsible for rejecting Catholicism in this text, external 
enemies are still at large in HLI’s framework. The advertisement continues:  
‘The Church is thriving [in Africa], but forces from wealthy Western nations are 
trying to bring the culture of death to this life-loving continent by injecting it with 
contraception, abortifacients, and destructive sex education.’69 
Unlike other ‘pro-family’ organisations, HLI remains reluctant to fully translate its 
discussion of declining population into terms which see the enemy as internal to 
society, rather than external to it.  
 
This movement away from religion has spawned a number of different drivers of 
demographic winter, say ‘pro-family’ groups. Sometimes the blame for declining 
fertility is assigned to the absence of religion from government. ‘Pro-family’ 
organisations cite ‘anti-family’ economic policies, mass state education, and legal 
tolerance of homosexuality and abortion as leading causes of ‘demographic winter.’ 
At other times ‘pro-family’ leaders hold the diminishing role of religion in 
industrialised society responsible for people’s choices to limit their family size. In 
this way, ‘pro-family’ groups see the absence of a public religious culture as 
leading to ‘demographic winter’ through an increase in selfishness, individualism 
and materialism, and the diminishing status of children in society.  
 
‘Pro-family’ activists acknowledge the role that tax laws and welfare play in 
influencing the way families are formed. Over time, ‘pro-family’ scholars trace a 
movement away from an economic system that rewards the one-income family with 
many children to one that encourages two-income parents with smaller families. 
Dobson recommends that child-rearing is already ‘bone-wearying and time-
consuming work,’ so those that choose to do so should not face ‘backbreaking taxes 
and family-unfriendly policies from the government.’70 While most ‘pro-family’ 
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leaders see family formation as a natural human urge, which is not necessarily 
dependent on economic policies, they nevertheless argue that government 
incentives have a significant impact on young couples’ decisions about their 
families.  
 
In 2003, Carlson makes a similar complaint about the way that governments in 
industrialised economies disincentivise marriage and child-rearing. In his attempt to 
explain governments’ role in promoting fertility, he suggests that ‘family creation 
as an expression of religious belief’ is not sufficient to bring about a change in 
downward population trends. Being religious is not enough; the decision to start a 
family ‘also requires a favorable policy environment.’ 71  He highlights the 
importance of tax law in promoting marriage and childrearing, and offers the 
following view of transfer payments to low-income parents:   
‘The "Chicago School" also shows how state-provided welfare benefits can disrupt 
the natural economic gains of marriage. So can easier divorce, since women will only 
commit to more children and housework, and forego career advancement, if they are 
reasonably certain that their households will not dissolve.’72 
‘Pro-family’ economists concur. In his discussion of population decline during a 
discussion with Carlson and Fagan on the documentary Demographic Winter, 
economist John Mueller suggests that the best policy response to the trend (after 
criminalising abortion) is to ‘downsize transfer payments’ and institute a ‘broad 
base low rate income tax.’73  
 
Broadly agreed upon is the rejection of the ‘Swedish model.’ Though Sweden’s 
birth rate is higher than that of most European countries, it is still unsatisfactorily 
low in the view of ‘pro-family’ activists. In addition, stimuli intended to increase 
the number of Swedish children are derided as coercive and radical by ‘pro-family’ 
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intellectuals. 74  Sweden plays an interesting role in ‘pro-family’ texts as the 
antithesis of the conservative Christian development model. Despite Sweden’s 
obvious success in terms of the economic well-being of its citizens, ‘pro-family’ 
activists use Sweden as an example of how not to modernise. In terms of preventing 
‘demographic winter,’ ‘pro-family’ authority Philip Longman suggests there is ‘not 
much to say for the Swedish model.’75  ‘Pro-family’ groups portray Sweden as 
‘ultra-liberal,’76 with socialism having ‘triumphed over the home.’77 The country’s 
(as yet) unsuccessful efforts to increase its birth rate to 2.1, despite its generous 
parental leave policies, are cited by ‘pro-family’ organisations as the final nail in 
the coffin of the secular welfare state.  
 
Speaking on ‘Sweden and the Failure of European Family Policy’ in Prague, 
Carlson declares ‘that a social order that does not reproduce itself will be replaced 
by another... the Swedish model works no better than any other social welfare 
model in countering depopulation.’ 78  Part of the explanation for this, Carlson 
suggests, is because liberal economies in general create doubts in women’s minds 
as to whether they should devote their lives to raising children. Another reason for 
declining fertility rates, says Carlson, are Europe’s efforts to promote gender 
equality, which in his view are an attempt to cure a problem created by feminism 
with feminist ideas. In explaining why the US birth rate has not declined as far as 
Europe’s, Carlson suggests that Americans are ‘generally held less hostage to the 
anti-natal dogmas of pure “gender equality” than are the “Swedenized” 
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Europeans.’ 79  Sweden’s efforts to increase its birth rate – and Europe’s by 
association – are thus doomed to fail. In Carlson’s view, this is not just because 
Sweden has abandoned tradition and religion as guiding economic principles, but 
because its policy makers deny the innate differences between men and women. 
This denial, he argues, ‘can only result in violations of human nature, doing 
particular harm to existing and potential children.’80 Because its governments are 
infused with feminist sentiments and condone homosexuality and abortion, ‘pro-
family’ activists confidently predict that Sweden’s pro-natalist efforts will 
ultimately fail to prevent fertility decline. 
 
Europe is emerging as a new front line in the ‘pro-family’ battle for the ‘natural 
family.’ Instead of depicting Europe as ‘lost’ as was frequently the case in earlier 
texts, interest in ‘rescuing’ Europe from a secular and childless fate is increasingly 
common in ‘pro-family’ discourse. In a flyer for the fourth WCF in 2007, the 
Howard Center invites those who ‘believe in the family’ to attend the congress, 
stating that  
‘Europe is the battlefield and Poland is pivotal. Through demographic winter and the 
rule of an anti-family elite, Europe is almost lost to family values. The loss of Europe 
will have a devastating impact on the family in the Americas, Asia and Africa, as 
well as in international forums. Poland is a bastion of tradition, faith and family. 
WCF IV will draw pro-family advocates from across the European continent in what 
could be the beginning of a pro-family renaissance.’81  
Evoking images of war, tribulation and rebirth, the choice of Poland in 2007 (and 
indeed the Netherlands in 2009) as host countries for the WCF shows a new-found 
interest in Europe as a target for increased ‘pro-family’ activism. Europe’s 
demographic situation undoubtedly plays a part in this. Whether ‘pro-family’ 
organisations seek to use Europe as a warning, or to ‘save’ Europe from ‘extinction’ 
is not clear.82 
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‘Demographic winter’ has proved an opportunity for ‘pro-family’ activists to show 
old foes in a new and negative light. That homosexuality, contraception and 
abortion are cited by ‘pro-family’ organisations as drivers of declining fertility will 
come as no surprise to observers of the US Christian Right. What is interesting, 
however, is that ‘demographic winter’ has enabled ‘pro-family’ organisations to 
extend their criticism of practices they oppose to developed countries, such as 
Europe and Japan. ‘Look to Europe,’ suggest ‘pro-family’ organisations in their 
efforts to prevent gay marriage in the US. In the words of one Focus on the Family 
booklet: 
‘Marriage produces and raises the next generation of humanity, which every society 
needs. If you don’t believe this is a need, look at the current depopulation trends in 
much of Europe. Governments there are realizing that a dearth of childbearing 
couples raises many serious social and economic issues.’83 
Europe, generally seen as sympathetic to homosexuality in ‘pro-family’ circles, has 
only itself to blame for its low fertility rates in this author’s view.  
 
Like homosexuality, abortion is similarly targeted as a cause of declining fertility, 
and criminalisation of abortion is usually the first advice given to reverse 
‘demographic winter.’  Abortion causes ‘demographic winter’ in practical as well as 
well as cultural terms in ‘pro-family’ discourse. ‘By tolerating abortion of unborn 
children by the millions, particularly in North America, Europe and China,’ one 
Focus author writes,  
‘we have first of all eliminated a large group of young citizens who now and in the 
future could be helping to support our elderly. Second, we have instilled a “culture of 
death” that has taken us well beyond the notion of reasonably limiting family sizes, to 
becoming “anti-child” altogether.’84  
Seeing abortion as responsible for an alleged ‘anti-child’ culture of industrialised 
countries as well as driving down the overall numbers of young people, ‘pro-
family’ organisations have expanded the arguments they use to oppose the practice. 
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Another driver for fertility reduction identified by Carlson is ‘mass state education.’ 
This too is connected to the movement away from religion, say ‘pro-family’ 
activists, in that state schooling establishes state moralities in the place of traditional 
ones. Carlson sees state education as a major driver behind reduced fertility, citing a 
1982 study by demographer John Caldwell as evidence for this position. Caldwell’s 
view is that state schooling has programmed new generations of children against 
‘the old family morality,’ with the result that societies cannot maintain ‘stable high 
fertility beyond two generations of mass schooling.’ 85  As a solution to 
‘demographic winter,’ then, ‘pro-family’ policy solutions to combat ‘demographic 
winter’ (according to Patrick Fagan) are to ‘retain family control over education,’ 
and to ‘build an intellectual and organisational infrastructure that is forthrightly pro-
natalist.’86  
 
When religion is addressed in discussions of ‘demographic winter,’ such as in these 
arguments against state-schooling, abortion and homosexuality, it is discussed as an 
empirical variable, and associated with a desirable social outcome. In connecting 
‘demographic winter’ with older conservative Christian concerns, ‘pro-family’ 
groups can now depict the removal of old foes as new and statistically ‘proven’ 
policy solutions. If this seems like a sleight of hand however, it is not. As noted 
above, Carlson and his colleagues do not disguise their affection for religion as a 
public good. In his 2003 speech on world population trends, Carlson openly states 
that the other variables that might explain fertility decline are just a list of 
secondary causes deriving from the removal of religion from public life; all his 
speeches and articles on this subject identify the movement away from Christianity 
as the most crucial aspect of depopulation. This he sees as the key source of trouble 
faced in the economically developed world, and increased religious observance is 
the solution. Industrial societies’ rejection of religion is not only wrong in itself; in 
Carlson’s view, it is harming people in a measurable way.  
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One of the main reasons that the absence of religion causes ‘demographic winter,’ 
say ‘pro-family’ organisations, is that without religion as a moral guide, individuals 
become self-serving and materialistic. No longer seeking to be loving parents, ‘pro-
family’ authors suggest, couples opt out of having children because they see no 
reason to subject themselves to work that has no obvious material gratification. 
‘Pro-family’ intellectuals argue that not only do people live apart from their 
families in today’s society, their attitudes, beliefs and values have changed so 
significantly that individual successes and material wealth are now valued over 
family life. Recognising this, many ‘pro-family’ commentators suggest that changes 
to the economy and in the political sphere (the structural changes described above) 
would have been unlikely to have had such an enormous impact on family life in 
the absence of cultural changes influencing the ideologies of individuals.87 
 
These changes have been so momentous that in a discussion of how ‘pro-family’ 
advocates might reverse ‘demographic winter,’ Carlson suggests that ‘science is on 
our side… but the human heart…. culture… is no longer on our side.’88 This marks 
an important turning point away from asserting a ‘pro-family’ ‘moral majority,’ at 
least in the industrialised world. Carlson sees reality (as measured by social science 
indices) as confirming his political views, and yet diverging from most people’s 
heartfelt ideas about how the world is and should be.89 This goes some way to 
explaining the enormous effort ‘pro-family’ organisations are making to find 
evidence to support their positions outside the religious and traditional realm: they 
now see social science as their best foothold in an increasingly ‘anti-family’ public 
sphere. 
 
In a discussion of the film Demographic Winter, Carlson suggests that many of the 
issues that the documentary addresses – women working, divorce, affluence – are 
symptoms as well as causes of fertility decline. The real reason for declining 
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fertility, he suggests, is to be found in the changing world of politics and ideas.90 
Patrick Fagan concurs, and puts much of the blame for this on the world of 
academia. Universities, suggests Fagan, face a huge problem of political 
correctness, a lack of courage, and a reluctance to discuss contraceptives and 
abortion, which he sums up as a ‘huge denial’ and an ‘unwillingness to look at the 
truth.’91  
 
Similarly, Dobson also sees the source of fertility decline in the changing ideology 
and culture of industrialised societies. He suggests that the selfishness inherent in 
modern societies stops couples from having children. Acknowledging that raising 
children can be extremely difficult at the best of times, he sees the decision to have 
a child nowadays as a ‘counter-cultural’ act. In a 2007 article, Dobson states that 
‘the investment in children is the antithesis of our society’s self-centered, “me first” 
environment that so often aborts its babies or neglects its young.’92 He suggests that 
childless adults have huge economic appeal as consumers and workers, with more 
disposable income than their parenting peers. Contemporary society, his article 
suggests, tells people that children are a ‘burden and an inconvenience,’ part of a 
major shift from a society of families to one that is child-free.93  Moreover, in 
Dobson’s view, parents and children are not just disappearing from society, they are 
actively scorned as ‘breeders’ and ‘spawn’ in contemporary culture. 94  Making 
exceptions for those who cannot physically have children, Dobson takes issue with 
this culture and its ‘child-free adults,’ ultimately stating that ‘chosen childlessness 
must be named as moral rebellion.’95 He and his colleagues see children as the way 
for adults to become good people, by virtue of the way that parenthood forces other-
regarding behaviour. 
 
Dobson is not alone in his contention that the place of children in society has 
changed. Parents, families and children, say ‘pro-family’ groups, are now objects of 
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derision, and the well-being of children now takes second place to adult fulfilment. 
Kay Hymowitz, interviewed in Demographic Winter suggests that industrial 
societies tell people that ‘the happiness of adults is so much more important than 
the well-being of children.’ 96  Another interviewee, sociologist Steven Nock, 
suggests that ‘adults have an obligation to children generally.’97 Though he does not 
discuss what this means, Nock suggests that adults no longer recognise this 
obligation, and for this reason ‘things are unhappy in a general sense.’ 
 
Focus writer Glenn Stanton also takes this perspective, positing a link between 
moral decay and fertility decline. Stanton sees a waning of ‘selflessness, sacrifice 
and maturity’ and a dearth of children being born as reinforcing each other in a 
vicious circle. He is concerned that 
‘Rather than learning that healthy adulthood requires the consideration of others, 
many twenty- and thirty-somethings seem to view life as “all about me” as they 
pursue gadgets, fun, money and peer approval. This is at crosspurposes to the self-
sacrifice and commitment necessary for marriage and child-rearing.’98 
‘Pro-family’ groups reject the idea that people can be socialized well through 
relationships that exist outside of family life. Echoing Eberstadt’s consideration that 
children need aunts, uncles, cousins and siblings to be properly socialised, Fagan 
explains that children from large families learn to give.99 Again ‘pro-family’ groups 
offer family life – large family life – as the antidote to all forms of anti-social 
behaviour. 
 
HLI also offers an opinion on the link between reduced fertility and individualism.  
In a trip to Mexico, HLI’s Euteneuer criticises what he sees as selfishness in 
choosing to have smaller families, complaining that couples  
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‘opt for lifestyles that exclude or minimize children, and the practice of divorce 
becomes regularized and justified for the self-fulfilment of parents with no thought of 
its effect on children.’100 
Framing small families as a materialistic lifestyle choice, as opposed to what in 
practice is likely to incorporate a far more complicated set of values and issues, HLI 
sees the ‘contraceptive mentality’ as a package that promotes this kind of ‘Porsche 
versus pregnancy’ calculus.  Euteneuer goes on to advise his ‘pro-life’ colleagues 
that 
‘…there are always three inevitable, I would say, infallible, consequences of the 
contraceptive mentality when it permeates a society long enough-and I wish all pro-
lifers recognized these consequences as well: 
1. A precipitous lowering of the fertility rate of a country; 
2. An increase in abortion (whether legal or illegal) and the legalization of it where it 
is not yet legal; and worst of all, 
3. The formation of selfishness in a populace.’101 
Euteneuer links these consequences in a causal chain, in which the worst 
consequence – selfishness – is the social outcome of adopting secular ideas about 
sexuality and reproduction.  
 
The pursuit of money and material things is disdained in a number of different ‘pro-
family’ texts. Prosperity is understood as a correlate of low fertility both in terms of 
couple’s financial choices to delay (or forgo) childbearing, and also in terms of the 
inverse relationship between a country’s level of economic development and its 
fertility rate. This challenges the pursuit of money as a means of success, and 
deeply problematises the notion – central to the Republican Party platform – of 
personal financial responsibility. Dobson suggests that older generations should 
advise younger married couples to become parents as soon as possible, rather than 
‘waiting for all of their financial dreams and aspirations to be realized.’102 And as 
‘pro-family’ activists accept, young couples in industrialised countries today face 
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‘stark choices’ when it comes to deciding when or whether to start a family. They 
can either ‘live like kings,’ or choose to have children, which is acknowledged as a 
‘relatively tough life, economically.’103 Still, ‘pro-family’ authors consistently state 
their preference for people to have a difficult financial life and a large family, 
characterizing childless couples who seek to delay the financial hindrance of 
childrearing as greedy, idle and un-Christian.  
 
Reviewing a study on why American women remain childless in 2001, CWA 
considers the decision not to have children as a lazy one. The study’s conclusion 
acknowledges that environmental issues and career advancement have an impact on 
peoples’ decisions, but concludes that ‘most childless couples simply have no desire 
for children or do not think they would be suitable parents.’ This CWA translates as 
follows: ‘in other words, they simply can’t be bothered.’104  Again, choice and 
individual responsibility – demonstrated in this case by people’s concern that they 
would be poor parents – is given short shrift. 
 
Carlson offers us some insight as to why ‘pro-family’ intellectuals are so happy to 
move away from a focus on individual responsibility and choice in favour of 
blanket pro-natalism. He suggests that it is the social view of children that is at 
stake; personal choice has less to do with the matter than people are led to believe. 
He writes that 
‘It is important to note that the values of the new secular order, despite the rhetoric, 
do not in fact center on "freedom" and "choice."  Rather, the evidence suggests that 
those are transitional arguments, masking a new and quite negative view of 
children.’105 
Carlson sees the current ‘secular order’ as one in which children are commodified 
to some degree: they are either avoided as an economic burden or demanded to 
fulfil a lifestyle choice. Thus even the choice to have children is problematic to 
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Carlson, because it is now privately made. As he puts it: ‘those who choose to 
parent now do so “to satisfy their private needs,” rather than to meet religious, 
family, or communal obligations.’106 He bemoans a society in which childrearing is 
merely the realisation of a consumption preference: ‘some people have poodle dogs, 
others have children,’ as he puts it. 107  Having reproductive choice, rather than 
making all pregnancies ‘wanted,’ is seen as part of a general anti-child worldview.  
 
Those ‘pro-family’ authors who discuss reproductive choice in this way see it as a 
running counter to ‘pro-family’ ideas about the role of God in conception. As 
Dobson puts it, ‘lifestyle childlessness... is a wilful rejection of God’s procreative 
purpose for marriage.’108 The choice to have children, or not to have them, becomes 
a self-referential exercise that has nothing to do with God. In Carlson’s words, 
fertility is now in the domain of the ‘individual’s secular conscience.’109 Perhaps 
most importantly, reproductive choice is part of an increasingly common relativistic 
value set that ‘pro-family’ groups find intolerable. ‘Pro-family’ intellectuals posit 
that in conferring couples (or women) the choice to have children or not, altruism is 
no longer possible: parents do not have the ability to sacrifice their own happiness 
for that of their families, because such a sacrifice only makes sense outside the 
context of choice. Carlson suggests that societies are moving away from the values 
‘long affirmed by Christian teaching... responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, and [the] 
sanctity of long-term commitments... and toward a militant secular 
individualism.’ 110  ‘Demographic winter,’ in this light, is just a depressing by-
product of this shift. Not surprisingly, Carlson sees the key ‘pro-family’ response to 
‘demographic winter’ as cultural rather than economic or political. He calls for the 
launching of ‘a counter-revolution in values, which welcomes children under the 
banner of the natural family.’111  
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Part II: Tensions 
 ‘Demographic winter’ is an idea that has been broadly picked up by ‘pro-family’ 
activists and has enormous potential to broaden the movement’s appeal. Many 
countries in the industrialised world are indeed experiencing a ‘birth dearth,’ which 
in conjunction with faltering economies makes them ripe with potential for a well-
organised pro-natalist, ‘traditionalist’ movement. 112  In this context, it is 
unsurprising that US ‘pro-family’ organisations seek to fill that role. Yet 
‘demographic winter’ brings to light a number of tensions between competing ‘pro-
family’ views of the world. I highlight three.  
 
To prosper or not to prosper, that is the question 
Within the framework of ‘demographic winter’ sits the premise that affluence and 
family size are inversely related. This connection is made in a number of ways. 
Statistically, ‘pro-family’ social scientists measure income against fertility at the 
level of individual families, and in cross-country comparisons, and find that a 
negative relationship is produced in most cases. Others note the tough economic 
futures faced by young couples, and empathise to some degree with the enormity of 
the consequences of the decisions that they have to make. The relationship is also 
explained in terms of social norms in modern societies: the industrial world, ‘pro-
family’ intellectuals claim, is actively ‘anti-child.’ Weyrich, in writing that life is 
about more than the acquisition of ‘more stuff,’ puts a distinctly anti-materialistic 
spin on this.  
 
Yet on the other hand, ‘demographic winter’ is an appeal to maintain economic 
well-being through consumption. As Harry S. Dent reminds us, it is consumption 
that drives the earnings of companies. ‘Demographic winter’ scenarios rely on a 
crashing economy, produced by the combination of an ageing population with a 
sharp decline in consumption. More babies are required not just as a work force, but 
as a cohort of consumers to avoid the prolonged stagnation of the economy as baby-
boomers retire. If people are not afraid of this economic forecast, ‘demographic 
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winter’ loses a lot of its sting. Just as ‘pro-family’ groups are starting to suggest that 
capitalism needs to be restrained so that it better tends to the needs of families, they 
are also relying on the consumption appetite of the next generation to save it. Do 
‘pro-family’ organisations want young people to prosper and consume in a 
materialistic manner, or do they want young people to have a ‘relatively tough life’?  
 
As we have seen with other ‘pro-family’ issues, ‘demographic winter’ turns 
development on its head. The global South is now used by proponents of 
‘demographic winter’ to cast light on the problems of the West. Affluence as a goal 
of development is called into question. Yet there is little evidence that ‘pro-family’ 
groups are rhetorically moving away from advocacy for flat taxes and free trade, 
with economic growth as a major overall goal. Rather these economic policies are 
supported because of their supposedly beneficial impact on increasing the size of 
families. Families, I suggest, are the basis of ‘the new conservatism’ as advocated 
by Weyrich and others.113 ‘Natural families’ and fertility trump affluence as the 
primary goal of ‘pro-family’ development policy. 
 
Explaining facts with morals: ends-means issues  
Just as feminists struggled with their population-minded allies, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations are likely to run into problems as they pursue fertility under the name 
of staving off a ‘demographic winter.’ Feminists who sought to remedy human 
rights issues that did not fit with the macro-level agenda of their allies, such as 
treating fistulae and infertility in the developing world, found funding hard to come 
by. In the same way, it seems likely that if ‘pro-family’ organisations pursue the 
goal of higher fertility levels they may well succeed, but higher birth rates will not 
be delivered solely by ‘natural families.’ Similarly, huge families of atheists, 
socialists or liberals are unlikely to bring about the ‘demographic springtime’ 
desired by leaders of the ‘pro-family’ movement.  
 
‘Pro-family’ emphasis on fertility, though it struggles to retain a positivist 
framework, consistently leads to advocacy for the containment of sexuality within 
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marriage. This is despite the acknowledgement that out-of-wedlock births do 
significantly alleviate the ‘birth dearth’ in the industrialised world. In this way, the 
message of ‘demographic winter’ is constantly blurred: ‘pro-family’ 
environmentalist arguments about carbon footprints ‘prove’ that divorce is bad for 
the environment, but does this really say anything about fertility? It seems more 
likely that ‘demographic winter’ is a kind of umbrella phrase under which any 
regression analysis that associates the ‘natural family’ with a positive social 
outcome can be promoted.  
 
Ultimately, arguments that utilise demographic and economic statistics are really 
about fighting normative trends to which ‘pro-family’ organisations morally object. 
As feminists and others before them have found, demographic facts cannot be made 
to support absolute moral positions. What will ‘pro-family’ groups do with high 
fertility that is not a result of maritally contained sex?  
 
‘Pro-family’ environmentalism? 
Sympathetic to those at the height of the ‘population boom’ who felt that it was not 
responsible to have a large family, some recent ‘pro-family’ discourse 
acknowledges that there is indeed a limit to the population that the Earth can sustain. 
This marks a shift for a movement that on the whole remains wary of 
environmentalism. In arguing that countries with lower birth-rates are the world’s 
largest polluters, ‘pro-family’ organisations are starting to adopt a stance that brings 
stewardship of the environment into the ‘pro-family’ framework. In adding up 
‘carbon footprints,’ ‘pro-family’ groups give some measure of credence to this form 
of environmentalism.  
 
As has been shown in previous chapters, however, the ‘pro-family’ movement is 
suspicious, and even in some cases nauseated by environmentalist attitudes. 
Environmentalism is still seen as a coercive means of extending the reach of 
governments and international institutions in many ‘pro-family’ texts. Moreover, it 
is decidedly contaminated by association with the Left.  Nevertheless, this fledgling 
‘pro-family environmentalism may be another way in which the ‘pro-family’ 
movement is able to ‘integrate new ideas’ into its agenda (as Butler puts it). But so 
far, this new concern with the environment is just another part of the ‘pro-family’ 
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toolkit; that its use works in spite of the general flow of ‘pro-family’ politics as a 
whole may not be particularly important. 
 
If the ‘faithless’ die out – so what? 
‘Pro-family’ activists are enormously confident that ‘people of faith’ will survive 
‘demographic winter.’ Moreover, ‘real demographers,’ as ‘pro-family’ activists put 
it, have always known what is going on, and have disagreed with ‘population 
controllers’ and fought against their efforts to make people have fewer children.114 
Given that ‘pro-family’ groups are hopeful about the potential of people of faith to 
inherit the Earth, how do they justify this warning – ostensibly directed to a secular 
audience – that a ‘demographic winter’ is looming? Why not keep quiet about it? 
 
‘Demographic winter’ is likely to be seen by ‘pro-family’ activists as a means of 
entering new political arenas, declaring a commonsense solution to a problem that 
other political actors are unwilling to identify. Targeting Europe makes sense here, 
because its low birth-rate and high levels of immigration mean that the ‘problem’ is 
broadly acknowledged. Europe, once considered a lost cause in ‘pro-family’ circles, 
is now the recipient of ‘pro-family’ attempts to save it from extinction. Yet this 
rescue mission is bound to be a tricky one. Entering the immigration debate leaves 
‘pro-family’ organisations open to accusations of racism, and the inherent 
nationalism implied in ‘pro-family’ solutions to ‘demographic winter’ may not be in 
harmony with other aspects of the movement’s global activism. Balancing (at least 
rhetorical) concern for the people of the developing world whilst exploiting the 
racist fears of the West will be a difficult task for the ‘pro-family’ movement. 
 
If people of faith are going to inherit the Earth, broadcasting the message of 
‘demographic winter’ in a secular manner might have the effect of preventing or 
reducing this inheritance. One answer to this is that ‘demographic winter’ may be 
an outlet for the evangelical inclinations of the ‘pro-family’ movement. If the 
population of the world is threatened, Christians have a role to play in proselytising 
the non-religious (and childless) people of the world. In this case, they are called to 
spread the gospel of the ‘natural family.’ The secularism of the medium in this case 
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just reflects the efforts of its proponents to reach as many people as they possibly 
can. Another possibility is that the ‘pro-family’ movement has become so deeply 
involved in changing social norms that so long as people’s behaviour conforms to 
the ‘pro-family’ ideal, their religious status is of secondary importance. 
 
In this way, ‘demographic winter’ raises a broader question about the role of 
religion in ‘pro-family’ activism. Can ‘pro-family’ activists continue to diminish the 
importance of religion into a mere ‘variable’ that hinders or helps family life? Or 
will ‘pro-family’ activists feel the need to acknowledge their religion as being of 
paramount importance – just as human rights are to feminist NGOs – pervading all 
aspects of life regardless of its effects on macroeconomic and demographic 
outcomes? This question may be of interest to future observers of the ‘pro-family’ 
movement. 
 
Conclusion 
‘Pro-family’ discourse around fertility is changing. Where they had previously 
focused much of their international advocacy against ‘population controllers,’ ‘pro-
family’ organisations now see fertility decline as an issue that is connected to 
changes inherent in the process of secular modernisation. In other words, where 
fertility decline was once considered a result of malevolent forces external to 
societies, ‘pro-family’ groups are now more likely to frame their arguments in terms 
of an impending ‘demographic winter,’ the result of ‘anti-family’ cultural changes 
which influence people’s decisions to have smaller families, or to forgo family life 
altogether.  
 
‘Pro-family’ interest in fertility, which was previously focussed on the people of the 
global South, now also encompasses ‘pro-family’ concerns about the West. The 
new focus on Europe may mark a significant shift for a movement which initially 
globalized – at least rhetorically – in defence of the Southern poor. This indicates 
that the movement may be seeking to move beyond development politics and into 
the broader realm of international and domestic social and economic policy-making.  
 
‘Pro-family’ groups now highlight a number of different reasons for declining 
fertility, many of which revolve around what their leaders see as the ‘anti-family’ 
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economic, social and cultural environments of developed countries. Other ‘pro-
family’ intellectuals link declining fertility directly to the removal of religion from 
public life in developed countries. ‘Population controllers’ are still at large in the 
view of many ‘pro-family’ activists, but they are no longer the main focus of ‘pro-
family’ actors interested in population issues. 
 
This changing emphasis emerges in a number of different ways. For example, 
where ‘pro-family’ organisations have tended to oppose the supply of 
contraceptives and condoms to the developing world, they are increasingly placing 
themselves in opposition to what they see as the cultural messages associated with 
industrial capitalism. These messages, they suggest, are loaded with individualism, 
and bring selfishness and ultimately, unhappiness to the countries they ‘infect.’ 
Another example of this changing emphasis is in ‘pro-family’ organisations’ 
increasing recognition that it is now normal to want to limit the size of one’s family, 
rather than making the claim that it is coercive ‘population controllers’ and 
governments that are responsible for declining fertility. ‘Pro-family’ efforts are now 
focused on changing people’s attitudes about larger families, and recasting old 
enemies – abortion, contraception, homosexuality, feminism and socialism – not 
just as problems in themselves, but as contributors to ‘demographic winter.’ 
 
Towards the end of their chapter on population policy and Christian Right activism, 
Buss and Herman observe that debates about population have led the Christian 
Right to adopt a ‘pro-development’ agenda, in the sense that they now compete 
with feminists in their claim to speak on behalf of women. In doing so, ‘pro-family’ 
organisations (to some extent) forgo their suspicion of international development. 
Thus Buss and Herman pose the following question: can the new ‘development-
friendly’ approach of ‘pro-family’ organisations be reconciled with the Christian 
Right’s ‘long-standing and often vehement objection to international measures as 
amounting to governmental interference in the free operation of the market and 
undermining US independence?’115 They suggest that the answer is probably no.  
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My findings suggest that the ‘pro-family’ movement may have found a way to get 
around this conflict. In defending the rights of people in developing countries to 
have large ‘strong’ families, free from the interference of secular development 
models, these organisations claim to speak on behalf of the people of the 
developing world even as they suggest that poverty alleviation is not the answer (as 
their models show, the accumulation of wealth is in opposition to the accumulation 
of children). Advocacy for increasing family size in the West can be framed as 
reducing the future burden on the families of the South, as their men will no longer 
be encouraged to migrate for work at better wages in rich foreign lands. Families in 
the South are glorified as young, strong and fertile, and juxtaposed with those in 
rich countries which are small and old.  
 
Time and again we see the ‘pro-family’ movement adapt to new political 
requirements and use new tools to advance their cause. Demography, once an 
instrument of environmentalists and progressives, is now wielded with fierce 
determination by ‘pro-family’ advocates of the ‘natural family.’ Racism, a charge 
once used to sideline the predominantly white Christian Right, is now being turned 
back on progressives. Progressives are culpable, say ‘pro-family’ groups, because in 
their support for population control and abortion they have coerced and targeted 
disadvantaged ethnic groups.  
 
Environmentalism is another example of this adaptation. Buss and Herman suggest 
that phrases such as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘caring for the Earth’ are seen 
by ‘pro-family’ groups as globalist ambitions; a part of ‘the UN’s hidden agenda for 
ideological control.’116 Though their analysis may be true of earlier ‘pro-family’ 
discourse (and especially that of the domestic Christian Right), this chapter has 
shown that though the organisations remain sceptical of environmentalism, a 
budding ‘pro-family’ version in support of the ‘natural family’ is emerging.  
 
In all of this change, then, what can be said about the global future of the ‘pro-
family’ movement? Can the ‘pro-family’ movement continue to garner support 
from the global South as it challenges some of the more broadly accepted ideas 
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about development? If it is successful in doing so, how will this affect the 
movement’s domestic base? How much accommodation to new ideas can ‘pro-
family’ organisations manage before the cracks start to show? These are the 
questions I consider in the conclusion to this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
 
Though they no longer enjoy the patronage of a president sympathetic to their 
views, the global activism of ‘pro-family’ organisations shows no signs of abating. 
A sixth World Congress of Families is scheduled for 2011, and new conservative, 
‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-family’ organisations continue to register for NGO accreditation 
at the UN.1 This may reflect an overall burgeoning in civil society participation at 
the UN in general, but it also shows an increasing interest on the part of US ‘pro-
family’ organisations in political participation beyond their homeland. 
 
This participation is sustained by the earnest commitment of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations to prevent progressive norms about sexuality and reproduction from 
being further established as dominant models, both in the development arena and 
beyond it. In their global endeavours to save the unborn and maintain the social 
value of chastity, modesty and ‘traditional’ understandings of gender, ‘pro-family’ 
groups have created a global network of likeminded activists, a ready source of 
inspiration to maintain the movement as it struggles to pursue its agenda. Over time, 
this agenda has changed to suit the political milieu, growing in sophistication, 
funding and intellectual depth. This thesis has attempted to capture the ideological 
views of the ‘pro-family’ movement, and show some of the important ways that 
their discourse has shifted as they have established and continue to maintain a 
global presence.  
 
In terms of their views on globalization and how the world is changing because of 
the phenomenon, ‘pro-family’ groups now tend not to depict ‘globalists’ and a ‘new 
world order’ as the forces behind global change. They still oppose globalization as a 
homogenising force, but for the reason that in its present form it is secular, 
individualistic and relativising, rather than because they perceive that a set of 
powerful people are orchestrating global change for the purpose of achieving 
totalitarian outcomes. Totalitarian outcomes may occur, in this altered ‘pro-family’ 
view, but this will be a result of unrestrained liberal capitalism racing to forget 
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religion, ‘traditional morality,’ and the importance of family life. The role of ‘pro-
family’ organisations in this view is thus not just to represent these things in the 
global public realm; it is also to preserve them in human memory. In this way, we 
can see that the threat of annihilation is still present in the ‘pro-family’ political 
world, but the agents of chaos are beginning to be depicted as aspects of modern 
culture itself, rather than in the form of would-be evildoers at large in the world. 
Yet this may not be such a large shift, as the elites targeted by ‘pro-family’ 
organisations earlier in their activism were the focus of ‘pro-family’ ire precisely 
because they espoused and encouraged liberal and individualistic ideas about how 
the social world should be organised.  
 
However it is framed, anti-individualism is most certainly emerging as a key 
component of ‘pro-family’ discourse (as evident in the theme of the Amsterdam 
WCF conference: ‘the family: more than the sum of the parts’). With this new 
perspective, ‘pro-family’ activists are both better-off and worse off. They are better 
equipped to bring about the outcomes they desire, because they are tackling the root 
causes of the political changes they do not like, and they will find many like-
minded people from beyond the limits of US Christian conservatism to join their 
cause. But in staking their claims against the individualistic culture of modernity 
itself, ‘pro-family’ groups will be obliged to address the new tensions and 
contradictions within their worldview. 
 
Despite the enormous task they have set themselves – a worldwide ‘pro-family’ 
reversal of modern values – ‘pro-family activists seem content to work towards 
long-term change. In their tireless organising and prolific publishing, Carlson, 
Crouse, Dobson, Euteneuer and their allies often give the impression that they are 
already riding a wave of ‘pro-family’ euphoria that cannot help but spread across 
the globe. Though they scramble to oppose globalization, ‘pro-family’ groups 
continue to embrace certain universal principles and strengthen their global 
network. ‘Pro-family’ organisations also enthusiastically participate in the global 
propagation of norms and ideas, even while they oppose the interference of their 
opponent’s ideas as violating the sovereignty of other nations. In their actions and 
proposed policy positions, ‘pro-family’ groups accept, take advantage of, and can 
even be said to advance a form of globalization. 
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In 1994, Peter Beyer made the following prediction:  
‘... if particular cultures are to survive in altered form in the modern global context, 
the religious traditions associated with them will also survive, but not without 
themselves facing the serious challenge of the relativised context. Given that 
religions deal with absolutes, this adjustment should result in significant crises within 
those traditions.’2  
Beyer’s insistence on the incompatibility between the relativism wrought by 
globalization and the universalism of religion guides observers of emerging global 
religions to seek out this struggle in the discourse of the religious movements they 
examine. My research suggests a new response or episode in the adjustment of 
religious communities to modernity and globalization. Many religious people have 
reacted to globalization in the same way, have found in its challenges more 
commonalities than differences with each other, and have paradoxically confirmed 
(at least in their own eyes) that their views are, after all, ‘universal.’  
 
Thus if globalization is a crisis for conservative religious groups, it has also been an 
opportunity. This global ‘pro-family’ network may be the result of many particular 
crises, in which different groups rise to face similar challenges to their way of life; 
as Butler suggests, rather than challenging it, globalization may have caused (and 
may in fact be strengthening) the ‘pro-family’ movement. In terms of the survival 
of certain religious traditions referred to by Beyer, we can see that a number of 
tenets historically associated with the ‘pro-family’ movement have indeed survived 
the process of globalization. The Christian Right suspicion of international 
institutions still remains, though altered, and fear of extinction has been smoothly 
transferred to the global context. Opposition to abortion, and to a lesser extent, 
homosexuality, still dominate the political agenda of these organisations.  
 
Yet much has changed. The ‘pro-family’ view of the UN, an organisation cast for a 
time as the force majeure behind the impending enslavement of the world’s people, 
now more often than not is spoken of with a kind of cautious familiarity in ‘pro-
family’ parlance, reflecting a decade and a half of investment in the institution. 
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Though they are still largely dissatisfied with most of its outcomes, ‘pro-family’ 
activists now see themselves as belonging to the democratic process that goes on at 
the UN. Their integration may, in time, be considered an enormous achievement of 
the UN civil society process. 
 
Inclusion, though, has its costs for the ‘pro-family’ movement. Buss and Herman 
ask whether ‘pro-family’ groups actually want to pull the UN back from its slide 
into ‘anti-family chaos,’ given that Christian Right activism there goes some way to 
legitimising an organisation that is seen as a key threat to the ‘natural family.’3 The 
research in this thesis suggests that if ‘pro-family’ groups were ambivalent about 
their role at the UN, their certainty about their presence there is increasing. 
Carlson’s steady repetition of Article 16, Ruse’s desire to form a permanent ‘pro-
family’ bloc at the General Assembly, and Crouse’s dedication to ‘fixing’ the UN 
show a movement that is now dedicated to rescuing this organisation with an 
injection of ‘pro-family’ values and zeal. Thus the UN is seldom considered an evil 
entity in recent ‘pro-family’ pronouncements; it is seen as a legitimate institution, 
although with a number of problems, which is worth saving. 
 
As expected, association with the UN has had an important effect on the discourse 
of ‘pro-family’ organisations. HLI stands out among the organisations under 
scrutiny in this thesis not only because of the peculiar take it has on the world, but 
also because of the venom in the language it uses. HLI does not have the same 
reason to modify its language or behaviour in the way that its ‘pro-family’ allies do, 
because it has no UN accreditation to lose. Moreover, it is likely that by speaking in 
the way it does, HLI has developed a niche audience of supporters and donors who 
appreciate the organisation’s combative vernacular.  
 
In addition, though they do not say so outright, it is likely that the UN now also 
functions as a bastion for the defence of nationhood in the ‘pro-family’ world view. 
This is somewhat ironic, because it was not long ago that the UN was considered to 
be a major ‘globalist’ threat to the very idea of nationhood. Though the 
organisations condemn what they see as attempts by the UN to violate national 
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Politics, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 79. 
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sovereignty, they surely prefer it to the prospect of a globalizing world without the 
UN. For without the UN to represent, justify and reify nations, globalization as 
understood by ‘pro-family’ organisations would probably be even more socially 
destabilizing than it already is. Torn between enduring social chaos or supporting a 
forum they once depicted as the forefront of a new ‘anti-family’ order, ‘pro-family’ 
groups, it would seem, have decided to err on the side of order and maintain their 
presence at the UN. 
 
Similarly altered is the ‘pro-family’ view of feminism. Both feminism and the UN 
are now seen as noble causes that have been hijacked by totalitarians and ‘radicals,’ 
and both are seen as potentially beneficial forces in the ‘pro-family’ battle for the 
future. As noted by a number of different scholars, ‘pro-family’ leaders no longer 
oppose all feminism as immoral, rather they oppose a certain type of feminism that 
they see as rampant in the development arena. ‘Radical’ feminists, once seen as the 
smokescreen for totalitarian elements in the UN, are now frequently depicted as part 
of a hijacked tradition, a righteous idea infiltrated and corrupted by liberal and 
secular forces. Feminism is still seen as dangerous, but this is because of its 
association with the set of ideas that make modern culture selfish and 
individualistic, not because feminists are attempting to bring about a ‘new world 
order.’   
 
Certainly the fight to represent the true needs of poor women is still being waged by 
‘pro-family’ forces and their progressive counterparts, but ‘pro-family’ 
organisations increasingly depict the efforts of their feminist opponents as a feature 
of secularism and liberalism. In this framework, if it were not misinformed by these 
ideologies, the feminist impulse would in fact be ‘pro-family,’ rather than a distinct 
fifth column. Feminism, in recent ‘pro-family’ discourse, occupies an odd position. 
Though they are not really given the full share of blame or credit for the ‘anti-
family’ aspects of modern society, the issues raised by ‘pro-family’ activists are still 
all about feminist issues: sexual and reproductive health, homosexuality, and 
women’s rights and empowerment. ‘Pro-family’ leaders seek to sideline feminists, 
even as they directly address and argue against feminist ideas. 
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In this way, ‘pro-family’ groups do not address feminism as a cause of 
‘demographic winter’ as such, rather they highlight social changes associated with 
feminism – the sexual revolution, and access to divorce and contraception – as 
reasons for declining fertility. ‘Demographic winter’ is the chief example of the 
new modus operandi of the ‘pro-family’ movement: a collection of regression 
analyses that finally ‘prove’ that the ‘natural family’ is the way to achieve better 
social outcomes. This approach has potential in its appeal to policymakers, but also 
compromises the movement. One major issue is that family life and religion 
become means to socially prescribed ends, an idea which is bound to raise concern 
for a movement that is suspicious of central planning and ideological control, be it 
through governments or the UN.  
 
Another issue with the recent efforts of ‘pro-family’ activists to use social science 
research is that they run the risk of blurring the agenda of the movement. As ‘pro-
family’ experts on ‘demographic winter’ acknowledge, retaining higher birth rates 
may mean encouraging everyone to have more children, wed or unwed. Just as 
feminists discovered decades ago, targeting fertility does not always bring about 
desired outcomes. Moreover, if the assumption that large families make honest, 
generous and well-socialised people (as discussed in the previous chapter) is 
broadly accepted in the movement, the emphasis on the containment of sex within 
marriage may be compromised. The social role of marriage is the lynchpin of most 
‘pro-family’ arguments that purport to ‘defend’ the married state.  
 
‘Demographic winter’ discourse justifies and necessitates the turning of ‘pro-
family’ activists attention to Europe, a major shift for a movement that had 
previously relied on taking the moral high ground in defence of poor families in the 
South to legitimise its global activism. Though ‘pro-family’ groups do still 
articulate their activities as defending the victims of Western governments and 
institutions (especially women), their interest in Europe marks an attempt to move 
their politics beyond the development arena, as noted in chapter six. It seems likely 
that ‘pro-family’ activists will continue to exploit Europe’s demographic ‘crisis’ for 
as long as they can, because the continent is so politically threatening to the ‘pro-
family’ movement. By denying its Christian heritage, secular Europe also calls into 
question the core religiosity of the US. Also, as Butler suggests, as a ‘super-
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government,’ the EU threatens to disseminate its ‘nihilist values’ to the rest of the 
world.4 Similarly, the new ‘pro-family’ approaches to the UN and feminism also 
show the extent to which political concerns are guiding this discourse. The 
movement could no more maintain its outright hostility to the UN than it could 
continue to frame development as a problem of paganism. Likewise, feminists will 
no longer be depicted as the smokescreen for a ‘new world order’ if their threat is 
diminished in the ‘pro-family’ political world. Though they may never again be 
seen by ‘pro-family’ activists as powerful agents of change, however, it is likely 
that feminists will always be a part of ‘pro-family’ discourse, ensconced as they are 
in the issues against which the movement rallies. 
 
As in the past, ‘pro-family’ groups see themselves as trying to hold back dangerous 
new trends. In this way, they portray themselves as steering global norms ‘back’: 
back to the original intentions of the founders of the UN; ‘back’ to valuing the 
‘natural’ morality of families in developing countries; ‘back’ to a time when culture 
and traditions were respected in the industrialised world. Though there is some 
evidence that they are increasingly aware of the new issues faced by families of the 
South – the absence of fathers in the developing world due to labour migration, for 
example – the movement is still a deeply nostalgic one. Yet for a global movement 
that seeks to inspire sweeping global ‘pro-family’ change, is this focus on arresting 
and reversing progress a good fit? Do they want to go forward to a ‘demographic 
springtime’ or back to a time before ‘development’ began to occur? 
 
The changes highlighted in this thesis suggest that ‘pro-family’ involvement in 
development is more about bringing attention to the problems of the West than 
about advocating for meaningful change for people in the global South. In this 
sense, unless the ‘pro-family’ movement starts to address the glaring poverty, 
environmental decay and lack of human security faced by families in the South, it is 
in grave danger of being seen as pursuing a wholly self-serving endeavour.  
 
Yet perhaps judging the ‘pro-family’ movement by such progressive criteria is to 
miss the point of its political activism. ‘Pro-family’ progress would like to see 
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poverty alleviated and democratic protections enjoyed across the globe, but without 
what they see as the institutionalised selfishness which has been a part of modern 
capitalist development in the West. The ‘pro-family’ blueprint for development 
would temper market fundamentalism with religion and ‘family values,’ and if 
Dobson and Carlson’s views were to prevail, with the institutionalisation of a tax 
system that favoured large, single-income ‘natural’ families. 
 
In working towards this ideal, ‘pro-family’ groups are likely to continue to appeal 
to religion as the cure for ‘anti-family’ political change, and large families as the 
antidote for individualism. The nexus of orthodox religion and idealised family life 
will remain the core ideals for the movement, with abortion and homosexuality 
framed as both the wilful rejection of these principles and as forces that threaten to 
damage people already following the ‘pro-family’ path. The change that the 
research in this thesis suggests is that ‘pro-family’ appeals will be made against 
modern ideas and culture rather than entities and people. The ‘friend-foe’ way of 
thinking endures, but in an altered form. Expect to see more ‘pro-family’ arguments 
couched in regression analyses: crime, health indices, wealth, and other indicators 
of social stability will all be marshalled to support ‘pro-family’ development policy. 
Cogent arguments explaining these correlations in terms of materialism, self-
gratification and secular values – and their ‘opposites,’ self-sacrifice, discipline and 
Christian principles – will be advanced as justifications and acclamations for the 
influence of the ‘pro-family’ movement in policymaking.  
 
Overall observations 
If Buss and Herman are correct in their suggestion that the Christian Right have 
globalized in order to mainstream their political movement, then this research 
suggests that they have been largely successful in that endeavour. ‘Pro-family’ 
discourse has changed significantly since these organisations became active in the 
international arena. Concern with globalism and a rising ‘new world order’ in ‘pro-
family’ discourse’ has transformed into more social science based criticism about 
the effects of modernity on family life. The movement away from evil entities in 
‘pro-family’ discourse has allowed the movement to be far more appealing to those 
who do not share its legacy of conspiracy theories and suspicion. The incorporation 
of empirical material to support their positions is an also an important way in which 
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‘pro-family’ groups are demanding to be taken seriously by people all over the 
political spectrum. 
 
As they get more involved in international politics, ‘pro-family’ groups are getting 
more specific about the aspects of development of which they disapprove. Since the 
1990s, ‘pro-family’ groups have incorporated aspects of feminism into their 
political ideology, have gone from opposing the UN as an entity to seeing it as a 
forum which they can use to bring about meaningful change. This is also an aspect 
of mainstreaming, and is likely to happen more, rather than less, as the groups tone 
down their righteous anger in order to be taken seriously by their political peers.  
 
Yet the way the ‘pro-family’ movement is changing as a result of its global 
endeavours problematises the very idea of ‘mainstream’ politics. Under the tutelage 
of Christian Right academics and think-tank researchers, the ‘pro-family’ view of 
the world can be considered both more and less mainstream. Being more 
conventional in its appeal to a wider set of people in that its politics (now framed in 
terms of protecting the family from the excesses of modernity rather than from 
unseen but nefarious global nemeses) means that the movement can no longer be 
written off as a far-right religious cult with a conspirational bent. On the other hand, 
the ‘pro-family’ movement is remains critical of some widely held ideas and norms. 
In the light of the 21st century, Dobson’s position on ‘wilful’ childlessness as moral 
rebellion, and Carlson’s opposition to economic materialism are relatively 
revolutionary ideas. This is acknowledged by some of the more thoughtful ‘pro-
family’ intellectuals; as Carlson laments, the human heart is no longer ‘pro-family.’ 
Moreover, ‘pro-family’ organisations now see a role for themselves in a far wider 
range of political roles: in the attempt to ‘mainstream’ the ‘pro-family’ agenda into 
areas beyond its original scope, such as health, immigration, economics, and 
increasingly, academia, ‘pro-family’ activists are showing that they seek to totally 
transform the way people think about their world. Again, Carlson recognises and 
embraces this revolutionary sentiment in his suggestion that the world needs a 
‘counter-revolution’ in values. 
 
Ten years ago, few would have guessed that the spark for this ‘pro-family’ counter-
revolution might be sought in ‘secular, childless’ Europe. Yet the focus on this 
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continent has been intensifying for some time, and has stimulated sufficient 
European interest in the ‘pro-family’ cause to justify continued activism there. The 
focus on Europe is also likely to contribute to the increased secularisation of ‘pro-
family’ arguments, as the groups change their discourse to suit a European 
audience. In some ways, this complicates Butler, Jenkins and Brouwer, Gifford and 
Rose’s forecast that the conservative Christian centre of gravity is moving South. If 
these authors are correct in this prediction, the unwillingness of ‘pro-family’ 
organisations to relinquish Europe (and the secular, industrialised world in general) 
splits the ‘pro-family’ movement from this southwards trend. That ‘pro-family’ 
organisations have found allies in European countries and acted promptly to 
strengthen these alliances to ‘save’ Europe speaks to the wider literature on the 
Christian Right: it shows both the importance of the emergence of ‘pro-family’ 
statisticians and demographers (providers of what Buss and Herman refer to as 
‘expert discourse’) and the significance of international alliance building – friends, 
not just foes – in directing the activism of this movement. Future examinations of 
the global activism of Christian Right ‘pro-family’ organisations would do well to 
further examine this finding. 
 
Buss and Herman, among others, have suggested that the Christian Right view the 
world outside the US as a hostile place. My research shows that while this has been 
a characterisation of ‘pro-family’ thought in the not too distant past, it is no longer 
the case. ‘Pro-family’ groups now perceive that their future political role lies 
beyond the US, a realm they now depict as relatively receptive to their message. As 
an explanation for this change, I suggest that the organisations’ movement into the 
global realm – their policy achievements and beneficial alliances – has 
fundamentally changed their view of the world beyond the US.  
 
In The Battle for God, Karen Armstrong writes that American Protestants in the 
1970s 
‘felt alienated from modern secular culture but their leaders at least enjoyed 
prosperity and success. This would later prove to be one of their problems. Despite 
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their conviction that they were outsiders, Protestant fundamentalists were very much 
at home in America.’5  
This, I suggest, has largely been true of the ‘pro-family’ experience of the global 
realm as well. Though they relished their hated status at the UN and took pleasure 
in portraying themselves as a small but courageous force fighting the onslaught of 
feminists, globalists and the like, ‘pro-family’ leaders can no longer claim to be 
fighting the good fight alone in a wholly hostile environment. This, I suggest, is 
because they have taken advantage of globalization and enjoyed considerable 
success in the global realm, especially compared to their achievements 
domestically. Moreover, ‘pro-family’ groups now claim to represent the ‘natural 
families’ of the world, defending what they see as an innocent majority from the 
corrupting norms and practices of modern secular culture. 
 
Part of what the families of the developing world need to be protected from is 
capitalism itself, although this is far from established in ‘pro-family’ circles. 
Distrustful of corporations and increasingly scornful of the drive to consume, a 
number of ‘pro-family’ leaders now stress the importance of ‘fixing’ capitalism in 
order to make it encourage marriage and family formation, and discourage avarice 
and egotism. In addition, affluence has been questioned as an objective of 
development and public policy, given its highly negative impact on fertility. 
 
In this sense, Butler and Petchesky’s concern, that the culture wars distract the 
public’s attention from an economic agenda that is harmful to the vast majority of 
the world’s people, may in time become apparent to ‘pro-family’ organisations.6 
Many in the ‘pro-family’ movement are aware of the uglier aspects of unrestrained 
global capitalism. Joint activism with left wing opponents of global capitalism is 
not without precedent, as witnessed in Seattle in 1999. However, as it stands, ‘pro-
family’ organisations still impede the transfer of funds to the developed world, 
attaching so much more attention to condoms, contraception and homosexuality 
than suffering and poverty that it seems highly unlikely that they will more closely 
ally their agenda with their ideological opponents in the near future. Moreover, 
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though they may agree with progressives that there is a problem with capitalism, it 
is difficult to think of any kind of economic solutions on which both sides might 
actually support. Though some ‘pro-family’ leaders are growing increasingly vocal 
in their opposition to unbridled capitalism in the name of protecting ‘the family,’ 
this remains a very tentative adjustment in ‘pro-family’ discourse. 
 
It is unlikely that any new and critical consideration of capitalism would have been 
raised and sustained in ‘pro-family’ discourse without the intellectual impact of 
Allan Carlson on the movement. Carlson, the force behind the WCF, has arguably 
been the key figure bringing about the changes in the ‘pro-family’ movement that 
this thesis has documented, especially in its shift away from suspicion and 
vehement antipathy. Carlson is the chief instigator of the term ‘natural family,’ with 
which he has largely shaped the agenda of the ‘pro-family’ movement. He is the co-
author of the Natural Family Manifesto, in which he seeks to guide ‘pro-family’ 
activism to some degree.  
 
In his efforts, Carlson has broadened the appeal of the international Christian Right 
beyond a narrowly reactive politics opposing abortion and population control, to 
include a number of different issues faced by people in many different parts of the 
world. Though the ‘pro-family’ movement is still a largely reactionary one, 
Carlson’s emphasis on the ‘natural family’ has been crucial to the movement 
towards criticism of norms and ideas that question ‘traditional morality’ and 
endanger the kinds of families he seeks to protect. 
 
This discursive trend away from agents of evil goes some way to confirming one of 
Beyer’s key ideas in his understanding of how religions must change as they 
globalize: 
 ‘the effort on the part of many people in the world nevertheless to preserve, stabilize, 
and (re)create particular identities … constantly runs counter to this tendency of the 
global system to relativise them. The resulting conflict, in this case, is then not so 
much against rival cultures and identities, although people may formulate it as such, 
as against the corrosiveness of the system itself.’7  
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Under Carlson’s leadership, the ‘pro-family’ movement is indeed beginning to 
comprehend that it is the absence of their religious principles from the global realm 
– rather than ‘radical’ feminists, liberals or globalists – which is behind the changes 
they so desperately seek to reverse. Though ‘pro-family’ groups have laid the blame 
for devaluing families and motherhood on their progressive opponents, their real 
complaint is that social norms have become so distorted that ‘natural families’ – 
robust entities that have existed for millennia – must now be defended at all. 
 
In this context, ‘anti-family’ agents would not have made any progress without an 
ideological structure that allowed their ideas to flourish and take hold as global 
norms. Globalization, in its current form, is providing that structure. Some ‘pro-
family’ leaders are beginning to acknowledge this. To revise Steve Bruce’s words, 
in the new ‘pro-family’ discourse, bad things happen not so much because bad 
people want them to happen, but because bad ideas are so appealing and corrupting, 
and there is no global moral system to arrest their advance. 
 
Buss and Herman’s suggestion that millennialism is important in the makeup of 
Christian Right ideology has been borne out to some degree in this research. 
Though the emphasis on globalists has changed, there is evidence that some ‘pro-
family’ groups still hold on to the idea that powerful and evil forces remain at large 
in the global realm. That they are now ideological rather than demonic 
organisations and people may not be a particularly important shift. Millennialism 
does persist as an aspect of the way the ‘pro-family’ movement looks to the future. 
Discourse around Demographic Winter is a case in point; the documentary is a 
curious blend of statistics set to an apocalyptic narrative: the millennium is coming, 
and here are some measurements to estimate when it might occur. A sophisticated 
‘rapture index,’ if you will. Proponents of ‘demographic winter’ allude to a broad 
ranging plan to decimate the world’s population, concocted by a set of global elites. 
In addition, the presence of a number of Christians – or in Demographic Winter 
terms ‘real demographers’ – who ‘see what is really happening’ and attempt to 
expose it to the public, is (consciously or otherwise) lifted out of the apocalyptic 
narratives of Christian Right prophetic literature and given a statistical gloss. 
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Another way of framing this ‘pro-family’ view of the future is that it may not be 
millennialism that is driving ‘pro-family’ activists, so much as fear of annihilation. 
Karen Armstrong warns her readers not to underestimate the impact of dread and 
anxiety in motivating religious groups to defend their way of life against secular 
humanism. ‘The desire to define doctrines, erect barriers, establish borders,’ she 
suggests, are ‘rooted in fear.’8 In this context, ‘demographic winter’ is a plea to 
maintain the ‘pro-family’ way of life against the onslaught of secular modernity, 
which has evicted Christianity and family values from Europe and much of the 
industrialised world, and threatens to do the same everywhere else.  
 
Hence it remains difficult to measure how important second coming beliefs are in 
the ‘pro-family’ view of the world. They are a part of the discourse, but they are 
conspicuously absent from the surface. Given the emphasis that this thesis has 
placed on the language of ‘pro-family’ representations of the world, perhaps greater 
sensitivity to ‘pro-family’ narratives ‘between the lines’ might have uncovered 
more underlying apocalyptic sentiments. Yet the absence of clear apocalyptic 
discourse may reflect the growing successes that the ‘pro-family’ movement has 
enjoyed under the Bush Administration: as their perceptions of their strength and 
potential have increased, so their millennial narratives have faded into the 
background. Should these groups face a major setback, we may once again see 
unconcealed references to end times on the rise. 
 
The relationship between global ‘pro-family’ activists and the grassroots Christian 
Right movement remains an interesting question. My focus on elites as leaders of 
the movement does not allow me to assess what effect the changes in the global 
‘pro-family’ movement have had, if any, on their domestic base. These 
organisations may have significant autonomy, but they are not ‘free-floating’ 
entities. Thus the relationship between the globally active ‘pro-family’ movement 
and the Christian Right as a whole is an area in which future researchers can 
uncover interesting shifts and important tensions. 
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Though the internet has been the source of my ‘pro-family’ texts, how much the 
internet is having an impact on the political evolution of ‘pro-family’ groups 
remains unknown. In solely focussing on materials published through the internet, it 
is possible that this research has overlooked some vital aspects of ‘pro-family’ 
activism. My analysis has not sought to explore the ways in which the internet itself 
is impacting on the way that social movements define and present themselves. 
Other researchers might consider how the medium itself moderates or intensifies 
‘pro-family’ discourse, and the way in which it affects efforts to create a global 
‘pro-family’ network.9  
 
What has been undertaken in this thesis is a detailed analysis of ‘pro-family’ texts 
from 1997 to 2008. I have extended Buss and Herman’s 2003 examination of the 
ideological underpinnings of ‘pro-family’ activism, confirming some of their 
findings and demurring on others. I have shown how the discourse of this 
movement has changed in the relatively short period covered in my timeframe. I 
have analysed an example of ‘pro-family’ ‘expert discourse’ in my chapter on 
‘demographic winter’ and shown the way that it conforms with the general ‘pro-
family’ trend identified in my other research chapters, that ‘pro-family’ ideology is 
moving away from suspicion of powerful elites in the global realm and towards a 
full-scale condemnation of the values they see as inherent in the culture of secular 
modernity. The tensions involved in taking the movement in this direction have 
been analysed in each research chapter. This kind of research could be usefully 
applied to other kinds of social movements, for example, the left-wing anti-
globalization movement. 
 
Further research must examine how the global ‘pro-family’ network fares in the 
post-Bush context; in this endeavour, the ideas produced at ‘Amsterdam 2009’ 
would make an excellent starting point. Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang theory 
might prove useful in analysing whether ‘pro-family’ organisations are keen to 
maintain their international role in order to bring pressure to bear on the Obama 
Administration. Given that there is little evidence of a slowdown in the global 
activism of the movement, the increasingly favourable ‘pro-family’ view of the 
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political world outside the US makes for an interesting dynamic for observers of 
Christian Right politics in general. Another question for future observers of this 
movement is to consider how globally active ‘pro-family’ women combine their 
new brand of feminism with their global activism: how does the religious, powerful, 
‘pro-life’ woman balance the expectations of conservatives from outside the US? 
Do they reject secular norms about equality in their global activism? Will ‘pro-
family’ women promote a form of women’s empowerment with their conservative 
Islamic sisters?  
 
Lastly, many gay people, liberals, and feminists agree with the ‘pro-family’ view 
that the ‘me’ culture inherent in modern consumption-driven economies, and its 
associated promiscuity and general obsession with sex, are indeed vulgar aspects of 
modern life. Research is required into the ways that ‘pro-family’ discourse deals 
with the adoption of positions with which its political opponents have some 
sympathy, even as its leaders lay the blame for the increase in this behaviour on the 
shoulders of these same opponents. 
 
Concluding remarks 
‘Pro-family’ discourse may be changing in all of the ways described above, but it 
still does not address the suffering of the people it now purports to be protecting 
from modern secular culture. ‘Pro-family’ organisations’ still keenly oppose 
condoms, contraceptives and abortion, and their position that funding for these 
should be redirected towards the ‘real needs’ of women belies the fact that they still 
broadly oppose the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor. Even on their own 
terms, there is a disconnect between their stated concern for the ‘real’ needs of 
women in developing countries and their willingness to concretely address these 
needs. The reason for this disconnect is that the body of a needy third world woman 
remains a symbol for ‘pro-family’ organisations, highly invested with meaning, but 
not a real living body in need of sustenance and security. Despite their new pro-
development approach, it is still the case that ‘pro-family rhetoric and religious 
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morality,’ as Petchesky and Judd argued a decade ago, are ‘synonymous with the 
eradication of social welfare programmes for the poor.’10 
 
As long as ‘pro-family’ organisations maintain their focus on opposing abortion and 
containing sex within heterosexual marriage, they are unlikely to make much of a 
difference in the lives of women in the global South, who are already largely living 
under those social norms. ‘Pro-family’ activism, in this sense, just detracts from 
efforts to improve the quality of health services in poor countries and ignores the 
plight of abused women and girls in deference to religion, ‘tradition,’ and the 
‘family.’ Insofar as ‘pro-family’ organisations are developing a critical vision of the 
developed world, the reflection of this vision on the South now glorifies poverty 
and praises the absence of women’s reproductive autonomy. 
 
Nevertheless, distracting and destructive as their activism may be, ‘pro-family’ 
groups do highlight some important issues about the way we live. For conservative 
men and women who want to raise their children according to the norms of their 
parents and grandparents, globalization and the liberal ideas it spreads represent a 
multifaceted threat to their families and their way of life. New ideas about sexuality 
and reproduction do have a profound impact on families and communities, and not 
only on their size. Sexual and reproductive rights and the empowerment of women 
have complicated social consequences that must be acknowledged and managed.  
 
Thus while it is tempting to hope that the changes in ‘pro-family’ discourse 
documented in this thesis – such as their opposition to consumerism and 
materialism, and their commitment to the world’s families – might  lead to genuine 
practical compassion towards those suffering under poverty, this is very unlikely. 
‘Pro-family’ anxieties will not be overcome by the simple assertion that the 
enjoyment of sexual and reproductive health is a human right, nor will it be 
assuaged by measurements of improving human development indices or even by the 
prevention of disease, disability and death. Even in the face of such a depressing 
lack of development, the ‘pro-family’ movement will remain to remind whoever 
will listen that things are not as they should be in the West, either. 
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